On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets - Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo; Leonardi, Stefano; Henzinger, Monika H; Starnberger, Martin (ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2015)
We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned to a bidder is bounded. We show the following results: (1) We give the first mechanism for multiple keywords, where click-through rates differ among slots. Our mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational in expectation, and Pareto optimal. (2) We study the combinatorial setting, where each bidder is only interested in a subset of the keywords. We give an incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanism for identical click-through rates. (3) We give an impossibility result for incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto-optimal, and deterministic mechanisms for bidders with diminishing marginal valuations.
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Keywords: article; Algorithms -- Economics -- Clinching ascending auction -- auctions with budgets -- Sponsored search auctions