---
_id: '13258'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where
individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback
between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic
games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending
on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can
reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic
games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games,
participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of
the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state
could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof)
shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games
we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there
is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation
is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment.
We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to
determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral,
or worse for evolution of cooperation.
acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818
(ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT
(to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under
the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale
de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010)
(to M.K.).'
article_number: '4153'
article_processing_charge: Yes
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Maria
full_name: Kleshnina, Maria
id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Kleshnina
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Stepan
full_name: Simsa, Stepan
id: 409d615c-2f95-11ee-b934-90a352102c1e
last_name: Simsa
orcid: 0000-0001-6687-1210
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin A.
full_name: Nowak, Martin A.
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. The effect of environmental
information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications.
2023;14. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9
apa: Kleshnina, M., Hilbe, C., Simsa, S., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2023).
The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic
games. Nature Communications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9
chicago: Kleshnina, Maria, Christian Hilbe, Stepan Simsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee,
and Martin A. Nowak. “The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of
Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature Communications. Springer Nature,
2023. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9.
ieee: M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, and M. A. Nowak, “The effect
of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games,”
Nature Communications, vol. 14. Springer Nature, 2023.
ista: Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. 2023. The effect of
environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature
Communications. 14, 4153.
mla: Kleshnina, Maria, et al. “The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution
of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature Communications, vol. 14, 4153,
Springer Nature, 2023, doi:10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9.
short: M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature Communications
14 (2023).
date_created: 2023-07-23T22:01:11Z
date_published: 2023-07-12T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-14T09:09:53Z
day: '12'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '001029450400031'
pmid:
- '37438341'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 5aceefdfe76686267b93ae4fe81899f1
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2023-07-31T11:32:36Z
date_updated: 2023-07-31T11:32:36Z
file_id: '13337'
file_name: 2023_NatureComm_Kleshnina.pdf
file_size: 1601682
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2023-07-31T11:32:36Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 14'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '07'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '754411'
name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships
publication: Nature Communications
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 2041-1723
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '13336'
relation: research_data
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic
games
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 14
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '12861'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The field of indirect reciprocity investigates how social norms can foster
cooperation when individuals continuously monitor and assess each other’s social
interactions. By adhering to certain social norms, cooperating individuals can
improve their reputation and, in turn, receive benefits from others. Eight social
norms, known as the “leading eight," have been shown to effectively promote the
evolution of cooperation as long as information is public and reliable. These
norms categorize group members as either ’good’ or ’bad’. In this study, we examine
a scenario where individuals instead assign nuanced reputation scores to each
other, and only cooperate with those whose reputation exceeds a certain threshold.
We find both analytically and through simulations that such quantitative assessments
are error-correcting, thus facilitating cooperation in situations where information
is private and unreliable. Moreover, our results identify four specific norms
that are robust to such conditions, and may be relevant for helping to sustain
cooperation in natural populations.
acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818
(ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529:
E-DIRECT (to C.H.). L.S. received additional partial support by the Austrian Science
Fund (FWF) under grant Z211-N23 (Wittgenstein Award), and also thanks the support
by the Stochastic Analysis and Application Research Center (SAARC) under National
Research Foundation of Korea grant NRF-2019R1A5A1028324. The authors additionally
thank Stefan Schmid for providing access to his lab infrastructure at the University
of Vienna for the purpose of collecting simulation data.'
article_number: '2086'
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Laura
full_name: Schmid, Laura
id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Schmid
orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329
- first_name: Farbod
full_name: Ekbatani, Farbod
last_name: Ekbatani
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
citation:
ama: Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. Quantitative assessment can stabilize
indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications.
2023;14. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x
apa: Schmid, L., Ekbatani, F., Hilbe, C., & Chatterjee, K. (2023). Quantitative
assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature
Communications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x
chicago: Schmid, Laura, Farbod Ekbatani, Christian Hilbe, and Krishnendu Chatterjee.
“Quantitative Assessment Can Stabilize Indirect Reciprocity under Imperfect Information.”
Nature Communications. Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x.
ieee: L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, and K. Chatterjee, “Quantitative assessment
can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information,” Nature Communications,
vol. 14. Springer Nature, 2023.
ista: Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. 2023. Quantitative assessment
can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications.
14, 2086.
mla: Schmid, Laura, et al. “Quantitative Assessment Can Stabilize Indirect Reciprocity
under Imperfect Information.” Nature Communications, vol. 14, 2086, Springer
Nature, 2023, doi:10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x.
short: L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, Nature Communications 14
(2023).
date_created: 2023-04-23T22:01:03Z
date_published: 2023-04-12T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-14T09:09:52Z
day: '12'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '001003644100020'
pmid:
- '37045828'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: a4b3b7b36fbef068cabf4fb99501fef6
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2023-04-25T09:13:53Z
date_updated: 2023-04-25T09:13:53Z
file_id: '12868'
file_name: 2023_NatureComm_Schmid.pdf
file_size: 1786475
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2023-04-25T09:13:53Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 14'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '04'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: The Wittgenstein Prize
publication: Nature Communications
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 2041-1723
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect
information
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
volume: 14
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '12280'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In repeated interactions, players can use strategies that respond to the
outcome of previous rounds. Much of the existing literature on direct reciprocity
assumes that all competing individuals use the same strategy space. Here, we study
both learning and evolutionary dynamics of players that differ in the strategy
space they explore. We focus on the infinitely repeated donation game and compare
three natural strategy spaces: memory-1 strategies, which consider the last moves
of both players, reactive strategies, which respond to the last move of the co-player,
and unconditional strategies. These three strategy spaces differ in the memory
capacity that is needed. We compute the long term average payoff that is achieved
in a pairwise learning process. We find that smaller strategy spaces can dominate
larger ones. For weak selection, unconditional players dominate both reactive
and memory-1 players. For intermediate selection, reactive players dominate memory-1
players. Only for strong selection and low cost-to-benefit ratio, memory-1 players
dominate the others. We observe that the supergame between strategy spaces can
be a social dilemma: maximum payoff is achieved if both players explore a larger
strategy space, but smaller strategy spaces dominate.'
acknowledgement: "This work was supported by the European Research Council (https://erc.europa.eu/)\r\nCoG
863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), and the European Research Council Starting Grant
850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.). The funders had no role in study design, data collection
and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript."
article_number: e1010149
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Laura
full_name: Schmid, Laura
id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Schmid
orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Direct reciprocity between individuals
that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational Biology. 2022;18(6).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149
apa: Schmid, L., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2022). Direct reciprocity
between individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational
Biology. Public Library of Science. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149
chicago: Schmid, Laura, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak.
