---
_id: '7411'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "Proofs of sequential work (PoSW) are proof systems where a prover, upon receiving
    a statement χ and a time parameter T computes a proof ϕ(χ,T) which is efficiently
    and publicly verifiable. The proof can be computed in T sequential steps, but
    not much less, even by a malicious party having large parallelism. A PoSW thus
    serves as a proof that T units of time have passed since χ\r\n\r\nwas received.\r\n\r\nPoSW
    were introduced by Mahmoody, Moran and Vadhan [MMV11], a simple and practical
    construction was only recently proposed by Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18].\r\n\r\nIn
    this work we construct a new simple PoSW in the random permutation model which
    is almost as simple and efficient as [CP18] but conceptually very different. Whereas
    the structure underlying [CP18] is a hash tree, our construction is based on skip
    lists and has the interesting property that computing the PoSW is a reversible
    computation.\r\nThe fact that the construction is reversible can potentially be
    used for new applications like constructing proofs of replication. We also show
    how to “embed” the sloth function of Lenstra and Weselowski [LW17] into our PoSW
    to get a PoSW where one additionally can verify correctness of the output much
    more efficiently than recomputing it (though recent constructions of “verifiable
    delay functions” subsume most of the applications this construction was aiming
    at)."
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Hamza M
  full_name: Abusalah, Hamza M
  id: 40297222-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Abusalah
- first_name: Chethan
  full_name: Kamath Hosdurg, Chethan
  id: 4BD3F30E-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Kamath Hosdurg
- first_name: Karen
  full_name: Klein, Karen
  id: 3E83A2F8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Klein
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Michael
  full_name: Walter, Michael
  id: 488F98B0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Walter
  orcid: 0000-0003-3186-2482
citation:
  ama: 'Abusalah HM, Kamath Hosdurg C, Klein K, Pietrzak KZ, Walter M. Reversible
    proofs of sequential work. In: <i>Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2019</i>.
    Vol 11477. Springer International Publishing; 2019:277-291. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_10">10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_10</a>'
  apa: 'Abusalah, H. M., Kamath Hosdurg, C., Klein, K., Pietrzak, K. Z., &#38; Walter,
    M. (2019). Reversible proofs of sequential work. In <i>Advances in Cryptology
    – EUROCRYPT 2019</i> (Vol. 11477, pp. 277–291). Darmstadt, Germany: Springer International
    Publishing. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_10">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_10</a>'
  chicago: Abusalah, Hamza M, Chethan Kamath Hosdurg, Karen Klein, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak,
    and Michael Walter. “Reversible Proofs of Sequential Work.” In <i>Advances in
    Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2019</i>, 11477:277–91. Springer International Publishing,
    2019. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_10">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_10</a>.
  ieee: H. M. Abusalah, C. Kamath Hosdurg, K. Klein, K. Z. Pietrzak, and M. Walter,
    “Reversible proofs of sequential work,” in <i>Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT
    2019</i>, Darmstadt, Germany, 2019, vol. 11477, pp. 277–291.
  ista: Abusalah HM, Kamath Hosdurg C, Klein K, Pietrzak KZ, Walter M. 2019. Reversible
    proofs of sequential work. Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2019. International
    Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, LNCS, vol.
    11477, 277–291.
  mla: Abusalah, Hamza M., et al. “Reversible Proofs of Sequential Work.” <i>Advances
    in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2019</i>, vol. 11477, Springer International Publishing,
    2019, pp. 277–91, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_10">10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_10</a>.
  short: H.M. Abusalah, C. Kamath Hosdurg, K. Klein, K.Z. Pietrzak, M. Walter, in:,
    Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2019, Springer International Publishing, 2019,
    pp. 277–291.
conference:
  end_date: 2019-05-23
  location: Darmstadt, Germany
  name: International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
  start_date: 2019-05-19
date_created: 2020-01-30T09:26:14Z
date_published: 2019-04-24T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-06T15:26:06Z
day: '24'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_10
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
  isi:
  - '000483516200010'
intvolume: '     11477'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/252
month: '04'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 277-291
project:
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '682815'
  name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2019
publication_identifier:
  eissn:
  - 1611-3349
  isbn:
  - '9783030176556'
  - '9783030176563'
  issn:
  - 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer International Publishing
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Reversible proofs of sequential work
type: conference
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 11477
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '83'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "A proof system is a protocol between a prover and a verifier over a common
    input in which an honest prover convinces the verifier of the validity of true
    statements. Motivated by the success of decentralized cryptocurrencies, exemplified
    by Bitcoin, the focus of this thesis will be on proof systems which found applications
    in some sustainable alternatives to Bitcoin, such as the Spacemint and Chia cryptocurrencies.
