---
_id: '15007'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Traditional blockchains grant the miner of a block full control not only over
which transactions but also their order. This constitutes a major flaw discovered
with the introduction of decentralized finance and allows miners to perform MEV
attacks. In this paper, we address the issue of sandwich attacks by providing
a construction that takes as input a blockchain protocol and outputs a new blockchain
protocol with the same security but in which sandwich attacks are not profitable.
Furthermore, our protocol is fully decentralized with no trusted third parties
or heavy cryptography primitives and carries a linear increase in latency and
minimum computation overhead.
acknowledgement: "We would like to thank Krzysztof Pietrzak and Jovana Mićić for useful
discussions. This work has been funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNSF) under grant agreement Nr. 200021_188443 (Advanced Consensus Protocols).\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '12'
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Orestis
full_name: Alpos, Orestis
last_name: Alpos
- first_name: Ignacio
full_name: Amores-Sesar, Ignacio
last_name: Amores-Sesar
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Cachin, Christian
last_name: Cachin
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
citation:
ama: 'Alpos O, Amores-Sesar I, Cachin C, Yeo MX. Eating sandwiches: Modular and
lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks. In: 27th International
Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems. Vol 286. Schloss Dagstuhl
- Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2024. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12'
apa: 'Alpos, O., Amores-Sesar, I., Cachin, C., & Yeo, M. X. (2024). Eating sandwiches:
Modular and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks. In 27th
International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (Vol. 286).
Tokyo, Japan: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12'
chicago: 'Alpos, Orestis, Ignacio Amores-Sesar, Christian Cachin, and Michelle X
Yeo. “Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination of Transaction Reordering
Attacks.” In 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems,
Vol. 286. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2024. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12.'
ieee: 'O. Alpos, I. Amores-Sesar, C. Cachin, and M. X. Yeo, “Eating sandwiches:
Modular and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks,” in 27th
International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Tokyo, Japan,
2024, vol. 286.'
ista: 'Alpos O, Amores-Sesar I, Cachin C, Yeo MX. 2024. Eating sandwiches: Modular
and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks. 27th International
Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems. OPODIS: Conference on Principles
of Distributed Systems, LIPIcs, vol. 286, 12.'
mla: 'Alpos, Orestis, et al. “Eating Sandwiches: Modular and Lightweight Elimination
of Transaction Reordering Attacks.” 27th International Conference on Principles
of Distributed Systems, vol. 286, 12, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für
Informatik, 2024, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12.'
short: O. Alpos, I. Amores-Sesar, C. Cachin, M.X. Yeo, in:, 27th International Conference
on Principles of Distributed Systems, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
2024.
conference:
end_date: 2023-12-08
location: Tokyo, Japan
name: 'OPODIS: Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems'
start_date: 2023-12-06
date_created: 2024-02-18T23:01:02Z
date_published: 2024-01-18T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-02-26T10:18:18Z
day: '18'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.12
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2307.02954'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 2993e810a45e8c8056106834b07aea92
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2024-02-26T10:16:57Z
date_updated: 2024-02-26T10:16:57Z
file_id: '15031'
file_name: 2024_LIPICs_Alpos.pdf
file_size: 1505994
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2024-02-26T10:16:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 286'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication: 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783959773089'
issn:
- 1868-8969
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Eating sandwiches: Modular and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering
attacks'
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 286
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '14490'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising solution to the scalability
problem of cryptocurrencies. Any two users connected by a payment channel in the
network can theoretically send an unbounded number of instant, costless transactions
between them. Users who are not directly connected can also transact with each
other in a multi-hop fashion. In this work, we study the incentive structure behind
the creation of payment channel networks, particularly from the point of view
of a single user that wants to join the network. We define a utility function
for a new user in terms of expected revenue, expected fees, and the cost of creating
channels, and then provide constant factor approximation algorithms that optimise
the utility function given a certain budget. Additionally, we take a step back
from a single user to the whole network and examine the parameter spaces under
which simple graph topologies form a Nash equilibrium.
acknowledgement: The work was partially supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF)
through the project CoRaF (grant 2020388). It was also partially supported by NCN
Grant 2019/35/B/ST6/04138 and ERC Grant 885666.
