{"article_processing_charge":"No","date_created":"2020-08-26T12:32:10Z","month":"07","citation":{"ista":"Stewart A, Kokoris Kogias E. GRANDPA: A Byzantine finality gadget. arXiv, 2007.01560.","chicago":"Stewart, Alistair, and Eleftherios Kokoris Kogias. “GRANDPA: A Byzantine Finality Gadget.” <i>ArXiv</i>, n.d.","apa":"Stewart, A., &#38; Kokoris Kogias, E. (n.d.). GRANDPA: A Byzantine finality gadget. <i>arXiv</i>.","short":"A. Stewart, E. Kokoris Kogias, ArXiv (n.d.).","ama":"Stewart A, Kokoris Kogias E. GRANDPA: A Byzantine finality gadget. <i>arXiv</i>.","mla":"Stewart, Alistair, and Eleftherios Kokoris Kogias. “GRANDPA: A Byzantine Finality Gadget.” <i>ArXiv</i>, 2007.01560.","ieee":"A. Stewart and E. Kokoris Kogias, “GRANDPA: A Byzantine finality gadget,” <i>arXiv</i>. ."},"day":"03","external_id":{"arxiv":["2007.01560"]},"status":"public","year":"2020","oa":1,"date_published":"2020-07-03T00:00:00Z","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","type":"preprint","extern":"1","date_updated":"2021-01-12T08:18:02Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"GRANDPA: A Byzantine finality gadget","author":[{"last_name":"Stewart","first_name":"Alistair","full_name":"Stewart, Alistair"},{"full_name":"Kokoris Kogias, Eleftherios","first_name":"Eleftherios","last_name":"Kokoris Kogias","id":"f5983044-d7ef-11ea-ac6d-fd1430a26d30"}],"main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.01560"}],"_id":"8307","article_number":"2007.01560","oa_version":"Preprint","abstract":[{"text":"Classic Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols forfeit liveness in the face of asynchrony in order to preserve safety, whereas most deployed blockchain protocols forfeit safety in order to remain live. In this work, we achieve the best of both worlds by proposing a novel abstractions called the finality gadget. A finality gadget allows for transactions to always optimistically commit but informs the clients that these transactions might be unsafe. As a result, a blockchain can execute transactions optimistically and only commit them after they have been sufficiently and provably audited. In\r\nthis work, we formally model the finality gadget abstraction, prove that it is impossible to solve it deterministically in full asynchrony (even though it is stronger than consensus) and provide a partially synchronous protocol which is currently securing a major blockchain. This way we show that the protocol designer can decouple safety and liveness in order to speed up recovery from failures. We believe that there can be other types of finality gadgets that provide weaker safety (e.g., probabilistic) in order to gain more efficiency and this can depend on the probability that the network is not in synchrony.","lang":"eng"}],"publication":"arXiv","publication_status":"submitted"}