    In particular, we focus on proofs of space and proofs of sequential work.\r\nProofs
    of space (PoSpace) were suggested as more ecological, economical, and egalitarian
    alternative to the energy-wasteful proof-of-work mining of Bitcoin. However, the
    state-of-the-art constructions of PoSpace are based on sophisticated graph pebbling
    lower bounds, and are therefore complex. Moreover, when these PoSpace are used
    in cryptocurrencies like Spacemint, miners can only start mining after ensuring
    that a commitment to their space is already added in a special transaction to
    the blockchain. Proofs of sequential work (PoSW) are proof systems in which a
    prover, upon receiving a statement x and a time parameter T, computes a proof
    which convinces the verifier that T time units had passed since x was received.
    Whereas Spacemint assumes synchrony to retain some interesting Bitcoin dynamics,
    Chia requires PoSW with unique proofs, i.e., PoSW in which it is hard to come
    up with more than one accepting proof for any true statement. In this thesis we
    construct simple and practically-efficient PoSpace and PoSW. When using our PoSpace
    in cryptocurrencies, miners can start mining on the fly, like in Bitcoin, and
    unlike current constructions of PoSW, which either achieve efficient verification
    of sequential work, or faster-than-recomputing verification of correctness of
    proofs, but not both at the same time, ours achieve the best of these two worlds."
alternative_title:
- ISTA Thesis
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Hamza M
  full_name: Abusalah, Hamza M
  id: 40297222-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Abusalah
citation:
  ama: Abusalah HM. Proof systems for sustainable decentralized cryptocurrencies.
    2018. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT:ISTA:TH_1046">10.15479/AT:ISTA:TH_1046</a>
  apa: Abusalah, H. M. (2018). <i>Proof systems for sustainable decentralized cryptocurrencies</i>.
    Institute of Science and Technology Austria. <a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT:ISTA:TH_1046">https://doi.org/10.15479/AT:ISTA:TH_1046</a>
  chicago: Abusalah, Hamza M. “Proof Systems for Sustainable Decentralized Cryptocurrencies.”
    Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2018. <a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT:ISTA:TH_1046">https://doi.org/10.15479/AT:ISTA:TH_1046</a>.
  ieee: H. M. Abusalah, “Proof systems for sustainable decentralized cryptocurrencies,”
    Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2018.
  ista: Abusalah HM. 2018. Proof systems for sustainable decentralized cryptocurrencies.
    Institute of Science and Technology Austria.
  mla: Abusalah, Hamza M. <i>Proof Systems for Sustainable Decentralized Cryptocurrencies</i>.
    Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2018, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT:ISTA:TH_1046">10.15479/AT:ISTA:TH_1046</a>.
  short: H.M. Abusalah, Proof Systems for Sustainable Decentralized Cryptocurrencies,
    Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2018.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:44:32Z
date_published: 2018-09-05T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-07T12:30:23Z
day: '05'
ddc:
- '004'
degree_awarded: PhD
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.15479/AT:ISTA:TH_1046
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: c4b5f7d111755d1396787f41886fc674
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: dernst
  date_created: 2019-04-09T06:43:41Z
  date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:48:11Z
  file_id: '6245'
  file_name: 2018_Thesis_Abusalah.pdf
  file_size: 876241
  relation: main_file
- access_level: closed
  checksum: 0f382ac56b471c48fd907d63eb87dafe
  content_type: application/x-gzip
  creator: dernst
  date_created: 2019-04-09T06:43:41Z
  date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:48:11Z
  file_id: '6246'
  file_name: 2018_Thesis_Abusalah_source.tar.gz
  file_size: 2029190
  relation: source_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:48:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: '59'
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '259668'
  name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '682815'
  name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 2663-337X
publication_status: published
publisher: Institute of Science and Technology Austria
publist_id: '7971'
pubrep_id: '1046'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '1229'
    relation: part_of_dissertation
    status: public
  - id: '1235'
    relation: part_of_dissertation
    status: public
  - id: '1236'
    relation: part_of_dissertation
    status: public
  - id: '559'
    relation: part_of_dissertation
    status: public
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
title: Proof systems for sustainable decentralized cryptocurrencies
type: dissertation
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '559'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Proofs of space (PoS) were suggested as more ecological and economical alternative
    to proofs of work, which are currently used in blockchain designs like Bitcoin.