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Zeta
full_name: Avarikioti, Zeta
last_name: Avarikioti
- first_name: Tomasz
full_name: Lizurej, Tomasz
last_name: Lizurej
- first_name: Tomasz
full_name: Michalak, Tomasz
last_name: Michalak
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
citation:
ama: 'Avarikioti Z, Lizurej T, Michalak T, Yeo MX. Lightning creation games. In:
43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems. Vol 2023.
IEEE; 2023:603-613. doi:10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00037'
apa: 'Avarikioti, Z., Lizurej, T., Michalak, T., & Yeo, M. X. (2023). Lightning
creation games. In 43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
(Vol. 2023, pp. 603–613). Hong Kong, China: IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00037'
chicago: Avarikioti, Zeta, Tomasz Lizurej, Tomasz Michalak, and Michelle X Yeo.
“Lightning Creation Games.” In 43rd International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems, 2023:603–13. IEEE, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00037.
ieee: Z. Avarikioti, T. Lizurej, T. Michalak, and M. X. Yeo, “Lightning creation
games,” in 43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems,
Hong Kong, China, 2023, vol. 2023, pp. 603–613.
ista: 'Avarikioti Z, Lizurej T, Michalak T, Yeo MX. 2023. Lightning creation games.
43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems. ICDCS: International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems vol. 2023, 603–613.'
mla: Avarikioti, Zeta, et al. “Lightning Creation Games.” 43rd International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, vol. 2023, IEEE, 2023, pp. 603–13,
doi:10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00037.
short: Z. Avarikioti, T. Lizurej, T. Michalak, M.X. Yeo, in:, 43rd International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, IEEE, 2023, pp. 603–613.
conference:
end_date: 2023-07-21
location: Hong Kong, China
name: 'ICDCS: International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems'
start_date: 2023-07-18
date_created: 2023-11-05T23:00:54Z
date_published: 2023-10-11T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-11-30T10:54:51Z
day: '11'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00037
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2306.16006'
intvolume: ' 2023'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2306.16006
month: '10'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 603-613
publication: 43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 2575-8411
isbn:
- '9798350339864'
publication_status: published
publisher: IEEE
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '14506'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Lightning creation games
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 2023
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '14506'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Payment channel networks are a promising approach to improve the scalability
bottleneck\r\nof cryptocurrencies. Two design principles behind payment channel
networks are\r\nefficiency and privacy. Payment channel networks improve efficiency
by allowing users\r\nto transact in a peer-to-peer fashion along multi-hop routes
in the network, avoiding\r\nthe lengthy process of consensus on the blockchain.
Transacting over payment channel\r\nnetworks also improves privacy as these transactions
are not broadcast to the blockchain.\r\nDespite the influx of recent protocols
built on top of payment channel networks and\r\ntheir analysis, a common shortcoming
of many of these protocols is that they typically\r\nfocus only on either improving
efficiency or privacy, but not both. Another limitation\r\non the efficiency front
is that the models used to model actions, costs and utilities of\r\nusers are
limited or come with unrealistic assumptions.\r\nThis thesis aims to address some
of the shortcomings of recent protocols and algorithms\r\non payment channel networks,
particularly in their privacy and efficiency aspects. We\r\nfirst present a payment
route discovery protocol based on hub labelling and private\r\ninformation retrieval
that hides the route query and is also efficient. We then present\r\na rebalancing
protocol that formulates the rebalancing problem as a linear program\r\nand solves
the linear program using multiparty computation so as to hide the channel\r\nbalances.
The rebalancing solution as output by our protocol is also globally optimal.\r\nWe
go on to develop more realistic models of the action space, costs, and utilities
of\r\nboth existing and new users that want to join the network. In each of these
settings,\r\nwe also develop algorithms to optimise the utility of these users
with good guarantees\r\non the approximation and competitive ratios."
alternative_title:
- ISTA Thesis
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
orcid: 0009-0001-3676-4809
citation:
ama: Yeo MX. Advances in efficiency and privacy in payment channel network analysis.
