{"article_processing_charge":"No","citation":{"ieee":"P. Dütting, M. H. Henzinger, and M. Starnberger, “Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions,” in <i>9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics</i>, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2013, vol. 8289, pp. 146–159.","short":"P. Dütting, M.H. Henzinger, M. Starnberger, in:, 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, Springer Nature, 2013, pp. 146–159.","mla":"Dütting, Paul, et al. “Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions.” <i>9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics</i>, vol. 8289, Springer Nature, 2013, pp. 146–159, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13\">10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13</a>.","ama":"Dütting P, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions. In: <i>9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics</i>. Vol 8289. Springer Nature; 2013:146–159. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13\">10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13</a>","apa":"Dütting, P., Henzinger, M. H., &#38; Starnberger, M. (2013). Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions. In <i>9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics</i> (Vol. 8289, pp. 146–159). Cambridge, MA, USA: Springer Nature. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13</a>","ista":"Dütting P, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. 2013. Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions. 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics. WINE: International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, LNCS, vol. 8289, 146–159.","chicago":"Dütting, Paul, Monika H Henzinger, and Martin Starnberger. “Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions.” In <i>9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics</i>, 8289:146–159. Springer Nature, 2013. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13</a>."},"month":"12","date_created":"2022-08-11T11:05:14Z","status":"public","page":"146–159","external_id":{"arxiv":["1310.3153"]},"user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","oa":1,"date_updated":"2023-02-13T11:20:42Z","volume":8289,"extern":"1","type":"conference","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["9783642450457"],"issn":["1611-3349"]},"_id":"11791","author":[{"full_name":"Dütting, Paul","first_name":"Paul","last_name":"Dütting"},{"full_name":"Henzinger, Monika H","first_name":"Monika H","orcid":"0000-0002-5008-6530","last_name":"Henzinger","id":"540c9bbd-f2de-11ec-812d-d04a5be85630"},{"first_name":"Martin","full_name":"Starnberger, Martin","last_name":"Starnberger"}],"doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13","conference":{"name":"WINE: International Conference on Web and Internet Economics","location":"Cambridge, MA, USA","end_date":"2013-12-14","start_date":"2013-12-01"},"alternative_title":["LNCS"],"publication":"9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics","publication_status":"published","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently. We prove improved upper bounds on the welfare loss for restrictions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to non-additive bids. These bounds show that the welfare loss increases in expressiveness. All our bounds apply to equilibrium concepts that can be computed in polynomial time as well as to learning outcomes."}],"publisher":"Springer Nature","year":"2013","day":"01","date_published":"2013-12-01T00:00:00Z","intvolume":"      8289","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.3153","open_access":"1"}],"quality_controlled":"1","scopus_import":"1","title":"Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions","oa_version":"Preprint"}