{"day":"10","type":"conference","file":[{"checksum":"8557c17a8c2586d06ebfe62d934f5c5f","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","access_level":"open_access","creator":"system","file_name":"IST-2016-686-v1+1_059.pdf","date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:46:06Z","file_id":"5074","file_size":372292,"date_created":"2018-12-12T10:14:23Z"}],"date_updated":"2021-01-12T07:42:22Z","tmp":{"image":"/images/cc_by.png","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)","short":"CC BY (4.0)","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode"},"month":"03","date_published":"2012-03-10T00:00:00Z","publication_status":"published","abstract":[{"text":"Traditionally, symmetric-key message authentication codes (MACs) are easily built from pseudorandom functions (PRFs). In this work we propose a wide variety of other approaches to building efficient MACs, without going through a PRF first. In particular, unlike deterministic PRF-based MACs, where each message has a unique valid tag, we give a number of probabilistic MAC constructions from various other primitives/assumptions. Our main results are summarized as follows: We show several new probabilistic MAC constructions from a variety of general assumptions, including CCA-secure encryption, Hash Proof Systems and key-homomorphic weak PRFs. By instantiating these frameworks under concrete number theoretic assumptions, we get several schemes which are more efficient than just using a state-of-the-art PRF instantiation under the corresponding assumption. For probabilistic MACs, unlike deterministic ones, unforgeability against a chosen message attack (uf-cma ) alone does not imply security if the adversary can additionally make verification queries (uf-cmva ). We give an efficient generic transformation from any uf-cma secure MAC which is &quot;message-hiding&quot; into a uf-cmva secure MAC. This resolves the main open problem of Kiltz et al. from Eurocrypt'11; By using our transformation on their constructions, we get the first efficient MACs from the LPN assumption. While all our new MAC constructions immediately give efficient actively secure, two-round symmetric-key identification schemes, we also show a very simple, three-round actively secure identification protocol from any weak PRF. In particular, the resulting protocol is much more efficient than the trivial approach of building a regular PRF from a weak PRF. © 2012 International Association for Cryptologic Research.","lang":"eng"}],"department":[{"_id":"KrPi"}],"date_created":"2018-12-11T12:02:27Z","user_id":"3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","oa_version":"Submitted Version","oa":1,"publisher":"Springer","status":"public","quality_controlled":"1","title":"Message authentication, revisited","alternative_title":["LNCS"],"has_accepted_license":"1","author":[{"full_name":"Dodis, Yevgeniy","last_name":"Dodis","first_name":"Yevgeniy"},{"first_name":"Krzysztof Z","last_name":"Pietrzak","id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z","orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654"},{"full_name":"Kiltz, Eike","first_name":"Eike","last_name":"Kiltz"},{"full_name":"Wichs, Daniel","last_name":"Wichs","first_name":"Daniel"}],"page":"355 - 374","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22","conference":{"location":"Cambridge, UK","end_date":"2012-04-19","start_date":"2012-04-15","name":"EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques"},"citation":{"short":"Y. Dodis, K.Z. Pietrzak, E. Kiltz, D. Wichs, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 355–374.","ista":"Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. 2012. Message authentication, revisited. EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, LNCS, vol. 7237, 355–374.","chicago":"Dodis, Yevgeniy, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, Eike Kiltz, and Daniel Wichs. “Message Authentication, Revisited,” 7237:355–74. Springer, 2012. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>.","apa":"Dodis, Y., Pietrzak, K. Z., Kiltz, E., &#38; Wichs, D. (2012). Message authentication, revisited (Vol. 7237, pp. 355–374). Presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Cambridge, UK: Springer. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>","ama":"Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. Message authentication, revisited. In: Vol 7237. Springer; 2012:355-374. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22\">10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>","ieee":"Y. Dodis, K. Z. Pietrzak, E. Kiltz, and D. Wichs, “Message authentication, revisited,” presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Cambridge, UK, 2012, vol. 7237, pp. 355–374.","mla":"Dodis, Yevgeniy, et al. <i>Message Authentication, Revisited</i>. Vol. 7237, Springer, 2012, pp. 355–74, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22\">10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>."},"ec_funded":1,"_id":"3282","pubrep_id":"686","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publist_id":"3364","volume":7237,"intvolume":"      7237","year":"2012","acknowledgement":"Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC)","file_date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:46:06Z","project":[{"call_identifier":"FP7","grant_number":"259668","name":"Provable Security for Physical Cryptography","_id":"258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425"}],"ddc":["000","004"]}