2023. doi:10.15479/14506
apa: Yeo, M. X. (2023). Advances in efficiency and privacy in payment channel
network analysis. Institute of Science and Technology Austria. https://doi.org/10.15479/14506
chicago: Yeo, Michelle X. “Advances in Efficiency and Privacy in Payment Channel
Network Analysis.” Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2023. https://doi.org/10.15479/14506.
ieee: M. X. Yeo, “Advances in efficiency and privacy in payment channel network
analysis,” Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2023.
ista: Yeo MX. 2023. Advances in efficiency and privacy in payment channel network
analysis. Institute of Science and Technology Austria.
mla: Yeo, Michelle X. Advances in Efficiency and Privacy in Payment Channel Network
Analysis. Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2023, doi:10.15479/14506.
short: M.X. Yeo, Advances in Efficiency and Privacy in Payment Channel Network Analysis,
Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2023.
date_created: 2023-11-10T08:10:43Z
date_published: 2023-11-10T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-14T09:09:52Z
day: '10'
ddc:
- '000'
degree_awarded: PhD
department:
- _id: GradSch
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.15479/14506
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: closed
checksum: 521c72818d720a52b377207b2ee87b6a
content_type: application/x-zip-compressed
creator: cchlebak
date_created: 2023-11-23T10:29:55Z
date_updated: 2023-11-23T10:29:55Z
file_id: '14598'
file_name: thesis_yeo.zip
file_size: 3037720
relation: source_file
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checksum: 0ed5d16899687aecf13d843c9878c9f2
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cchlebak
date_created: 2023-11-23T10:30:08Z
date_updated: 2023-11-23T10:30:08Z
file_id: '14599'
file_name: thesis_yeo.pdf
file_size: 2717256
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2023-11-23T10:30:08Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: '162'
project:
- _id: 2564DBCA-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '665385'
name: International IST Doctoral Program
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2663 - 337X
publication_status: published
publisher: Institute of Science and Technology Austria
related_material:
record:
- id: '9969'
relation: part_of_dissertation
status: public
- id: '14490'
relation: part_of_dissertation
status: public
- id: '13238'
relation: part_of_dissertation
status: public
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
title: Advances in efficiency and privacy in payment channel network analysis
type: dissertation
user_id: 8b945eb4-e2f2-11eb-945a-df72226e66a9
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '14736'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising technology to improve the
scalability of cryptocurrencies. PCNs, however, face the challenge that the frequent
usage of certain routes may deplete channels in one direction, and hence prevent
further transactions. In order to reap the full potential of PCNs, recharging
and rebalancing mechanisms are required to provision channels, as well as an admission
control logic to decide which transactions to reject in case capacity is insufficient.
This paper presents a formal model of this optimisation problem. In particular,
we consider an online algorithms perspective, where transactions arrive over time
in an unpredictable manner. Our main contributions are competitive online algorithms
which come with provable guarantees over time. We empirically evaluate our algorithms
on randomly generated transactions to compare the average performance of our algorithms
to our theoretical bounds. We also show how this model and approach differs from
related problems in classic communication networks.
acknowledgement: Supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(BMBF), grant 16KISK020K (6G-RIC), 2021–2025, and ERC CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Mahsa
full_name: Bastankhah, Mahsa
last_name: Bastankhah
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Mohammad Ali
full_name: Maddah-Ali, Mohammad Ali
last_name: Maddah-Ali
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Schmid, Stefan
last_name: Schmid
- first_name: Jakub
full_name: Svoboda, Jakub
id: 130759D2-D7DD-11E9-87D2-DE0DE6697425
last_name: Svoboda
orcid: 0000-0002-1419-3267
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
orcid: 0009-0001-3676-4809
citation:
ama: 'Bastankhah M, Chatterjee K, Maddah-Ali MA, Schmid S, Svoboda J, Yeo MX. R2:
Boosting liquidity in payment channel networks with online admission control.
In: 27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security.
Vol 13950. Springer Nature; 2023:309-325. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_18'
apa: 'Bastankhah, M., Chatterjee, K., Maddah-Ali, M. A., Schmid, S., Svoboda, J.,
& Yeo, M. X. (2023). R2: Boosting liquidity in payment channel networks with online
admission control. In 27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
and Data Security (Vol. 13950, pp. 309–325). Bol, Brac, Croatia: Springer
Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_18'
chicago: 'Bastankhah, Mahsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali, Stefan
Schmid, Jakub Svoboda, and Michelle X Yeo. “R2: Boosting Liquidity in Payment
Channel Networks with Online Admission Control.” In 27th International Conference
on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 13950:309–25. Springer Nature,
2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_18.'
ieee: 'M. Bastankhah, K. Chatterjee, M. A. Maddah-Ali, S. Schmid, J. Svoboda, and
M. X. Yeo, “R2: Boosting liquidity in payment channel networks with online admission
control,” in 27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data
Security, Bol, Brac, Croatia, 2023, vol. 13950, pp. 309–325.'
ista: 'Bastankhah M, Chatterjee K, Maddah-Ali MA, Schmid S, Svoboda J, Yeo MX. 2023.
