{"acknowledgement":"Part of this work is supported by the Commission of the European Communities through the IST program under contract IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT.","month":"07","date_created":"2018-12-11T12:02:04Z","citation":{"ama":"Pietrzak KZ. A tight bound for EMAC. In: Vol 4052. Springer; 2006:168-179. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_15\">10.1007/11787006_15</a>","mla":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. <i>A Tight Bound for EMAC</i>. Vol. 4052, Springer, 2006, pp. 168–79, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_15\">10.1007/11787006_15</a>.","short":"K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2006, pp. 168–179.","ieee":"K. Z. Pietrzak, “A tight bound for EMAC,” presented at the ICALP: Automata, Languages and Programming, 2006, vol. 4052, pp. 168–179.","chicago":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. “A Tight Bound for EMAC,” 4052:168–79. Springer, 2006. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_15\">https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_15</a>.","ista":"Pietrzak KZ. 2006. A tight bound for EMAC. ICALP: Automata, Languages and Programming, LNCS, vol. 4052, 168–179.","apa":"Pietrzak, K. Z. (2006). A tight bound for EMAC (Vol. 4052, pp. 168–179). Presented at the ICALP: Automata, Languages and Programming, Springer. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_15\">https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_15</a>"},"day":"28","status":"public","publisher":"Springer","year":"2006","page":"168 - 179","date_published":"2006-07-28T00:00:00Z","extern":1,"type":"conference","date_updated":"2021-01-12T07:41:52Z","publist_id":"3463","volume":4052,"intvolume":"      4052","quality_controlled":0,"alternative_title":["LNCS"],"title":"A tight bound for EMAC","_id":"3216","conference":{"name":"ICALP: Automata, Languages and Programming"},"doi":"10.1007/11787006_15","author":[{"orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654","full_name":"Krzysztof Pietrzak","first_name":"Krzysztof Z","id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Pietrzak"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We prove a new upper bound on the advantage of any adversary for distinguishing the encrypted CBC-MAC (EMAC) based on random permutations from a random function. Our proof uses techniques recently introduced in [BPR05], which again were inspired by [DGH + 04].\nThe bound we prove is tight — in the sense that it matches the advantage of known attacks up to a constant factor — for a wide range of the parameters: let n denote the block-size, q the number of queries the adversary is allowed to make and ℓ an upper bound on the length (i.e. number of blocks) of the messages, then for ℓ ≤ 2 n/8 and q≥ł2 the advantage is in the order of q 2/2 n (and in particular independent of ℓ). This improves on the previous bound of q 2ℓΘ(1/ln ln ℓ)/2 n from [BPR05] and matches the trivial attack (which thus is basically optimal) where one simply asks random queries until a collision is found."}],"publication_status":"published"}