“Direct Reciprocity between Individuals That Use Different Strategy Spaces.” PLOS
Computational Biology. Public Library of Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149.
ieee: L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Direct reciprocity between
individuals that use different strategy spaces,” PLOS Computational Biology,
vol. 18, no. 6. Public Library of Science, 2022.
ista: Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2022. Direct reciprocity between
individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational Biology. 18(6),
e1010149.
mla: Schmid, Laura, et al. “Direct Reciprocity between Individuals That Use Different
Strategy Spaces.” PLOS Computational Biology, vol. 18, no. 6, e1010149,
Public Library of Science, 2022, doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149.
short: L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PLOS Computational Biology
18 (2022).
date_created: 2023-01-16T10:02:51Z
date_published: 2022-06-14T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-14T09:09:49Z
day: '14'
ddc:
- '000'
- '570'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000843626800031'
pmid:
- '35700167'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 31b6b311b6731f1658277a9dfff6632c
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2023-01-30T11:28:13Z
date_updated: 2023-01-30T11:28:13Z
file_id: '12460'
file_name: 2022_PlosCompBio_Schmid.pdf
file_size: 3143222
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2023-01-30T11:28:13Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 18'
isi: 1
issue: '6'
keyword:
- Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience
- Genetics
- Molecular Biology
- Ecology
- Modeling and Simulation
- Ecology
- Evolution
- Behavior and Systematics
language:
- iso: eng
month: '06'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: PLOS Computational Biology
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1553-7358
publication_status: published
publisher: Public Library of Science
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
volume: 18
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '9402'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation.
Direct reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether
to cooperate with another person. Indirect reciprocity means that they also consider
the experiences of others. Although these two mechanisms are intertwined, they
are typically studied in isolation. Here, we introduce a mathematical framework
that allows us to explore both kinds of reciprocity simultaneously. We show that
the well-known ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy of direct reciprocity has a natural
analogue in indirect reciprocity, which we call ‘generous scoring’. Using an equilibrium
analysis, we characterize under which conditions either of the two strategies
can maintain cooperation. With simulations, we additionally explore which kind
of reciprocity evolves when members of a population engage in social learning
to adapt to their environment. Our results draw unexpected connections between
direct and indirect reciprocity while highlighting important differences regarding
their evolvability.
acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818
(ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), the European Research Council Start Grant 279307: Graph
Games (to K.C.), and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT
(to C.H.). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis,
decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.'
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Laura
full_name: Schmid, Laura
id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Schmid
orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Martin A.
full_name: Nowak, Martin A.
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. A unified framework of direct and
indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 2021;5(10):1292–1302. doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8
apa: Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2021). A unified
framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. Springer
Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8
chicago: Schmid, Laura, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Christian Hilbe, and Martin A. Nowak.
“A Unified Framework of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity.” Nature Human Behaviour.
Springer Nature, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8.
ieee: L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, and M. A. Nowak, “A unified framework
of direct and indirect reciprocity,” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 5, no.
10. Springer Nature, pp. 1292–1302, 2021.
ista: Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. 2021. A unified framework of direct
and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 5(10), 1292–1302.
mla: Schmid, Laura, et al. “A Unified Framework of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity.”
Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 5, no. 10, Springer Nature, 2021, pp. 1292–1302,
doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8.
short: L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, M.A. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 5
(2021) 1292–1302.
date_created: 2021-05-18T16:56:57Z
date_published: 2021-05-13T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-14T09:10:09Z
day: '13'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
- _id: GradSch
doi: 10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000650304000002'
pmid:
- '33986519'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 34f55e173f90dc1dab731063458ac780
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2023-11-07T08:27:23Z
date_updated: 2023-11-07T08:27:23Z
file_id: '14496'
file_name: 2021_NatureHumanBehaviour_Schmid_accepted.pdf
file_size: 5232761
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2023-11-07T08:27:23Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 5'
isi: 1
issue: '10'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 1292–1302
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
publication: Nature Human Behaviour
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 2397-3374
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on IST Homepage
relation: press_release
url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/the-emergence-of-cooperation/
record:
- id: '10293'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 5
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '7343'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Coinfections with multiple pathogens can result in complex within‐host dynamics
affecting virulence and transmission. While multiple infections are intensively
studied in solitary hosts, it is so far unresolved how social host interactions
interfere with pathogen competition, and if this depends on coinfection diversity.
We studied how the collective disease defences of ants – their social immunity
– influence pathogen competition in coinfections of same or different fungal pathogen
species. Social immunity reduced virulence for all pathogen combinations, but
interfered with spore production only in different‐species coinfections. Here,
it decreased overall pathogen sporulation success while increasing co‐sporulation
on individual cadavers and maintaining a higher pathogen diversity at the community
level. Mathematical modelling revealed that host sanitary care alone can modulate
competitive outcomes between pathogens, giving advantage to fast‐germinating,
thus less grooming‐sensitive ones. Host social interactions can hence modulate
infection dynamics in coinfected group members, thereby altering pathogen communities
at the host level and population level.
acknowledged_ssus:
- _id: LifeSc
acknowledgement: "We thank Bernhardt Steinwender and Jorgen Eilenberg for the fungal
strains, Xavier Espadaler, Mireia Diaz, Christiane Wanke, Lumi Viljakainen and the
Social Immunity Team at IST Austria, for help with ant collection, and Wanda Gorecka
and Gertraud Stift of the IST Austria Life Science Facility for technical support.
We are thankful to Dieter Ebert for input at all stages of the project, Roger Mundry
for statistical advice, Hinrich Schulenburg, Paul Schmid-Hempel, Yuko\r\nUlrich
and Joachim Kurtz for project discussion, Bor Kavcic for advice on growth curves,
Marcus Roper for advice on modelling work and comments on the manuscript, as well
as Marjon de Vos, Weini Huang and the Social Immunity Team for comments on the manuscript.\r\nThis
study was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the Priority Programme
1399 Host-parasite Coevolution (CR 118/3 to S.C.) and the People Programme\r\n(Marie
Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)
under REA grant agreement no 291734 (ISTFELLOW to B.M.). "
article_processing_charge: Yes (via OA deal)
article_type: letter_note
author:
- first_name: Barbara
full_name: Milutinovic, Barbara
id: 2CDC32B8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Milutinovic
orcid: 0000-0002-8214-4758
- first_name: Miriam
full_name: Stock, Miriam
id: 42462816-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Stock
- first_name: Anna V
full_name: Grasse, Anna V
id: 406F989C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Grasse
- first_name: Elisabeth
full_name: Naderlinger, Elisabeth
id: 31757262-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Naderlinger
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Sylvia
full_name: Cremer, Sylvia
id: 2F64EC8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Cremer
orcid: 0000-0002-2193-3868
citation:
ama: Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. Social
immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. Ecology Letters.
2020;23(3):565-574. doi:10.1111/ele.13458
apa: Milutinovic, B., Stock, M., Grasse, A. V., Naderlinger, E., Hilbe, C., &
Cremer, S. (2020). Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens.
Ecology Letters. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1111/ele.13458
chicago: Milutinovic, Barbara, Miriam Stock, Anna V Grasse, Elisabeth Naderlinger,
Christian Hilbe, and Sylvia Cremer. “Social Immunity Modulates Competition between
Coinfecting Pathogens.” Ecology Letters. Wiley, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/ele.13458.
ieee: B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A. V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, and S. Cremer,
“Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens,” Ecology
Letters, vol. 23, no. 3. Wiley, pp. 565–574, 2020.
ista: Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. 2020.
Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. Ecology Letters.
23(3), 565–574.
mla: Milutinovic, Barbara, et al. “Social Immunity Modulates Competition between
Coinfecting Pathogens.” Ecology Letters, vol. 23, no. 3, Wiley, 2020, pp.