    The existing PoS are based on rather sophisticated graph pebbling lower bounds.
    Much simpler and in several aspects more efficient schemes based on inverting
    random functions have been suggested, but they don’t give meaningful security
    guarantees due to existing time-memory trade-offs. In particular, Hellman showed
    that any permutation over a domain of size N can be inverted in time T by an algorithm
    that is given S bits of auxiliary information whenever (Formula presented). For
    functions Hellman gives a weaker attack with S2· T≈ N2 (e.g., S= T≈ N2/3). To
    prove lower bounds, one considers an adversary who has access to an oracle f:
    [ N] → [N] and can make T oracle queries. The best known lower bound is S· T∈
    Ω(N) and holds for random functions and permutations. We construct functions that
    provably require more time and/or space to invert. Specifically, for any constant
    k we construct a function [N] → [N] that cannot be inverted unless Sk· T∈ Ω(Nk)
    (in particular, S= T≈ (Formula presented). Our construction does not contradict
    Hellman’s time-memory trade-off, because it cannot be efficiently evaluated in
    forward direction. However, its entire function table can be computed in time
    quasilinear in N, which is sufficient for the PoS application. Our simplest construction
    is built from a random function oracle g: [N] × [N] → [ N] and a random permutation
    oracle f: [N] → N] and is defined as h(x) = g(x, x′) where f(x) = π(f(x′)) with
    π being any involution without a fixed point, e.g. flipping all the bits. For
    this function we prove that any adversary who gets S bits of auxiliary information,
    makes at most T oracle queries, and inverts h on an ϵ fraction of outputs must
    satisfy S2· T∈ Ω(ϵ2N2).'
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Hamza M
  full_name: Abusalah, Hamza M
  id: 40297222-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Abusalah
- first_name: Joel F
  full_name: Alwen, Joel F
  id: 2A8DFA8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Alwen
- first_name: Bram
  full_name: Cohen, Bram
  last_name: Cohen
- first_name: Danylo
  full_name: Khilko, Danylo
  last_name: Khilko
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Leonid
  full_name: Reyzin, Leonid
  last_name: Reyzin
citation:
  ama: 'Abusalah HM, Alwen JF, Cohen B, Khilko D, Pietrzak KZ, Reyzin L. Beyond Hellman’s
    time-memory trade-offs with applications to proofs of space. In: Vol 10625. Springer;
    2017:357-379. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_13">10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_13</a>'
  apa: 'Abusalah, H. M., Alwen, J. F., Cohen, B., Khilko, D., Pietrzak, K. Z., &#38;
    Reyzin, L. (2017). Beyond Hellman’s time-memory trade-offs with applications to
    proofs of space (Vol. 10625, pp. 357–379). Presented at the ASIACRYPT: Theory
    and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China: Springer.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_13">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_13</a>'
  chicago: Abusalah, Hamza M, Joel F Alwen, Bram Cohen, Danylo Khilko, Krzysztof Z
    Pietrzak, and Leonid Reyzin. “Beyond Hellman’s Time-Memory Trade-Offs with Applications
    to Proofs of Space,” 10625:357–79. Springer, 2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_13">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_13</a>.
  ieee: 'H. M. Abusalah, J. F. Alwen, B. Cohen, D. Khilko, K. Z. Pietrzak, and L.
