---
_id: '2974'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We construct a perfectly binding string commitment scheme whose security
    is based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption, or equivalently,
    the hardness of decoding random linear codes. Our scheme not only allows for a
    simple and efficient zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for committed values (essentially
    a Σ-protocol), but also for such proofs showing any kind of relation amongst committed
    values, i.e. proving that messages m_0,...,m_u, are such that m_0=C(m_1,...,m_u)
    for any circuit C.\r\n\r\nTo get soundness which is exponentially small in a security
    parameter t, and when the zero-knowledge property relies on the LPN problem with
    secrets of length l, our 3 round protocol has communication complexity O(t|C|l
    log(l)) and computational complexity of O(t|C|l) bit operations. The hidden constants
    are small, and the computation consists mostly of computing inner products of
    bit-vectors."
acknowledgement: "We are grateful to Petros Mol for helpful discussions on the reduction
  for the hardness of the xLPN problem.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Abhishek
  full_name: Jain, Abhishek
  last_name: Jain
- first_name: Stephan
  full_name: Krenn, Stephan
  id: 329FCCF0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Krenn
  orcid: 0000-0003-2835-9093
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Aris
  full_name: Tentes, Aris
  last_name: Tentes
citation:
  ama: 'Jain A, Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. Commitments and efficient zero knowledge
    proofs from learning parity with noise. In: Wang X, Sako K, eds. Vol 7658. Springer;
    2012:663-680. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40">10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40</a>'
  apa: 'Jain, A., Krenn, S., Pietrzak, K. Z., &#38; Tentes, A. (2012). Commitments
    and efficient zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise. In X. Wang
    &#38; K. Sako (Eds.) (Vol. 7658, pp. 663–680). Presented at the ASIACRYPT: Theory
    and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Beijing, China: Springer.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40</a>'
  chicago: Jain, Abhishek, Stephan Krenn, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Aris Tentes. “Commitments
    and Efficient Zero Knowledge Proofs from Learning Parity with Noise.” edited by
    Xiaoyun Wang and Kazue Sako, 7658:663–80. Springer, 2012. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40</a>.
  ieee: 'A. Jain, S. Krenn, K. Z. Pietrzak, and A. Tentes, “Commitments and efficient
    zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise,” presented at the ASIACRYPT:
    Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Beijing, China,
    2012, vol. 7658, pp. 663–680.'
  ista: 'Jain A, Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. 2012. Commitments and efficient zero
    knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise. ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application
    of Cryptology and Information Security, LNCS, vol. 7658, 663–680.'
  mla: Jain, Abhishek, et al. <i>Commitments and Efficient Zero Knowledge Proofs from
    Learning Parity with Noise</i>. Edited by Xiaoyun Wang and Kazue Sako, vol. 7658,
    Springer, 2012, pp. 663–80, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40">10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40</a>.
  short: A. Jain, S. Krenn, K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Tentes, in:, X. Wang, K. Sako (Eds.),
    Springer, 2012, pp. 663–680.
conference:
  end_date: 2012-12-06
  location: Beijing, China
  name: 'ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security'
  start_date: 2012-12-02
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:00:38Z
date_published: 2012-12-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T07:40:11Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '004'
- '005'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40
ec_funded: 1
editor:
- first_name: Xiaoyun
  full_name: Wang, Xiaoyun
  last_name: Wang
- first_name: Kazue
  full_name: Sako, Kazue
  last_name: Sako
file:
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: ab879537385efc4cb4203e7ef0fea17b
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: system
  date_created: 2018-12-12T10:14:00Z
  date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:58Z
  file_id: '5048'
  file_name: IST-2016-721-v1+1_513.pdf
  file_size: 482570
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:58Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '      7658'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '12'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 663 - 680
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '259668'
  name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3730'
pubrep_id: '721'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Commitments and efficient zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise
tmp:
  image: /images/cc_by.png
  legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
  name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
  short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7658
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3250'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: The Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem has recently found many applications
    in cryptography as the hardness assumption underlying the constructions of &quot;provably
    secure&quot; cryptographic schemes like encryption or authentication protocols.