565–74, doi:10.1111/ele.13458.
short: B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A.V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, S. Cremer,
Ecology Letters 23 (2020) 565–574.
date_created: 2020-01-20T13:32:12Z
date_published: 2020-03-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-05T16:04:49Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '570'
department:
- _id: SyCr
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1111/ele.13458
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000507515900001'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 0cd8be386fa219db02845b7c3991ce04
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2020-11-19T11:27:10Z
date_updated: 2020-11-19T11:27:10Z
file_id: '8776'
file_name: 2020_EcologyLetters_Milutinovic.pdf
file_size: 561749
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2020-11-19T11:27:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 23'
isi: 1
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 565-574
project:
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
- _id: 25DAF0B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
grant_number: CR-118/3-1
name: Host-Parasite Coevolution
publication: Ecology Letters
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1461-0248
issn:
- 1461-023X
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on IST Homepage
relation: press_release
url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/social-ants-shapes-disease-outcome/
record:
- id: '13060'
relation: research_data
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by_nc.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)
short: CC BY-NC (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 23
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '13060'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Coinfections with multiple pathogens can result in complex within-host dynamics
affecting virulence and transmission. Whilst multiple infections are intensively
studied in solitary hosts, it is so far unresolved how social host interactions
interfere with pathogen competition, and if this depends on coinfection diversity.
We studied how the collective disease defenses of ants – their social immunity
– influence pathogen competition in coinfections of same or different fungal
pathogen species. Social immunity reduced virulence for all pathogen combinations,
but interfered with spore production only in different-species coinfections. Here,
it decreased overall pathogen sporulation success, whilst simultaneously increasing
co-sporulation on individual cadavers and maintaining a higher pathogen diversity
at the community-level. Mathematical modeling revealed that host sanitary care
alone can modulate competitive outcomes between pathogens, giving advantage to
fast-germinating, thus less grooming-sensitive ones. Host social interactions
can hence modulate infection dynamics in coinfected group members, thereby altering
pathogen communities at the host- and population-level.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Barbara
full_name: Milutinovic, Barbara
id: 2CDC32B8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Milutinovic
orcid: 0000-0002-8214-4758
- first_name: Miriam
full_name: Stock, Miriam
id: 42462816-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Stock
- first_name: Anna V
full_name: Grasse, Anna V
id: 406F989C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Grasse
- first_name: Elisabeth
full_name: Naderlinger, Elisabeth
id: 31757262-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Naderlinger
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Sylvia
full_name: Cremer, Sylvia
id: 2F64EC8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Cremer
orcid: 0000-0002-2193-3868
citation:
ama: Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. Social
immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. 2020. doi:10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318
apa: Milutinovic, B., Stock, M., Grasse, A. V., Naderlinger, E., Hilbe, C., &
Cremer, S. (2020). Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens.
Dryad. https://doi.org/10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318
chicago: Milutinovic, Barbara, Miriam Stock, Anna V Grasse, Elisabeth Naderlinger,
Christian Hilbe, and Sylvia Cremer. “Social Immunity Modulates Competition between
Coinfecting Pathogens.” Dryad, 2020. https://doi.org/10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318.
ieee: B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A. V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, and S. Cremer,
“Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens.” Dryad,
2020.
ista: Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. 2020.
Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens, Dryad, 10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318.
mla: Milutinovic, Barbara, et al. Social Immunity Modulates Competition between
Coinfecting Pathogens. Dryad, 2020, doi:10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318.
short: B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A.V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, S. Cremer,
(2020).
date_created: 2023-05-23T16:11:22Z
date_published: 2020-12-19T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-05T16:04:48Z
day: '19'
ddc:
- '570'
department:
- _id: SyCr
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.crjdfn318
month: '12'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publisher: Dryad
related_material:
record:
- id: '7343'
relation: used_in_publication
status: public
status: public
title: Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens
tmp:
image: /images/cc_0.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication (CC0 1.0)
short: CC0 (1.0)
type: research_data_reference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '6836'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation
on the basis of repeated interactions1,2,3,4. It requires that interacting individuals
are sufficiently equal, such that everyone faces similar consequences when they
cooperate or defect. Yet inequality is ubiquitous among humans5,6 and is generally
considered to undermine cooperation and welfare7,8,9,10. Most previous models
of reciprocity do not include inequality11,12,13,14,15. These models assume that
individuals are the same in all relevant aspects. Here we introduce a general
framework to study direct reciprocity among unequal individuals. Our model allows
for multiple sources of inequality. Subjects can differ in their endowments, their
productivities and in how much they benefit from public goods. We find that extreme
inequality prevents cooperation. But if subjects differ in productivity, some
endowment inequality can be necessary for cooperation to prevail. Our mathematical
predictions are supported by a behavioural experiment in which we vary the endowments
and productivities of the subjects. We observe that overall welfare is maximized
when the two sources of heterogeneity are aligned, such that more productive individuals
receive higher endowments. By contrast, when endowments and productivities are
misaligned, cooperation quickly breaks down. Our findings have implications for
policy-makers concerned with equity, efficiency and the provisioning of public
goods.
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: letter_note
author:
- first_name: Oliver P.
full_name: Hauser, Oliver P.
last_name: Hauser
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin A.
full_name: Nowak, Martin A.
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Hauser OP, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Social dilemmas among unequals.
Nature. 2019;572(7770):524-527. doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5
apa: Hauser, O. P., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2019). Social
dilemmas among unequals. Nature. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5
chicago: Hauser, Oliver P., Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin A.
Nowak. “Social Dilemmas among Unequals.” Nature. Springer Nature, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5.
ieee: O. P. Hauser, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. A. Nowak, “Social dilemmas among
unequals,” Nature, vol. 572, no. 7770. Springer Nature, pp. 524–527, 2019.
ista: Hauser OP, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. 2019. Social dilemmas among unequals.
Nature. 572(7770), 524–527.
mla: Hauser, Oliver P., et al. “Social Dilemmas among Unequals.” Nature,
vol. 572, no. 7770, Springer Nature, 2019, pp. 524–27, doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5.
short: O.P. Hauser, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature 572 (2019) 524–527.
date_created: 2019-09-01T22:00:56Z
date_published: 2019-08-22T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-08-29T07:42:54Z
day: '22'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000482219600045'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: a6e0e3168bf62de624e7772cdfaeb26f
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2020-05-14T10:00:32Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:42Z
file_id: '7828'
file_name: 2019_Nature_Hauser.pdf
file_size: 18577756
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 572'
isi: 1
issue: '7770'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 524-527
project:
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: Nature
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- '14764687'
issn:
- '00280836'
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on IST Homepage
relation: press_release
url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/too-much-inequality-impedes-support-for-public-goods-according-to-research-published-in-nature/
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Social dilemmas among unequals
type: journal_article
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
volume: 572
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '293'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: People sometimes make their admirable deeds and accomplishments hard to spot,
such as by giving anonymously or avoiding bragging. Such ‘buried’ signals are
hard to reconcile with standard models of signalling or indirect reciprocity,
which motivate costly pro-social behaviour by reputational gains. To explain these
phenomena, we design a simple game theory model, which we call the signal-burying
game. This game has the feature that senders can bury their signal by deliberately
reducing the probability of the signal being observed. If the signal is observed,
however, it is identified as having been buried. We show under which conditions
buried signals can be maintained, using static equilibrium concepts and calculations
of the evolutionary dynamics. We apply our analysis to shed light on a number
of otherwise puzzling social phenomena, including modesty, anonymous donations,
subtlety in art and fashion, and overeagerness.
acknowledgement: This work was supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation
and by the Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-16-1-2914 (M.A.N.). C.H. acknowledges
generous support from the ISTFELLOW programme and by the Schrödinger scholarship
of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) J3475.