R2: Boosting liquidity in payment channel networks with online admission control.
27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC:
Financial Cryptography and Data Security, LNCS, vol. 13950, 309–325.'
mla: 'Bastankhah, Mahsa, et al. “R2: Boosting Liquidity in Payment Channel Networks
with Online Admission Control.” 27th International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, vol. 13950, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 309–25,
doi:10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_18.'
short: M. Bastankhah, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Maddah-Ali, S. Schmid, J. Svoboda, M.X.
Yeo, in:, 27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security,
Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 309–325.
conference:
end_date: 2023-05-05
location: Bol, Brac, Croatia
name: 'FC: Financial Cryptography and Data Security'
start_date: 2023-05-01
date_created: 2024-01-08T09:30:22Z
date_published: 2023-12-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-14T09:10:01Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrCh
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_18
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: ' 13950'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '12'
oa_version: None
page: 309-325
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: 27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
publication_identifier:
eisbn:
- '9783031477546'
eissn:
- 1611-3349
isbn:
- '9783031477539'
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'R2: Boosting liquidity in payment channel networks with online admission control'
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 13950
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '13238'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We consider a natural problem dealing with weighted packet selection across
a rechargeable link, which e.g., finds applications in cryptocurrency networks.
The capacity of a link (u, v) is determined by how much nodes u and v allocate
for this link. Specifically, the input is a finite ordered sequence of packets
that arrive in both directions along a link. Given (u, v) and a packet of weight
x going from u to v, node u can either accept or reject the packet. If u accepts
the packet, the capacity on link (u, v) decreases by x. Correspondingly, v’s capacity
on (u, v) increases by x. If a node rejects the packet, this will entail a cost
affinely linear in the weight of the packet. A link is “rechargeable” in the sense
that the total capacity of the link has to remain constant, but the allocation
of capacity at the ends of the link can depend arbitrarily on the nodes’ decisions.
The goal is to minimise the sum of the capacity injected into the link and the
cost of rejecting packets. We show that the problem is NP-hard, but can be approximated
efficiently with a ratio of (1+ε)⋅(1+3–√) for some arbitrary ε>0.\r\n."
acknowledgement: We thank Mahsa Bastankhah and Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali for fruitful
discussions about different variants of the problem. This work is supported by the
European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Project 864228 (AdjustNet), 2020-2025,
the ERC CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt), and the German Research Foundation (DFG) grant
470029389 (FlexNets), 2021–2024.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Schmid, Stefan
last_name: Schmid
- first_name: Jakub
full_name: Svoboda, Jakub
id: 130759D2-D7DD-11E9-87D2-DE0DE6697425
last_name: Svoboda
orcid: 0000-0002-1419-3267
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
orcid: 0009-0001-3676-4809
citation:
ama: 'Schmid S, Svoboda J, Yeo MX. Weighted packet selection for rechargeable links
in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation. In: SIROCCO 2023:
Structural Information and Communication Complexity . Vol 13892. Springer
Nature; 2023:576-594. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-32733-9_26'
apa: 'Schmid, S., Svoboda, J., & Yeo, M. X. (2023). Weighted packet selection
for rechargeable links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation.
In SIROCCO 2023: Structural Information and Communication Complexity (Vol.
13892, pp. 576–594). Alcala de Henares, Spain: Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32733-9_26'
chicago: 'Schmid, Stefan, Jakub Svoboda, and Michelle X Yeo. “Weighted Packet Selection
for Rechargeable Links in Cryptocurrency Networks: Complexity and Approximation.”
In SIROCCO 2023: Structural Information and Communication Complexity ,
13892:576–94. Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32733-9_26.'
ieee: 'S. Schmid, J. Svoboda, and M. X. Yeo, “Weighted packet selection for rechargeable
links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation,” in SIROCCO
2023: Structural Information and Communication Complexity , Alcala de Henares,
Spain, 2023, vol. 13892, pp. 576–594.'
ista: 'Schmid S, Svoboda J, Yeo MX. 2023. Weighted packet selection for rechargeable
links in cryptocurrency networks: Complexity and approximation. SIROCCO 2023:
Structural Information and Communication Complexity . SIROCCO: Structural Information
and Communication Complexity, LNCS, vol. 13892, 576–594.'