    Being provably secure means that the scheme comes with a proof showing that the
    existence of an efficient adversary against the scheme implies that the underlying
    hardness assumption is wrong. LPN based schemes are appealing for theoretical
    and practical reasons. On the theoretical side, LPN based schemes offer a very
    strong security guarantee. The LPN problem is equivalent to the problem of decoding
    random linear codes, a problem that has been extensively studied in the last half
    century. The fastest known algorithms run in exponential time and unlike most
    number-theoretic problems used in cryptography, the LPN problem does not succumb
    to known quantum algorithms. On the practical side, LPN based schemes are often
    extremely simple and efficient in terms of code-size as well as time and space
    requirements. This makes them prime candidates for light-weight devices like RFID
    tags, which are too weak to implement standard cryptographic primitives like the
    AES block-cipher. This talk will be a gentle introduction to provable security
    using simple LPN based schemes as examples. Starting from pseudorandom generators
    and symmetric key encryption, over secret-key authentication protocols, and, if
    time admits, touching on recent constructions of public-key identification, commitments
    and zero-knowledge proofs.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
  ama: 'Pietrzak KZ. Cryptography from learning parity with noise. In: Vol 7147. Springer;
    2012:99-114. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9">10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9</a>'
  apa: 'Pietrzak, K. Z. (2012). Cryptography from learning parity with noise (Vol.
    7147, pp. 99–114). Presented at the SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice
    of Computer Science, Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic: Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9</a>'
  chicago: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. “Cryptography from Learning Parity with Noise,”
    7147:99–114. Springer, 2012. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9</a>.
  ieee: 'K. Z. Pietrzak, “Cryptography from learning parity with noise,” presented
    at the SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, Špindlerův
    Mlýn, Czech Republic, 2012, vol. 7147, pp. 99–114.'
  ista: 'Pietrzak KZ. 2012. Cryptography from learning parity with noise. SOFSEM:
    Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, LNCS, vol. 7147, 99–114.'
  mla: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. <i>Cryptography from Learning Parity with Noise</i>.
    Vol. 7147, Springer, 2012, pp. 99–114, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9">10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9</a>.
  short: K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 99–114.
conference:
  end_date: 2012-01-27
  location: Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic
  name: 'SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science'
  start_date: 2012-01-21
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:15Z
date_published: 2012-02-19T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T07:42:07Z
day: '19'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9
intvolume: '      7147'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '02'
oa_version: None
page: 99 - 114
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3407'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Cryptography from learning parity with noise
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7147
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3279'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We show a hardness-preserving construction of a PRF from any length doubling
    PRG which improves upon known constructions whenever we can put a non-trivial
    upper bound q on the number of queries to the PRF. Our construction requires only
    O(logq) invocations to the underlying PRG with each query. In comparison, the
    number of invocations by the best previous hardness-preserving construction (GGM
    using Levin's trick) is logarithmic in the hardness of the PRG. For example, starting
    from an exponentially secure PRG {0,1} n → {0,1} 2n, we get a PRF which is exponentially
    secure if queried at most q = exp(√n)times and where each invocation of the PRF
    requires Θ(√n) queries to the underlying PRG. This is much less than the Θ(n)
    required by known constructions. \r\n"
acknowledgement: Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s
  Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC)
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Abhishek
  full_name: Jain, Abhishek
  last_name: Jain
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Aris
  full_name: Tentes, Aris
  last_name: Tentes
citation:
  ama: 'Jain A, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom
    functions. In: Vol 7194. Springer; 2012:369-382. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21</a>'
  apa: 'Jain, A., Pietrzak, K. Z., &#38; Tentes, A. (2012). Hardness preserving constructions
    of pseudorandom functions (Vol. 7194, pp. 369–382). Presented at the TCC: Theory
    of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy: Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21</a>'
  chicago: Jain, Abhishek, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Aris Tentes. “Hardness Preserving
    Constructions of Pseudorandom Functions,” 7194:369–82. Springer, 2012. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21</a>.
  ieee: 'A. Jain, K. Z. Pietrzak, and A. Tentes, “Hardness preserving constructions
    of pseudorandom functions,” presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference,
    Taormina, Sicily, Italy, 2012, vol. 7194, pp. 369–382.'
  ista: 'Jain A, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. 2012. Hardness preserving constructions of
    pseudorandom functions. TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 7194,
    369–382.'
  mla: Jain, Abhishek, et al. <i>Hardness Preserving Constructions of Pseudorandom
    Functions</i>. Vol. 7194, Springer, 2012, pp. 369–82, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21</a>.
  short: A. Jain, K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Tentes, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 369–382.