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Moshe
full_name: Hoffman, Moshe
last_name: Hoffman
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Hoffman M, Hilbe C, Nowak M. The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure
positive traits and good deeds. Nature Human Behaviour. 2018;2:397-404.
doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z
apa: Hoffman, M., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. (2018). The signal-burying game can
explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds. Nature Human Behaviour.
Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z
chicago: Hoffman, Moshe, Christian Hilbe, and Martin Nowak. “The Signal-Burying
Game Can Explain Why We Obscure Positive Traits and Good Deeds.” Nature Human
Behaviour. Nature Publishing Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z.
ieee: M. Hoffman, C. Hilbe, and M. Nowak, “The signal-burying game can explain why
we obscure positive traits and good deeds,” Nature Human Behaviour, vol.
2. Nature Publishing Group, pp. 397–404, 2018.
ista: Hoffman M, Hilbe C, Nowak M. 2018. The signal-burying game can explain why
we obscure positive traits and good deeds. Nature Human Behaviour. 2, 397–404.
mla: Hoffman, Moshe, et al. “The Signal-Burying Game Can Explain Why We Obscure
Positive Traits and Good Deeds.” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 2, Nature
Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 397–404, doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z.
short: M. Hoffman, C. Hilbe, M. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 2 (2018) 397–404.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:45:39Z
date_published: 2018-05-28T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-19T10:12:03Z
day: '28'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000435551300009'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 32efaf06a597495c184df91b3fbb19c0
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2019-11-19T08:17:23Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:54Z
file_id: '7051'
file_name: 2018_NatureHumanBeh_Hoffman.pdf
file_size: 194734
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:54Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 2'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 397 - 404
project:
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: Nature Human Behaviour
publication_status: published
publisher: Nature Publishing Group
publist_id: '7588'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on IST Homepage
relation: press_release
url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/the-logic-of-modesty-why-it-pays-to-be-humble/
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good
deeds
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 2
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Indirect reciprocity explores how humans act when their reputation is at stake,
and which social norms they use to assess the actions of others. A crucial question
in indirect reciprocity is which social norms can maintain stable cooperation
in a society. Past research has highlighted eight such norms, called “leading-eight”
strategies. This past research, however, is based on the assumption that all relevant
information about other population members is publicly available and that everyone
agrees on who is good or bad. Instead, here we explore the reputation dynamics
when information is private and noisy. We show that under these conditions, most
leading-eight strategies fail to evolve. Those leading-eight strategies that do
evolve are unable to sustain full cooperation.Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism
for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes
that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they
use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation.
When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree
on each other’s reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral
systems. These “leading-eight” strategies can maintain cooperation and resist
invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their
own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion
of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light.
Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity
when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence
of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if
a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when
errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and
synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Laura
full_name: Schmid, Laura
id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Schmid
orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329
- first_name: Josef
full_name: Tkadlec, Josef
id: 3F24CCC8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Tkadlec
orcid: 0000-0002-1097-9684
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Indirect reciprocity with
private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. 2018;115(48):12241-12246.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1810565115
apa: Hilbe, C., Schmid, L., Tkadlec, J., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018).
Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS.
National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810565115
chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Laura Schmid, Josef Tkadlec, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and
Martin Nowak. “Indirect Reciprocity with Private, Noisy, and Incomplete Information.”
PNAS. National Academy of Sciences, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810565115.
ieee: C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Indirect reciprocity
with private, noisy, and incomplete information,” PNAS, vol. 115, no. 48.
National Academy of Sciences, pp. 12241–12246, 2018.
ista: Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Indirect reciprocity
with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. 115(48), 12241–12246.
mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Indirect Reciprocity with Private, Noisy, and Incomplete
Information.” PNAS, vol. 115, no. 48, National Academy of Sciences, 2018,
pp. 12241–46, doi:10.1073/pnas.1810565115.
short: C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 115 (2018)
12241–12246.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:44:05Z
date_published: 2018-11-27T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-14T09:10:09Z
day: '27'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1810565115
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000451351000063'
pmid:
- '30429320'
intvolume: ' 115'
isi: 1
issue: '48'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30429320
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 12241-12246
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: P 23499-N23
name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: PNAS
publication_status: published
publisher: National Academy of Sciences
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on IST Homepage
relation: press_release
url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/no-cooperation-without-open-communication/
record:
- id: '10293'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 115
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '157'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with
group interests 1-7 . According to the ''tragedy of the commons'', these misalignments
can lead to overexploitation and collapse of public resources. The resulting behaviours
can be analysed with the tools of game theory 8 . The theory of direct reciprocity
9-15 suggests that repeated interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous
work has assumed that the public resource remains constant over time. Here we
introduce the idea that the public resource is instead changeable and depends
on the strategic choices of individuals. An intuitive scenario is that cooperation
increases the public resource, whereas defection decreases it. Thus, cooperation
allows the possibility of playing a more valuable game with higher payoffs, whereas
defection leads to a less valuable game. We analyse this idea using the theory
of stochastic games 16-19 and evolutionary game theory. We find that the dependence
of the public resource on previous interactions can greatly enhance the propensity
for cooperation. For these results, the interaction between reciprocity and payoff
feedback is crucial: neither repeated interactions in a constant environment nor
single interactions in a changing environment yield similar cooperation rates.
Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and environment - either
naturally occurring or designed - help to overcome social dilemmas.'
acknowledgement: "European Research Council Start Grant 279307, Austrian Science Fund
(FWF) grant P23499-N23, \r\nC.H. acknowledges support from the ISTFELLOW programme."
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Štepán
full_name: Šimsa, Štepán
last_name: Šimsa
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Evolution of cooperation in stochastic
games. Nature. 2018;559(7713):246-249. doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x
apa: Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Evolution of
cooperation in stochastic games. Nature. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x
chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Štepán Šimsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak.
“Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature. Nature Publishing
Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x.
ieee: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Evolution of cooperation
in stochastic games,” Nature, vol. 559, no. 7713. Nature Publishing Group,
pp. 246–249, 2018.
ista: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Evolution of cooperation in
stochastic games. Nature. 559(7713), 246–249.
mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature,
vol. 559, no. 7713, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 246–49, doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x.
short: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature 559 (2018) 246–249.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:44:56Z
date_published: 2018-07-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-11T13:43:22Z
day: '04'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000438240900054'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 011ab905cf9a410bc2b96f15174d654d
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2019-11-19T08:09:57Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z
file_id: '7049'
file_name: 2018_Nature_Hilbe.pdf
file_size: 2834442
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 559'
isi: 1
issue: '7713'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '07'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 246 - 249
project:
- _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11407
name: Game Theory
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: P 23499-N23
name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: Nature
publication_status: published
publisher: Nature Publishing Group
publist_id: '7764'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on IST Homepage
relation: press_release
url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/engineering-cooperation/
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 559
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '419'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Reciprocity is a major factor in human social life and accounts for a large
part of cooperation in our communities. Direct reciprocity arises when repeated
interactions occur between the same individuals. The framework of iterated games
formalizes this phenomenon. Despite being introduced more than five decades ago,
the concept keeps offering beautiful surprises. Recent theoretical research driven
by new mathematical tools has proposed a remarkable dichotomy among the crucial
strategies: successful individuals either act as partners or as rivals. Rivals
strive for unilateral advantages by applying selfish or extortionate strategies.