    Reyzin, “Beyond Hellman’s time-memory trade-offs with applications to proofs of
    space,” presented at the ASIACRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptology and
    Information Security, Hong Kong, China, 2017, vol. 10625, pp. 357–379.'
  ista: 'Abusalah HM, Alwen JF, Cohen B, Khilko D, Pietrzak KZ, Reyzin L. 2017. Beyond
    Hellman’s time-memory trade-offs with applications to proofs of space. ASIACRYPT:
    Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security, LNCS, vol. 10625,
    357–379.'
  mla: Abusalah, Hamza M., et al. <i>Beyond Hellman’s Time-Memory Trade-Offs with
    Applications to Proofs of Space</i>. Vol. 10625, Springer, 2017, pp. 357–79, doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_13">10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_13</a>.
  short: H.M. Abusalah, J.F. Alwen, B. Cohen, D. Khilko, K.Z. Pietrzak, L. Reyzin,
    in:, Springer, 2017, pp. 357–379.
conference:
  end_date: 2017-12-07
  location: Hong Kong, China
  name: 'ASIACRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security'
  start_date: 2017-12-03
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:47:10Z
date_published: 2017-11-18T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-07T12:30:22Z
day: '18'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_13
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: '     10625'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/893.pdf
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 357 - 379
project:
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '682815'
  name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - 978-331970696-2
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '7257'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '83'
    relation: dissertation_contains
    status: public
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Beyond Hellman’s time-memory trade-offs with applications to proofs of space
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 10625
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1229'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Witness encryption (WE) was introduced by Garg et al. [GGSW13]. A WE scheme
    is defined for some NP language L and lets a sender encrypt messages relative
    to instances x. A ciphertext for x can be decrypted using w witnessing x ∈ L,
    but hides the message if x ∈ L. Garg et al. construct WE from multilinear maps
    and give another construction [GGH+13b] using indistinguishability obfuscation
    (iO) for circuits. Due to the reliance on such heavy tools, WE can cur- rently
    hardly be implemented on powerful hardware and will unlikely be realizable on
    constrained devices like smart cards any time soon. We construct a WE scheme where
    encryption is done by simply computing a Naor-Yung ciphertext (two CPA encryptions
    and a NIZK proof). To achieve this, our scheme has a setup phase, which outputs
    public parameters containing an obfuscated circuit (only required for decryption),
    two encryption keys and a common reference string (used for encryption). This
    setup need only be run once, and the parame- ters can be used for arbitrary many
    encryptions. Our scheme can also be turned into a functional WE scheme, where
    a message is encrypted w.r.t. a statement and a function f, and decryption with
    a witness w yields f (m, w). Our construction is inspired by the functional encryption
    scheme by Garg et al. and we prove (selective) security assuming iO and statistically
    simulation-sound NIZK. We give a construction of the latter in bilinear groups
    and combining it with ElGamal encryption, our ciphertexts are of size 1.3 kB at
    a 128-bit security level and can be computed on a smart card.
acknowledgement: Research  supported  by  the  European  Research  Council,  ERC  starting  grant
  (259668-PSPC) and ERC consolidator grant (682815 - TOCNeT).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Hamza M
  full_name: Abusalah, Hamza M
  id: 40297222-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Abusalah
- first_name: Georg
  full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
  id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Fuchsbauer
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
  ama: 'Abusalah HM, Fuchsbauer G, Pietrzak KZ. Offline witness encryption. In: Vol
    9696. Springer; 2016:285-303. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_16">10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_16</a>'
  apa: 'Abusalah, H. M., Fuchsbauer, G., &#38; Pietrzak, K. Z. (2016). Offline witness
    encryption (Vol. 9696, pp. 285–303). Presented at the ACNS: Applied Cryptography
    and Network Security, Guildford, UK: Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_16">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_16</a>'
  chicago: Abusalah, Hamza M, Georg Fuchsbauer, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “Offline
    Witness Encryption,” 9696:285–303. Springer, 2016. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_16">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_16</a>.
  ieee: 'H. M. Abusalah, G. Fuchsbauer, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Offline witness encryption,”
    presented at the ACNS: Applied Cryptography and Network Security, Guildford, UK,
    2016, vol. 9696, pp. 285–303.'
  ista: 'Abusalah HM, Fuchsbauer G, Pietrzak KZ. 2016. Offline witness encryption.
