{"status":"public","title":"Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions","quality_controlled":"1","scopus_import":"1","publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery","date_created":"2022-07-27T11:46:46Z","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","oa_version":"Preprint","oa":1,"main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.3153"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions, the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. For many valuation spaces, computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently. We prove improved upper bounds on the welfare loss for restrictions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to non-additive bids. These bounds show that increased expressiveness can give rise to additional equilibria of poorer efficiency."}],"issue":"2","extern":"1","date_published":"2018-05-01T00:00:00Z","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-09-09T12:04:42Z","month":"05","article_processing_charge":"No","day":"01","type":"journal_article","keyword":["Theory of computation","Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design","Applied computing","Economics","Simplified mechanisms","Combinatorial auctions with item bidding","Price of anarchy"],"year":"2018","volume":6,"intvolume":"         6","article_number":"5","_id":"11667","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"article_type":"original","citation":{"ama":"Dütting P, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions. <i>ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation</i>. 2018;6(2). doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3232860\">10.1145/3232860</a>","ista":"Dütting P, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. 2018. Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 6(2), 5.","chicago":"Dütting, Paul, Monika H Henzinger, and Martin Starnberger. “Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions.” <i>ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation</i>. Association for Computing Machinery, 2018. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3232860\">https://doi.org/10.1145/3232860</a>.","apa":"Dütting, P., Henzinger, M. H., &#38; Starnberger, M. (2018). Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions. <i>ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation</i>. Association for Computing Machinery. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3232860\">https://doi.org/10.1145/3232860</a>","short":"P. Dütting, M.H. Henzinger, M. Starnberger, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 6 (2018).","mla":"Dütting, Paul, et al. “Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions.” <i>ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation</i>, vol. 6, no. 2, 5, Association for Computing Machinery, 2018, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3232860\">10.1145/3232860</a>.","ieee":"P. Dütting, M. H. Henzinger, and M. Starnberger, “Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions,” <i>ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation</i>, vol. 6, no. 2. Association for Computing Machinery, 2018."},"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2167-8375"],"eissn":["2167-8383"]},"external_id":{"arxiv":["1310.3153"]},"publication":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","author":[{"last_name":"Dütting","first_name":"Paul","full_name":"Dütting, Paul"},{"orcid":"0000-0002-5008-6530","id":"540c9bbd-f2de-11ec-812d-d04a5be85630","full_name":"Henzinger, Monika H","last_name":"Henzinger","first_name":"Monika H"},{"last_name":"Starnberger","first_name":"Martin","full_name":"Starnberger, Martin"}],"doi":"10.1145/3232860"}