Partners aim to share the payoff for mutual cooperation, but are ready to fight
back when being exploited. Which of these behaviours evolves depends on the environment.
Whereas small population sizes and a limited number of rounds favour rivalry,
partner strategies are selected when populations are large and relationships stable.
Only partners allow for evolution of cooperation, while the rivals’ attempt to
put themselves first leads to defection. Hilbe et al. synthesize recent theoretical
work on zero-determinant and ‘rival’ versus ‘partner’ strategies in social dilemmas.
They describe the environments under which these contrasting selfish or cooperative
strategies emerge in evolution.'
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: review
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity.
Nature Human Behaviour. 2018;2:469–477. doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9
apa: Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Partners and rivals in direct
reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9
chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Partners and
Rivals in Direct Reciprocity.” Nature Human Behaviour. Nature Publishing
Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9.
ieee: C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity,”
Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 2. Nature Publishing Group, pp. 469–477, 2018.
ista: Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity.
Nature Human Behaviour. 2, 469–477.
mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Partners and Rivals in Direct Reciprocity.” Nature
Human Behaviour, vol. 2, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 469–477, doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9.
short: C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 2 (2018) 469–477.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:46:22Z
date_published: 2018-03-19T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-13T09:38:54Z
day: '19'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000446612000016'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 571b8cc0ba14e8d5d8b18e439a9835eb
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2019-11-19T08:19:51Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:25Z
file_id: '7052'
file_name: 2018_NatureHumanBeh_Hilbe.pdf
file_size: 598033
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:25Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 2'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 469–477
project:
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: P 23499-N23
name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: Nature Human Behaviour
publication_status: published
publisher: Nature Publishing Group
publist_id: '7404'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- relation: erratum
url: http://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0342-3
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 2
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '454'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our
daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends,
colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated
games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games that a person plays simultaneously
have no effect on each other. Here we introduce a general framework that allows
us to analyze “crosstalk” between a player’s concurrent games. In the presence
of crosstalk, the action a person experiences in one game can alter the person’s
decision in another. We find that crosstalk impedes the maintenance of cooperation
and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. The magnitude of the effect depends
on the population structure. In more densely connected social groups, crosstalk
has a stronger effect. A harsh retaliator, such as Tit-for-Tat, is unable to counteract
crosstalk. The crosstalk framework provides a unified interpretation of direct
and upstream reciprocity in the context of repeated games.
acknowledgement: "This work was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) start
grant 279307: Graph Games (C.K.), Austrian Science Fund (FWF) grant no P23499-N23
(C.K.), FWF\r\nNFN grant no S11407-N23 RiSE/SHiNE (C.K.), Office of Naval Research
grant N00014-16-1-2914 (M.A.N.), National Cancer Institute grant CA179991 (M.A.N.)
and by the John Templeton Foundation. J.G.R. is supported by an Erwin Schrödinger
fellowship\r\n(Austrian Science Fund FWF J-3996). C.H. acknowledges generous support
from the\r\nISTFELLOW program. The Program for Evolutionary Dynamics is supported
in part by\r\na gift from B Wu and Eric Larson."
article_number: '555'
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Johannes
full_name: Reiter, Johannes
id: 4A918E98-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Reiter
orcid: 0000-0002-0170-7353
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: David
full_name: Rand, David
last_name: Rand
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Reiter J, Hilbe C, Rand D, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Crosstalk in concurrent repeated
games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness.
Nature Communications. 2018;9(1). doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8
apa: Reiter, J., Hilbe, C., Rand, D., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Crosstalk
in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger
levels of forgiveness. Nature Communications. Nature Publishing Group.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8
chicago: Reiter, Johannes, Christian Hilbe, David Rand, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and
Martin Nowak. “Crosstalk in Concurrent Repeated Games Impedes Direct Reciprocity
and Requires Stronger Levels of Forgiveness.” Nature Communications. Nature
Publishing Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8.
ieee: J. Reiter, C. Hilbe, D. Rand, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Crosstalk in concurrent
repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness,”
Nature Communications, vol. 9, no. 1. Nature Publishing Group, 2018.
ista: Reiter J, Hilbe C, Rand D, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Crosstalk in concurrent
repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness.
Nature Communications. 9(1), 555.
mla: Reiter, Johannes, et al. “Crosstalk in Concurrent Repeated Games Impedes Direct
Reciprocity and Requires Stronger Levels of Forgiveness.” Nature Communications,
vol. 9, no. 1, 555, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8.
short: J. Reiter, C. Hilbe, D. Rand, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature Communications
9 (2018).
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:46:34Z
date_published: 2018-02-07T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-11T12:51:03Z
day: '07'
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000424318200001'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: b6b90367545b4c615891c960ab0567f1
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:09:18Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:31Z
file_id: '4741'
file_name: IST-2018-964-v1+1_2018_Hilbe_Crosstalk_in.pdf
file_size: 843646
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9'
isi: 1
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '02'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: P 23499-N23
name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11407
name: Game Theory
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: Nature Communications
publication_status: published
publisher: Nature Publishing Group
publist_id: '7368'
pubrep_id: '964'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires
stronger levels of forgiveness
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 9
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '671'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Humans routinely use conditionally cooperative strategies when interacting
in repeated social dilemmas. They are more likely to cooperate if others cooperated
before, and are ready to retaliate if others defected. To capture the emergence
of reciprocity, most previous models consider subjects who can only choose from
a restricted set of representative strategies, or who react to the outcome of
the very last round only. As players memorize more rounds, the dimension of the
strategy space increases exponentially. This increasing computational complexity
renders simulations for individuals with higher cognitive abilities infeasible,
especially if multiplayer interactions are taken into account. Here, we take an
axiomatic approach instead. We propose several properties that a robust cooperative
strategy for a repeated multiplayer dilemma should have. These properties naturally
lead to a unique class of cooperative strategies, which contains the classical
Win-Stay Lose-Shift rule as a special case. A comprehensive numerical analysis
for the prisoner's dilemma and for the public goods game suggests that strategies
of this class readily evolve across various memory-n spaces. Our results reveal
that successful strategies depend not only on how cooperative others were in the
past but also on the respective context of cooperation.
article_processing_charge: Yes (in subscription journal)
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Vaquero
full_name: Martinez, Vaquero
last_name: Martinez
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Hilbe C, Martinez V, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity.
PNAS. 2017;114(18):4715-4720. doi:10.1073/pnas.1621239114
apa: Hilbe, C., Martinez, V., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2017). Memory-n strategies
of direct reciprocity. PNAS. National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1621239114
chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Vaquero Martinez, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak.
