{"publisher":"Nature Publishing Group","year":"2018","article_type":"original","ec_funded":1,"day":"28","date_published":"2018-05-28T00:00:00Z","scopus_import":"1","quality_controlled":"1","title":"The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds","oa_version":"Submitted Version","publist_id":"7588","file":[{"file_name":"2018_NatureHumanBeh_Hoffman.pdf","relation":"main_file","access_level":"open_access","checksum":"32efaf06a597495c184df91b3fbb19c0","date_created":"2019-11-19T08:17:23Z","date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:45:54Z","file_id":"7051","creator":"dernst","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":194734}],"intvolume":"         2","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"project":[{"grant_number":"291734","_id":"25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","name":"International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme","call_identifier":"FP7"}],"status":"public","page":"397 - 404","external_id":{"isi":["000435551300009"]},"user_id":"c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1","ddc":["000"],"oa":1,"file_date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:45:54Z","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"acknowledgement":"This work was supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation and by the Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-16-1-2914 (M.A.N.). C.H. acknowledges generous support from the ISTFELLOW programme and by the Schrödinger scholarship of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) J3475.","article_processing_charge":"No","citation":{"ieee":"M. Hoffman, C. Hilbe, and M. Nowak, “The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds,” <i>Nature Human Behaviour</i>, vol. 2. Nature Publishing Group, pp. 397–404, 2018.","short":"M. Hoffman, C. Hilbe, M. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 2 (2018) 397–404.","ama":"Hoffman M, Hilbe C, Nowak M. The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds. <i>Nature Human Behaviour</i>. 2018;2:397-404. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z\">10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z</a>","mla":"Hoffman, Moshe, et al. “The Signal-Burying Game Can Explain Why We Obscure Positive Traits and Good Deeds.” <i>Nature Human Behaviour</i>, vol. 2, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 397–404, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z\">10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z</a>.","apa":"Hoffman, M., Hilbe, C., &#38; Nowak, M. (2018). The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds. <i>Nature Human Behaviour</i>. Nature Publishing Group. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z\">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z</a>","chicago":"Hoffman, Moshe, Christian Hilbe, and Martin Nowak. “The Signal-Burying Game Can Explain Why We Obscure Positive Traits and Good Deeds.” <i>Nature Human Behaviour</i>. Nature Publishing Group, 2018. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z\">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z</a>.","ista":"Hoffman M, Hilbe C, Nowak M. 2018. The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds. Nature Human Behaviour. 2, 397–404."},"month":"05","date_created":"2018-12-11T11:45:39Z","_id":"293","doi":"10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z","author":[{"last_name":"Hoffman","first_name":"Moshe","full_name":"Hoffman, Moshe"},{"last_name":"Hilbe","id":"2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Hilbe, Christian","first_name":"Christian","orcid":"0000-0001-5116-955X"},{"full_name":"Nowak, Martin","first_name":"Martin","last_name":"Nowak"}],"related_material":{"link":[{"description":"News on IST Homepage","url":"https://ist.ac.at/en/news/the-logic-of-modesty-why-it-pays-to-be-humble/","relation":"press_release"}]},"publication_status":"published","publication":"Nature Human Behaviour","abstract":[{"text":"People sometimes make their admirable deeds and accomplishments hard to spot, such as by giving anonymously or avoiding bragging. Such ‘buried’ signals are hard to reconcile with standard models of signalling or indirect reciprocity, which motivate costly pro-social behaviour by reputational gains. To explain these phenomena, we design a simple game theory model, which we call the signal-burying game. This game has the feature that senders can bury their signal by deliberately reducing the probability of the signal being observed. If the signal is observed, however, it is identified as having been buried. We show under which conditions buried signals can be maintained, using static equilibrium concepts and calculations of the evolutionary dynamics. We apply our analysis to shed light on a number of otherwise puzzling social phenomena, including modesty, anonymous donations, subtlety in art and fashion, and overeagerness.","lang":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2023-09-19T10:12:03Z","volume":2,"has_accepted_license":"1","type":"journal_article","isi":1}