    ACNS: Applied Cryptography and Network Security, LNCS, vol. 9696, 285–303.'
  mla: Abusalah, Hamza M., et al. <i>Offline Witness Encryption</i>. Vol. 9696, Springer,
    2016, pp. 285–303, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_16">10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_16</a>.
  short: H.M. Abusalah, G. Fuchsbauer, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2016, pp. 285–303.
conference:
  end_date: 2016-06-22
  location: Guildford, UK
  name: 'ACNS: Applied Cryptography and Network Security'
  start_date: 2016-06-19
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:50:50Z
date_published: 2016-06-09T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-07T12:30:22Z
day: '09'
ddc:
- '005'
- '600'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_16
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: 34fa9ce681da845a1ba945ba3dc57867
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: system
  date_created: 2018-12-12T10:17:20Z
  date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:39Z
  file_id: '5273'
  file_name: IST-2017-765-v1+1_838.pdf
  file_size: 515000
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:39Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '      9696'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '06'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 285 - 303
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '259668'
  name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '682815'
  name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '6105'
pubrep_id: '765'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '83'
    relation: dissertation_contains
    status: public
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Offline witness encryption
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 9696
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1235'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'A constrained pseudorandom function (CPRF) F: K×X → Y for a family T of subsets
    of χ is a function where for any key k ∈ K and set S ∈ T one can efficiently compute
    a short constrained key kS, which allows to evaluate F(k, ·) on all inputs x ∈
    S, while the outputs on all inputs x /∈ S look random even given kS. Abusalah
    et al. recently constructed the first constrained PRF for inputs of arbitrary
    length whose sets S are decided by Turing machines. They use their CPRF to build
    broadcast encryption and the first ID-based non-interactive key exchange for an
    unbounded number of users. Their constrained keys are obfuscated circuits and
    are therefore large. In this work we drastically reduce the key size and define
    a constrained key for a Turing machine M as a short signature on M. For this,
    we introduce a new signature primitive with constrained signing keys that let
    one only sign certain messages, while forging a signature on others is hard even
    when knowing the coins for key generation.'
acknowledgement: H. Abusalah—Research supported by the European Research Council,
  ERC starting grant (259668-PSPC) and ERC consolidator grant (682815 - TOCNeT).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Hamza M
  full_name: Abusalah, Hamza M
  id: 40297222-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Abusalah
- first_name: Georg
  full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
  id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Fuchsbauer
citation:
  ama: 'Abusalah HM, Fuchsbauer G. Constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs with short
    keys. In: Vol 9696. Springer; 2016:445-463. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_24">10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_24</a>'
  apa: 'Abusalah, H. M., &#38; Fuchsbauer, G. (2016). Constrained PRFs for unbounded
    inputs with short keys (Vol. 9696, pp. 445–463). Presented at the ACNS: Applied
    Cryptography and Network Security, Guildford, UK: Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_24">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_24</a>'
  chicago: Abusalah, Hamza M, and Georg Fuchsbauer. “Constrained PRFs for Unbounded
    Inputs with Short Keys,” 9696:445–63. Springer, 2016. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_24">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_24</a>.
  ieee: 'H. M. Abusalah and G. Fuchsbauer, “Constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs
    with short keys,” presented at the ACNS: Applied Cryptography and Network Security,
    Guildford, UK, 2016, vol. 9696, pp. 445–463.'
  ista: 'Abusalah HM, Fuchsbauer G. 2016. Constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs with
    short keys. ACNS: Applied Cryptography and Network Security, LNCS, vol. 9696,
    445–463.'
  mla: Abusalah, Hamza M., and Georg Fuchsbauer. <i>Constrained PRFs for Unbounded
    Inputs with Short Keys</i>. Vol. 9696, Springer, 2016, pp. 445–63, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_24">10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_24</a>.
  short: H.M. Abusalah, G. Fuchsbauer, in:, Springer, 2016, pp. 445–463.