“Memory-n Strategies of Direct Reciprocity.” PNAS. National Academy of
Sciences, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1621239114.
ieee: C. Hilbe, V. Martinez, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Memory-n strategies of
direct reciprocity,” PNAS, vol. 114, no. 18. National Academy of Sciences,
pp. 4715–4720, 2017.
ista: Hilbe C, Martinez V, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2017. Memory-n strategies of direct
reciprocity. PNAS. 114(18), 4715–4720.
mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Memory-n Strategies of Direct Reciprocity.” PNAS,
vol. 114, no. 18, National Academy of Sciences, 2017, pp. 4715–20, doi:10.1073/pnas.1621239114.
short: C. Hilbe, V. Martinez, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 114 (2017) 4715–4720.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:47:50Z
date_published: 2017-05-02T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T08:08:37Z
day: '02'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1621239114
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
pmid:
- '28420786'
intvolume: ' 114'
issue: '18'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5422766/
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 4715 - 4720
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: P 23499-N23
name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11407
name: Game Theory
publication: PNAS
publication_identifier:
issn:
- '00278424'
publication_status: published
publisher: National Academy of Sciences
publist_id: '7053'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity
type: journal_article
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 114
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '699'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In antagonistic symbioses, such as host–parasite interactions, one population’s
success is the other’s loss. In mutualistic symbioses, such as division of labor,
both parties can gain, but they might have different preferences over the possible
mutualistic arrangements. The rates of evolution of the two populations in a symbiosis
are important determinants of which population will be more successful: Faster
evolution is thought to be favored in antagonistic symbioses (the “Red Queen effect”),
but disfavored in certain mutualistic symbioses (the “Red King effect”). However,
it remains unclear which biological parameters drive these effects. Here, we analyze
the effects of the various determinants of evolutionary rate: generation time,
mutation rate, population size, and the intensity of natural selection. Our main
results hold for the case where mutation is infrequent. Slower evolution causes
a long-term advantage in an important class of mutualistic interactions. Surprisingly,
less intense selection is the strongest driver of this Red King effect, whereas
relative mutation rates and generation times have little effect. In antagonistic
interactions, faster evolution by any means is beneficial. Our results provide
insight into the demographic evolution of symbionts. '
author:
- first_name: Carl
full_name: Veller, Carl
last_name: Veller
- first_name: Laura
full_name: Hayward, Laura
last_name: Hayward
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
citation:
ama: Veller C, Hayward L, Nowak M, Hilbe C. The red queen and king in finite populations.
PNAS. 2017;114(27):E5396-E5405. doi:10.1073/pnas.1702020114
apa: Veller, C., Hayward, L., Nowak, M., & Hilbe, C. (2017). The red queen and
king in finite populations. PNAS. National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1702020114
chicago: Veller, Carl, Laura Hayward, Martin Nowak, and Christian Hilbe. “The Red
Queen and King in Finite Populations.” PNAS. National Academy of Sciences,
2017. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1702020114.
ieee: C. Veller, L. Hayward, M. Nowak, and C. Hilbe, “The red queen and king in
finite populations,” PNAS, vol. 114, no. 27. National Academy of Sciences,
pp. E5396–E5405, 2017.
ista: Veller C, Hayward L, Nowak M, Hilbe C. 2017. The red queen and king in finite
populations. PNAS. 114(27), E5396–E5405.
mla: Veller, Carl, et al. “The Red Queen and King in Finite Populations.” PNAS,
vol. 114, no. 27, National Academy of Sciences, 2017, pp. E5396–405, doi:10.1073/pnas.1702020114.
short: C. Veller, L. Hayward, M. Nowak, C. Hilbe, PNAS 114 (2017) E5396–E5405.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:48:00Z
date_published: 2017-07-03T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T08:11:21Z
day: '03'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1702020114
external_id:
pmid:
- '28630336'
intvolume: ' 114'
issue: '27'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5502615/
month: '07'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: E5396 - E5405
pmid: 1
publication: PNAS
publication_identifier:
issn:
- '00278424'
publication_status: published
publisher: National Academy of Sciences
publist_id: '7002'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: The red queen and king in finite populations
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 114
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1322'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Direct reciprocity is a major mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.
Several classical studies have suggested that humans should quickly learn to adopt
reciprocal strategies to establish mutual cooperation in repeated interactions.
On the other hand, the recently discovered theory of ZD strategies has found that
subjects who use extortionate strategies are able to exploit and subdue cooperators.
Although such extortioners have been predicted to succeed in any population of
adaptive opponents, theoretical follow-up studies questioned whether extortion
can evolve in reality. However, most of these studies presumed that individuals
have similar strategic possibilities and comparable outside options, whereas asymmetries
are ubiquitous in real world applications. Here we show with a model and an economic
experiment that extortionate strategies readily emerge once subjects differ in
their strategic power. Our experiment combines a repeated social dilemma with
asymmetric partner choice. In our main treatment there is one randomly chosen
group member who is unilaterally allowed to exchange one of the other group members
after every ten rounds of the social dilemma. We find that this asymmetric replacement
opportunity generally promotes cooperation, but often the resulting payoff distribution
reflects the underlying power structure. Almost half of the subjects in a better
strategic position turn into extortioners, who quickly proceed to exploit their
peers. By adapting their cooperation probabilities consistent with ZD theory,
extortioners force their co-players to cooperate without being similarly cooperative
themselves. Comparison to non-extortionate players under the same conditions indicates
a substantial net gain to extortion. Our results thus highlight how power asymmetries
can endanger mutually beneficial interactions, and transform them into exploitative
relationships. In particular, our results indicate that the extortionate strategies
predicted from ZD theory could play a more prominent role in our daily interactions
than previously thought.
acknowledgement: 'CH was funded by the Schrödinger program of the Austrian Science
Fund (FWF) J3475. '
article_number: e0163867
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Kristin
full_name: Hagel, Kristin
last_name: Hagel
- first_name: Manfred
full_name: Milinski, Manfred
last_name: Milinski
citation:
ama: Hilbe C, Hagel K, Milinski M. Asymmetric power boosts extortion in an economic
experiment. PLoS One. 2016;11(10). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0163867
apa: Hilbe, C., Hagel, K., & Milinski, M. (2016). Asymmetric power boosts extortion
in an economic experiment. PLoS One. Public Library of Science. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0163867
chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Kristin Hagel, and Manfred Milinski. “Asymmetric Power
Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment.” PLoS One. Public Library of
Science, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.
ieee: C. Hilbe, K. Hagel, and M. Milinski, “Asymmetric power boosts extortion in
an economic experiment,” PLoS One, vol. 11, no. 10. Public Library of Science,
2016.
ista: Hilbe C, Hagel K, Milinski M. 2016. Asymmetric power boosts extortion in an
economic experiment. PLoS One. 11(10), e0163867.
mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic
Experiment.” PLoS One, vol. 11, no. 10, e0163867, Public Library of Science,
2016, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.
short: C. Hilbe, K. Hagel, M. Milinski, PLoS One 11 (2016).