mla: 'Schmid, Stefan, et al. “Weighted Packet Selection for Rechargeable Links in Cryptocurrency
Networks: Complexity and Approximation.” SIROCCO 2023: Structural Information
and Communication Complexity , vol. 13892, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 576–94,
doi:10.1007/978-3-031-32733-9_26.'
short: 'S. Schmid, J. Svoboda, M.X. Yeo, in:, SIROCCO 2023: Structural Information
and Communication Complexity , Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 576–594.'
conference:
end_date: 2023-06-09
location: Alcala de Henares, Spain
name: 'SIROCCO: Structural Information and Communication Complexity'
start_date: 2023-06-06
date_created: 2023-07-16T22:01:12Z
date_published: 2023-05-25T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-14T09:09:53Z
day: '25'
department:
- _id: KrPi
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-32733-9_26
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2204.13459'
intvolume: ' 13892'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2204.13459
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 576-594
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: 'SIROCCO 2023: Structural Information and Communication Complexity '
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1611-3349
isbn:
- '9783031327322'
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '14506'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Weighted packet selection for rechargeable links in cryptocurrency networks:
Complexity and approximation'
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 13892
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '12167'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Payment channels effectively move the transaction load off-chain thereby
successfully addressing the inherent scalability problem most cryptocurrencies
face. A major drawback of payment channels is the need to “top up” funds on-chain
when a channel is depleted. Rebalancing was proposed to alleviate this issue,
where parties with depleting channels move their funds along a cycle to replenish
their channels off-chain. Protocols for rebalancing so far either introduce local
solutions or compromise privacy.\r\nIn this work, we present an opt-in rebalancing
protocol that is both private and globally optimal, meaning our protocol maximizes
the total amount of rebalanced funds. We study rebalancing from the framework
of linear programming. To obtain full privacy guarantees, we leverage multi-party
computation in solving the linear program, which is executed by selected participants
to maintain efficiency. Finally, we efficiently decompose the rebalancing solution
into incentive-compatible cycles which conserve user balances when executed atomically."
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Georgia
full_name: Avarikioti, Georgia
id: c20482a0-3b89-11eb-9862-88cf6404b88c
last_name: Avarikioti
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Iosif
full_name: Salem, Iosif
last_name: Salem
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Schmid, Stefan
last_name: Schmid
- first_name: Samarth
full_name: Tiwari, Samarth
last_name: Tiwari
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
citation:
ama: 'Avarikioti G, Pietrzak KZ, Salem I, Schmid S, Tiwari S, Yeo MX. Hide &
Seek: Privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment channel networks. In: Financial
Cryptography and Data Security. Vol 13411. Springer Nature; 2022:358-373.
doi:10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_17'
apa: 'Avarikioti, G., Pietrzak, K. Z., Salem, I., Schmid, S., Tiwari, S., &
Yeo, M. X. (2022). Hide & Seek: Privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment
channel networks. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security (Vol. 13411,
pp. 358–373). Grenada: Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_17'
chicago: 'Avarikioti, Georgia, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, Iosif Salem, Stefan Schmid,
Samarth Tiwari, and Michelle X Yeo. “Hide & Seek: Privacy-Preserving Rebalancing
on Payment Channel Networks.” In Financial Cryptography and Data Security,
13411:358–73. Springer Nature, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_17.'
ieee: 'G. Avarikioti, K. Z. Pietrzak, I. Salem, S. Schmid, S. Tiwari, and M. X.
Yeo, “Hide & Seek: Privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment channel networks,”
in Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Grenada, 2022, vol. 13411,
pp. 358–373.'
ista: 'Avarikioti G, Pietrzak KZ, Salem I, Schmid S, Tiwari S, Yeo MX. 2022. Hide
& Seek: Privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment channel networks. Financial
Cryptography and Data Security. FC: Financial Cryptography and Data Security,
LNCS, vol. 13411, 358–373.'
mla: 'Avarikioti, Georgia, et al. “Hide & Seek: Privacy-Preserving Rebalancing
on Payment Channel Networks.” Financial Cryptography and Data Security,
vol. 13411, Springer Nature, 2022, pp. 358–73, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_17.'
short: G. Avarikioti, K.Z. Pietrzak, I. Salem, S. Schmid, S. Tiwari, M.X. Yeo, in:,
Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Springer Nature, 2022, pp. 358–373.
