On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets
Colini-Baldeschi R, Leonardi S, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. 2015. On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 4(1), 2.
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Journal Article
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Author
Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo;
Leonardi, Stefano;
Henzinger, MonikaISTA ;
Starnberger, Martin
Abstract
We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned to a bidder is bounded.
We show the following results: (1) We give the first mechanism for multiple keywords, where click-through rates differ among slots. Our mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational in expectation, and Pareto optimal. (2) We study the combinatorial setting, where each bidder is only interested in a subset of the keywords. We give an incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanism for identical click-through rates. (3) We give an impossibility result for incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanisms for bidders with diminishing marginal valuations.
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Publishing Year
Date Published
2015-12-05
Journal Title
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Volume
4
Issue
1
Article Number
2
ISSN
eISSN
IST-REx-ID
Cite this
Colini-Baldeschi R, Leonardi S, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2015;4(1). doi:10.1145/2818357
Colini-Baldeschi, R., Leonardi, S., Henzinger, M. H., & Starnberger, M. (2015). On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/2818357
Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo, Stefano Leonardi, Monika H Henzinger, and Martin Starnberger. “On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets.” ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1145/2818357.
R. Colini-Baldeschi, S. Leonardi, M. H. Henzinger, and M. Starnberger, “On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets,” ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 4, no. 1. Association for Computing Machinery, 2015.
Colini-Baldeschi R, Leonardi S, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. 2015. On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 4(1), 2.
Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo, et al. “On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets.” ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 4, no. 1, 2, Association for Computing Machinery, 2015, doi:10.1145/2818357.
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