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:51:22Z
date_published: 2016-10-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-02-23T14:11:27Z
day: '04'
ddc:
- '004'
- '006'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0163867
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 6b33e394003dfe8b4ca6be1858aaa8e3
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:08:08Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:44Z
file_id: '4668'
file_name: IST-2016-716-v1+1_journal.pone.0163867.PDF
file_size: 2077905
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:44Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 11'
issue: '10'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '10'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication: PLoS One
publication_status: published
publisher: Public Library of Science
publist_id: '5948'
pubrep_id: '716'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
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status: public
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status: public
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Asymmetric power boosts extortion in an economic experiment
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 11
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1333'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain.
In many dilemmas, such as elected governments negotiating climate-change mitigation
measures, the decisions are made not by individual players but by their representatives.
However, the behaviour of representatives in social dilemmas has not been investigated
experimentally. Here inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emissions
reductions, we experimentally study a collective-risk social dilemma that involves
representatives deciding on behalf of their fellow group members. Representatives
can be re-elected or voted out after each consecutive collective-risk game. Selfish
players are preferentially elected and are hence found most frequently in the
"representatives" treatment. Across all treatments, we identify the
selfish players as extortioners. As predicted by our mathematical model, their
steadfast strategies enforce cooperation from fair players who finally compensate
almost completely the deficit caused by the extortionate co-players. Everybody
gains, but the extortionate representatives and their groups gain the most.
acknowledgement: We thank the students for participation; H.-J. Krambeck for writing
the software for the game; H. Arndt, T. Bakker, L. Becks, H. Brendelberger, S. Dobler
and T. Reusch for support; and the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science
for funding.
article_number: '10915'
author:
- first_name: Manfred
full_name: Milinski, Manfred
last_name: Milinski
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Dirk
full_name: Semmann, Dirk
last_name: Semmann
- first_name: Ralf
full_name: Sommerfeld, Ralf
last_name: Sommerfeld
- first_name: Jochem
full_name: Marotzke, Jochem
last_name: Marotzke
citation:
ama: Milinski M, Hilbe C, Semmann D, Sommerfeld R, Marotzke J. Humans choose representatives
who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion. Nature Communications.
2016;7. doi:10.1038/ncomms10915
apa: Milinski, M., Hilbe, C., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R., & Marotzke, J. (2016).
Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through
extortion. Nature Communications. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915
chicago: Milinski, Manfred, Christian Hilbe, Dirk Semmann, Ralf Sommerfeld, and
Jochem Marotzke. “Humans Choose Representatives Who Enforce Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas through Extortion.” Nature Communications. Nature Publishing Group,
2016. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915.
ieee: M. Milinski, C. Hilbe, D. Semmann, R. Sommerfeld, and J. Marotzke, “Humans
choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion,”
Nature Communications, vol. 7. Nature Publishing Group, 2016.
ista: Milinski M, Hilbe C, Semmann D, Sommerfeld R, Marotzke J. 2016. Humans choose
representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion.
Nature Communications. 7, 10915.
mla: Milinski, Manfred, et al. “Humans Choose Representatives Who Enforce Cooperation
in Social Dilemmas through Extortion.” Nature Communications, vol. 7, 10915,
Nature Publishing Group, 2016, doi:10.1038/ncomms10915.
short: M. Milinski, C. Hilbe, D. Semmann, R. Sommerfeld, J. Marotzke, Nature Communications
7 (2016).
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:51:25Z
date_published: 2016-03-07T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:49:57Z
day: '07'
ddc:
- '519'
- '530'
- '599'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/ncomms10915
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 9ea0d7ce59a555a1cb8353d5559407cb
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:10:44Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:44Z
file_id: '4834'
file_name: IST-2016-661-v1+1_ncomms10915.pdf
file_size: 1432577
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:44Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 7'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication: Nature Communications
publication_status: published
publisher: Nature Publishing Group
publist_id: '5935'
pubrep_id: '661'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through
extortion
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1423'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based
on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional
strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot
social dilemmas. Direct reciprocity requires that individuals keep track of their
past interactions and find the right response. However, there are natural bounds
on strategic complexity: Humans find it difficult to remember past interactions
accurately, especially over long timespans. Given these limitations, it is natural
to ask how complex strategies need to be for cooperation to evolve. Here, we study
stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations to systematically
compare the evolutionary performance of reactive strategies, which only respond
to the co-player''s previous move, and memory-one strategies, which take into
account the own and the co-player''s previous move. In both cases, we compare
deterministic strategy and stochastic strategy spaces. For reactive strategies
and small costs, we find that stochasticity benefits cooperation, because it allows
for generous-tit-for-tat. For memory one strategies and small costs, we find that
stochasticity does not increase the propensity for cooperation, because the deterministic
rule of win-stay, lose-shift works best. For memory one strategies and large costs,
however, stochasticity can augment cooperation.'
acknowledgement: C.H. acknowledges generous funding from the Schrödinger scholarship
of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), J3475.
article_number: '25676'
author:
- first_name: Seung
full_name: Baek, Seung
last_name: Baek
- first_name: Hyeongchai
full_name: Jeong, Hyeongchai
last_name: Jeong
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Baek S, Jeong H, Hilbe C, Nowak M. Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies
of direct reciprocity. Scientific Reports. 2016;6. doi:10.1038/srep25676
apa: Baek, S., Jeong, H., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. (2016). Comparing reactive
and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity. Scientific Reports. Nature
Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep25676
chicago: Baek, Seung, Hyeongchai Jeong, Christian Hilbe, and Martin Nowak. “Comparing
Reactive and Memory-One Strategies of Direct Reciprocity.” Scientific Reports.
Nature Publishing Group, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep25676.
ieee: S. Baek, H. Jeong, C. Hilbe, and M. Nowak, “Comparing reactive and memory-one
strategies of direct reciprocity,” Scientific Reports, vol. 6. Nature Publishing
Group, 2016.
ista: Baek S, Jeong H, Hilbe C, Nowak M. 2016. Comparing reactive and memory-one
strategies of direct reciprocity. Scientific Reports. 6, 25676.
mla: Baek, Seung, et al. “Comparing Reactive and Memory-One Strategies of Direct
Reciprocity.” Scientific Reports, vol. 6, 25676, Nature Publishing Group,
2016, doi:10.1038/srep25676.
short: S. Baek, H. Jeong, C. Hilbe, M. Nowak, Scientific Reports 6 (2016).
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:51:56Z
date_published: 2016-05-10T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:50:38Z
day: '10'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/srep25676
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: ee17c482370d2e1b3add393710d3c696
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:18:08Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:53Z
file_id: '5327'
file_name: IST-2016-590-v1+1_srep25676.pdf
file_size: 1349915
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:53Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 6'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication: Scientific Reports
publication_status: published
publisher: Nature Publishing Group
publist_id: '5784'
pubrep_id: '590'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 6
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1426'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Brood parasites exploit their host in order to increase their own fitness.
Typically, this results in an arms race between parasite trickery and host defence.
Thus, it is puzzling to observe hosts that accept parasitism without any resistance.
The ‘mafia’ hypothesis suggests that these hosts accept parasitism to avoid retaliation.