conference:
  end_date: 2012-03-21
  location: Taormina, Sicily, Italy
  name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
  start_date: 2012-03-19
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:25Z
date_published: 2012-05-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T07:42:21Z
day: '04'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: '      7194'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.iacr.org/archive/tcc2012/tcc2012-index.html
month: '05'
oa_version: None
page: 369 - 382
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '259668'
  name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3367'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom functions
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7194
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3280'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'The (decisional) learning with errors problem (LWE) asks to distinguish &quot;noisy&quot;
    inner products of a secret vector with random vectors from uniform. The learning
    parities with noise problem (LPN) is the special case where the elements of the
    vectors are bits. In recent years, the LWE and LPN problems have found many applications
    in cryptography. In this paper we introduce a (seemingly) much stronger adaptive
    assumption, called &quot;subspace LWE&quot; (SLWE), where the adversary can learn
    the inner product of the secret and random vectors after they were projected into
    an adaptively and adversarially chosen subspace. We prove that, surprisingly,
    the SLWE problem mapping into subspaces of dimension d is almost as hard as LWE
    using secrets of length d (the other direction is trivial.) This result immediately
    implies that several existing cryptosystems whose security is based on the hardness
    of the LWE/LPN problems are provably secure in a much stronger sense than anticipated.
    As an illustrative example we show that the standard way of using LPN for symmetric
    CPA secure encryption is even secure against a very powerful class of related
    key attacks. '
acknowledgement: Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s
  Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
  ama: 'Pietrzak KZ. Subspace LWE. In: Vol 7194. Springer; 2012:548-563. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31</a>'
  apa: 'Pietrzak, K. Z. (2012). Subspace LWE (Vol. 7194, pp. 548–563). Presented at
    the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy: Springer.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31</a>'
  chicago: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. “Subspace LWE,” 7194:548–63. Springer, 2012. <a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31</a>.
  ieee: 'K. Z. Pietrzak, “Subspace LWE,” presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography
    Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy, 2012, vol. 7194, pp. 548–563.'
  ista: 'Pietrzak KZ. 2012. Subspace LWE. TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference,
    LNCS, vol. 7194, 548–563.'
  mla: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. <i>Subspace LWE</i>. Vol. 7194, Springer, 2012, pp.
    548–63, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31</a>.
  short: K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 548–563.
conference:
  end_date: 2012-03-21
  location: Taormina, Sicily, Italy
  name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
  start_date: 2012-03-19
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:26Z
date_published: 2012-05-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T07:42:21Z
day: '04'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: '      7194'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: http://www.iacr.org/archive/tcc2012/71940166/71940166.pdf
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 548 - 563
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '259668'
  name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3366'
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: Subspace LWE
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7194
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3281'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'We consider the problem of amplifying the &quot;lossiness&quot; of functions.
    We say that an oracle circuit C*: {0,1} m → {0,1}* amplifies relative lossiness
    from ℓ/n to L/m if for every function f:{0,1} n → {0,1} n it holds that 1 If f
    is injective then so is C f. 2 If f has image size of at most 2 n-ℓ, then C f
    has image size at most 2 m-L. The question is whether such C* exists for L/m ≫
    ℓ/n. This problem arises naturally in the context of cryptographic &quot;lossy
    functions,&quot; where the relative lossiness is the key parameter. We show that
    for every circuit C* that makes at most t queries to f, the relative lossiness
    of C f is at most L/m ≤ ℓ/n + O(log t)/n. In particular, no black-box method making
    a polynomial t = poly(n) number of queries can amplify relative lossiness by more
    than an O(logn)/n additive term. We show that this is tight by giving a simple
    construction (cascading with some randomization) that achieves such amplification.'
acknowledgement: "We would like to thank Oded Goldreich and Omer Rein- gold for discussions
  at an early stage of this project, and Scott Aaronson for clarifications regarding
  the collision problem.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Alon
  full_name: Rosen, Alon
  last_name: Rosen
- first_name: Gil
  full_name: Segev, Gil
  last_name: Segev
citation:
  ama: 'Pietrzak KZ, Rosen A, Segev G. Lossy functions do not amplify well. In: Vol
    7194. Springer; 2012:458-475. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26</a>'
  apa: 'Pietrzak, K. Z., Rosen, A., &#38; Segev, G. (2012). Lossy functions do not
    amplify well (Vol. 7194, pp. 458–475). Presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography
    Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy: Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26</a>'
  chicago: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z, Alon Rosen, and Gil Segev. “Lossy Functions Do Not
    Amplify Well,” 7194:458–75. Springer, 2012. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26</a>.
  ieee: 'K. Z. Pietrzak, A. Rosen, and G. Segev, “Lossy functions do not amplify well,”
    presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy,
    2012, vol. 7194, pp. 458–475.'
  ista: 'Pietrzak KZ, Rosen A, Segev G. 2012. Lossy functions do not amplify well.
    TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 7194, 458–475.'
  mla: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z., et al. <i>Lossy Functions Do Not Amplify Well</i>.
    Vol. 7194, Springer, 2012, pp. 458–75, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26</a>.
  short: K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Rosen, G. Segev, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 458–475.
conference:
  end_date: 2012-03-21
  location: Taormina, Sicily, Italy
  name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
  start_date: 2012-03-19
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:26Z
date_published: 2012-05-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T07:42:22Z
day: '04'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26
intvolume: '      7194'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.iacr.org/archive/tcc2012/tcc2012-index.html
month: '05'
oa_version: None
page: 458 - 475
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3365'
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: Lossy functions do not amplify well
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7194
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3282'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Traditionally, symmetric-key message authentication codes (MACs) are easily
    built from pseudorandom functions (PRFs). In this work we propose a wide variety
    of other approaches to building efficient MACs, without going through a PRF first.
    In particular, unlike deterministic PRF-based MACs, where each message has a unique
    valid tag, we give a number of probabilistic MAC constructions from various other
    primitives/assumptions. Our main results are summarized as follows: We show several
    new probabilistic MAC constructions from a variety of general assumptions, including
    CCA-secure encryption, Hash Proof Systems and key-homomorphic weak PRFs. By instantiating
    these frameworks under concrete number theoretic assumptions, we get several schemes
    which are more efficient than just using a state-of-the-art PRF instantiation
    under the corresponding assumption. For probabilistic MACs, unlike deterministic
    ones, unforgeability against a chosen message attack (uf-cma ) alone does not
    imply security if the adversary can additionally make verification queries (uf-cmva
    ). We give an efficient generic transformation from any uf-cma secure MAC which
    is &quot;message-hiding&quot; into a uf-cmva secure MAC. This resolves the main
    open problem of Kiltz et al. from Eurocrypt''11; By using our transformation on
    their constructions, we get the first efficient MACs from the LPN assumption.
    While all our new MAC constructions immediately give efficient actively secure,
    two-round symmetric-key identification schemes, we also show a very simple, three-round
    actively secure identification protocol from any weak PRF. In particular, the
    resulting protocol is much more efficient than the trivial approach of building
    a regular PRF from a weak PRF. © 2012 International Association for Cryptologic
    Research.'
acknowledgement: Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s
  Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC)
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Yevgeniy
  full_name: Dodis, Yevgeniy
  last_name: Dodis
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Eike
  full_name: Kiltz, Eike
  last_name: Kiltz
- first_name: Daniel
  full_name: Wichs, Daniel
  last_name: Wichs
citation:
  ama: 'Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. Message authentication, revisited.
    In: Vol 7237. Springer; 2012:355-374. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22">10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>'
  apa: 'Dodis, Y., Pietrzak, K. Z., Kiltz, E., &#38; Wichs, D. (2012). Message authentication,
    revisited (Vol. 7237, pp. 355–374). Presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications
    of Cryptographic Techniques, Cambridge, UK: Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>'
  chicago: Dodis, Yevgeniy, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, Eike Kiltz, and Daniel Wichs. “Message
    Authentication, Revisited,” 7237:355–74. Springer, 2012. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>.
  ieee: 'Y. Dodis, K. Z. Pietrzak, E. Kiltz, and D. Wichs, “Message authentication,
    revisited,” presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
    Techniques, Cambridge, UK, 2012, vol. 7237, pp. 355–374.'
  ista: 'Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. 2012. Message authentication, revisited.
    EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, LNCS, vol. 7237,
    355–374.'
  mla: Dodis, Yevgeniy, et al. <i>Message Authentication, Revisited</i>. Vol. 7237,
    Springer, 2012, pp. 355–74, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22">10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>.
  short: Y. Dodis, K.Z. Pietrzak, E. Kiltz, D. Wichs, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 355–374.
conference:
  end_date: 2012-04-19
  location: Cambridge, UK
  name: 'EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques'
  start_date: 2012-04-15
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:27Z
date_published: 2012-03-10T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T07:42:22Z
day: '10'
ddc:
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department:
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doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22
ec_funded: 1
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page: 355 - 374
project:
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  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '259668'
  name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
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title: Message authentication, revisited
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