conference:
  end_date: 2016-06-22
  location: Guildford, UK
  name: 'ACNS: Applied Cryptography and Network Security'
  start_date: 2016-06-19
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:50:52Z
date_published: 2016-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-07T12:30:22Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_24
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: '      9696'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/279.pdf
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 445 - 463
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '259668'
  name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '682815'
  name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '6098'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '83'
    relation: dissertation_contains
    status: public
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs with short keys
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 9696
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1236'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'A constrained pseudorandom function F: K × X → Y for a family T ⊆ 2X of subsets
    of X is a function where for any key k ∈ K and set S ∈ T one can efficiently compute
    a constrained key kS which allows to evaluate F (k, ·) on all inputs x ∈ S, while
    even given this key, the outputs on all inputs x ∉ S look random. At Asiacrypt’13
    Boneh and Waters gave a construction which supports the most general set family
    so far. Its keys kc are defined for sets decided by boolean circuits C and enable
    evaluation of the PRF on any x ∈ X where C(x) = 1. In their construction the PRF
    input length and the size of the circuits C for which constrained keys can be
    computed must be fixed beforehand during key generation. We construct a constrained
    PRF that has an unbounded input length and whose constrained keys can be defined
    for any set recognized by a Turing machine. The only a priori bound we make is
    on the description size of the machines. We prove our construction secure assuming
    publiccoin differing-input obfuscation. As applications of our constrained PRF
    we build a broadcast encryption scheme where the number of potential receivers
    need not be fixed at setup (in particular, the length of the keys is independent
    of the number of parties) and the first identity-based non-interactive key exchange
    protocol with no bound on the number of parties that can agree on a shared key.'
acknowledgement: Supported by the European Research Council, ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Hamza M
  full_name: Abusalah, Hamza M
  id: 40297222-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Abusalah
- first_name: Georg
  full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
  id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Fuchsbauer
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
  ama: 'Abusalah HM, Fuchsbauer G, Pietrzak KZ. Constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs.
    In: Vol 9610. Springer; 2016:413-428. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_24">10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_24</a>'
  apa: 'Abusalah, H. M., Fuchsbauer, G., &#38; Pietrzak, K. Z. (2016). Constrained
    PRFs for unbounded inputs (Vol. 9610, pp. 413–428). Presented at the CT-RSA: Topics
    in Cryptology, San Francisco, CA, USA: Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_24">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_24</a>'
  chicago: Abusalah, Hamza M, Georg Fuchsbauer, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “Constrained
    PRFs for Unbounded Inputs,” 9610:413–28. Springer, 2016. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_24">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_24</a>.
  ieee: 'H. M. Abusalah, G. Fuchsbauer, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Constrained PRFs for
    unbounded inputs,” presented at the CT-RSA: Topics in Cryptology, San Francisco,
    CA, USA, 2016, vol. 9610, pp. 413–428.'
  ista: 'Abusalah HM, Fuchsbauer G, Pietrzak KZ. 2016. Constrained PRFs for unbounded
    inputs. CT-RSA: Topics in Cryptology, LNCS, vol. 9610, 413–428.'
  mla: Abusalah, Hamza M., et al. <i>Constrained PRFs for Unbounded Inputs</i>. Vol.
    9610, Springer, 2016, pp. 413–28, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_24">10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_24</a>.
  short: H.M. Abusalah, G. Fuchsbauer, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2016, pp. 413–428.
conference:
  end_date: 2016-03-04
  location: San Francisco, CA, USA
  name: 'CT-RSA: Topics in Cryptology'
  start_date: 2016-02-29
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:50:52Z
date_published: 2016-02-02T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-07T12:30:22Z
day: '02'
ddc:
- '005'
- '600'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_24
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: 3851cee49933ae13b1272e516f213e13
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: system
  date_created: 2018-12-12T10:08:05Z
  date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:41Z
  file_id: '4664'
  file_name: IST-2017-764-v1+1_279.pdf
  file_size: 495176
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file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:41Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '      9610'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '02'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 413 - 428
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '259668'
  name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '6097'
pubrep_id: '764'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '83'
    relation: dissertation_contains
    status: public
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Constrained PRFs for unbounded inputs
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 9610
year: '2016'
...