Retaliation has been shown to evolve when the hosts condition their response to
mafia parasites, who use depredation as a targeted response to rejection. However,
it is unclear if acceptance would also emerge when ‘farming’ parasites are present
in the population. Farming parasites use depredation to synchronize the timing
with the host, destroying mature clutches to force the host to re-nest. Herein,
we develop an evolutionary model to analyse the interaction between depredatory
parasites and their hosts. We show that coevolutionary cycles between farmers
and mafia can still induce host acceptance of brood parasites. However, this equilibrium
is unstable and in the long-run the dynamics of this host–parasite interaction
exhibits strong oscillations: when farmers are the majority, accepters conditional
to mafia (the host will reject first and only accept after retaliation by the
parasite) have a higher fitness than unconditional accepters (the host always
accepts parasitism). This leads to an increase in mafia parasites’ fitness and
in turn induce an optimal environment for accepter hosts.'
acknowledgement: C.H. gratefully acknowledges funding by the Schrödinger scholarship
of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) J3475.
article_number: '160036'
author:
- first_name: Maria
full_name: Chakra, Maria
last_name: Chakra
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Arne
full_name: Traulsen, Arne
last_name: Traulsen
citation:
ama: Chakra M, Hilbe C, Traulsen A. Coevolutionary interactions between farmers
and mafia induce host acceptance of avian brood parasites. Royal Society Open
Science. 2016;3(5). doi:10.1098/rsos.160036
apa: Chakra, M., Hilbe, C., & Traulsen, A. (2016). Coevolutionary interactions
between farmers and mafia induce host acceptance of avian brood parasites. Royal
Society Open Science. Royal Society, The. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.160036
chicago: Chakra, Maria, Christian Hilbe, and Arne Traulsen. “Coevolutionary Interactions
between Farmers and Mafia Induce Host Acceptance of Avian Brood Parasites.” Royal
Society Open Science. Royal Society, The, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.160036.
ieee: M. Chakra, C. Hilbe, and A. Traulsen, “Coevolutionary interactions between
farmers and mafia induce host acceptance of avian brood parasites,” Royal Society
Open Science, vol. 3, no. 5. Royal Society, The, 2016.
ista: Chakra M, Hilbe C, Traulsen A. 2016. Coevolutionary interactions between farmers
and mafia induce host acceptance of avian brood parasites. Royal Society Open
Science. 3(5), 160036.
mla: Chakra, Maria, et al. “Coevolutionary Interactions between Farmers and Mafia
Induce Host Acceptance of Avian Brood Parasites.” Royal Society Open Science,
vol. 3, no. 5, 160036, Royal Society, The, 2016, doi:10.1098/rsos.160036.
short: M. Chakra, C. Hilbe, A. Traulsen, Royal Society Open Science 3 (2016).
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:51:57Z
date_published: 2016-05-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:50:39Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1098/rsos.160036
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: bf84211b31fe87451e738ba301d729c3
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:14:49Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:53Z
file_id: '5104'
file_name: IST-2016-589-v1+1_160036.full.pdf
file_size: 937002
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:53Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 3'
issue: '5'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication: Royal Society Open Science
publication_status: published
publisher: Royal Society, The
publist_id: '5776'
pubrep_id: '589'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Coevolutionary interactions between farmers and mafia induce host acceptance
of avian brood parasites
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 3
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1200'
acknowledgement: C.H. acknowledges generous support from the ISTFELLOW program.
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Arne
full_name: Traulsen, Arne
last_name: Traulsen
citation:
ama: 'Hilbe C, Traulsen A. Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations
can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on “Evolutionary
game theory using agent-based methods” by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze.
Physics of Life Reviews. 2016;19:29-31. doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004'
apa: 'Hilbe, C., & Traulsen, A. (2016). Only the combination of mathematics
and agent based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling:
Comment on “Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods” by C. Adami, J.
Schossau and A. Hintze. Physics of Life Reviews. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004'
chicago: 'Hilbe, Christian, and Arne Traulsen. “Only the Combination of Mathematics
and Agent Based Simulations Can Leverage the Full Potential of Evolutionary Modeling:
Comment on ‘Evolutionary Game Theory Using Agent-Based Methods’ by C. Adami, J.
Schossau and A. Hintze.” Physics of Life Reviews. Elsevier, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004.'
ieee: 'C. Hilbe and A. Traulsen, “Only the combination of mathematics and agent
based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment
on ‘Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods’ by C. Adami, J. Schossau
and A. Hintze,” Physics of Life Reviews, vol. 19. Elsevier, pp. 29–31,
2016.'
ista: 'Hilbe C, Traulsen A. 2016. Only the combination of mathematics and agent
based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment
on “Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods” by C. Adami, J. Schossau
and A. Hintze. Physics of Life Reviews. 19, 29–31.'
mla: 'Hilbe, Christian, and Arne Traulsen. “Only the Combination of Mathematics
and Agent Based Simulations Can Leverage the Full Potential of Evolutionary Modeling:
Comment on ‘Evolutionary Game Theory Using Agent-Based Methods’ by C. Adami, J.
Schossau and A. Hintze.” Physics of Life Reviews, vol. 19, Elsevier, 2016,
pp. 29–31, doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004.'
short: C. Hilbe, A. Traulsen, Physics of Life Reviews 19 (2016) 29–31.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:50:40Z
date_published: 2016-12-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:49:03Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '530'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 95e6dc78278334b99dacbf8822509364
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:11:02Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:39Z
file_id: '4855'
file_name: IST-2017-798-v1+1_comment_adami.pdf
file_size: 171352
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:39Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 19'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '12'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 29 - 31
project:
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: Physics of Life Reviews
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
publist_id: '6150'
pubrep_id: '798'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: 'Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations can leverage
the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on “Evolutionary game theory
using agent-based methods” by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze'
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by_nc_nd.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
short: CC BY-NC-ND (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 19
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '9867'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In the beginning of our experiment, subjects were asked to read a few pages
on their computer screens that would explain the rules of the subsequent game.
Here, we provide these instructions, translated from German.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Kristin
full_name: Hagel, Kristin
last_name: Hagel
- first_name: Manfred
full_name: Milinski, Manfred
last_name: Milinski
citation:
ama: Hilbe C, Hagel K, Milinski M. Experimental game instructions. 2016. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.s008
apa: Hilbe, C., Hagel, K., & Milinski, M. (2016). Experimental game instructions.
Public Library of Science. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.s008
chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Kristin Hagel, and Manfred Milinski. “Experimental Game
Instructions.” Public Library of Science, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.s008.
ieee: C. Hilbe, K. Hagel, and M. Milinski, “Experimental game instructions.” Public
Library of Science, 2016.
ista: Hilbe C, Hagel K, Milinski M. 2016. Experimental game instructions, Public
Library of Science, 10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.s008.
mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. Experimental Game Instructions. Public Library
of Science, 2016, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.s008.
short: C. Hilbe, K. Hagel, M. Milinski, (2016).
date_created: 2021-08-10T08:42:00Z
date_updated: 2023-02-21T16:59:01Z
day: '04'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.s008
month: '10'
oa_version: Published Version
publisher: Public Library of Science
related_material:
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relation: used_in_publication
status: public
status: public
title: Experimental game instructions
type: research_data_reference
user_id: 6785fbc1-c503-11eb-8a32-93094b40e1cf
year: '2016'
...