conference:
end_date: 2022-05-06
location: Grenada
name: 'FC: Financial Cryptography and Data Security'
start_date: 2022-05-02
date_created: 2023-01-12T12:10:38Z
date_published: 2022-10-22T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-05T15:10:57Z
day: '22'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_17
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2110.08848'
intvolume: ' 13411'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2110.08848
month: '10'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 358-373
publication: Financial Cryptography and Data Security
publication_identifier:
eisbn:
- '9783031182839'
eissn:
- 1611-3349
isbn:
- '9783031182822'
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Hide & Seek: Privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment channel networks'
type: conference
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 13411
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '12660'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We present Cross-Client Label Propagation(XCLP), a new method for transductive
federated learning. XCLP estimates a data graph jointly from the data of multiple
clients and computes labels for the unlabeled data by propagating label information
across the graph. To avoid clients having to share their data with anyone, XCLP
employs two cryptographically secure protocols: secure Hamming distance computation
and secure summation. We demonstrate two distinct applications of XCLP within
federated learning. In the first, we use it in a one-shot way to predict labels
for unseen test points. In the second, we use it to repeatedly pseudo-label unlabeled
training data in a federated semi-supervised setting. Experiments on both real
federated and standard benchmark datasets show that in both applications XCLP
achieves higher classification accuracy than alternative approaches.'
article_number: '2210.06434'
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Jonathan A
full_name: Scott, Jonathan A
id: e499926b-f6e0-11ea-865d-9c63db0031e8
last_name: Scott
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
- first_name: Christoph
full_name: Lampert, Christoph
id: 40C20FD2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Lampert
orcid: 0000-0001-8622-7887
citation:
ama: Scott JA, Yeo MX, Lampert C. Cross-client Label Propagation for transductive
federated learning. arXiv. doi:10.48550/arXiv.2210.06434
apa: Scott, J. A., Yeo, M. X., & Lampert, C. (n.d.). Cross-client Label Propagation
for transductive federated learning. arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2210.06434
chicago: Scott, Jonathan A, Michelle X Yeo, and Christoph Lampert. “Cross-Client
Label Propagation for Transductive Federated Learning.” ArXiv, n.d. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2210.06434.
ieee: J. A. Scott, M. X. Yeo, and C. Lampert, “Cross-client Label Propagation for
transductive federated learning,” arXiv. .
ista: Scott JA, Yeo MX, Lampert C. Cross-client Label Propagation for transductive
federated learning. arXiv, 2210.06434.
mla: Scott, Jonathan A., et al. “Cross-Client Label Propagation for Transductive
Federated Learning.” ArXiv, 2210.06434, doi:10.48550/arXiv.2210.06434.
short: J.A. Scott, M.X. Yeo, C. Lampert, ArXiv (n.d.).
date_created: 2023-02-20T08:21:50Z
date_published: 2022-10-12T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-02-21T08:20:18Z
day: '12'
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: ChLa
doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2210.06434
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2210.06434'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 7ab20543fd4393f14fb857ce2e4f03c6
content_type: application/pdf
creator: chl
date_created: 2023-02-20T08:21:35Z
date_updated: 2023-02-20T08:21:35Z
file_id: '12661'
file_name: 2210.06434.pdf
file_size: 291893
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2023-02-20T08:21:35Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '10'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
publication: arXiv
publication_status: submitted
status: public
title: Cross-client Label Propagation for transductive federated learning
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: preprint
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '10049'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: While messaging systems with strong security guarantees are widely used in
practice, designing a protocol that scales efficiently to large groups and enjoys
similar security guarantees remains largely open. The two existing proposals to
date are ART (Cohn-Gordon et al., CCS18) and TreeKEM (IETF, The Messaging Layer
Security Protocol, draft). TreeKEM is the currently considered candidate by the
IETF MLS working group, but dynamic group operations (i.e. adding and removing
users) can cause efficiency issues. In this paper we formalize and analyze a variant
of TreeKEM which we term Tainted TreeKEM (TTKEM for short). The basic idea underlying
TTKEM was suggested by Millican (MLS mailing list, February 2018). This version
is more efficient than TreeKEM for some natural distributions of group operations,
we quantify this through simulations.Our second contribution is two security proofs
for TTKEM which establish post compromise and forward secrecy even against adaptive
attackers. The security loss (to the underlying PKE) in the Random Oracle Model
is a polynomial factor, and a quasipolynomial one in the Standard Model. Our proofs
can be adapted to TreeKEM as well. Before our work no security proof for any TreeKEM-like
protocol establishing tight security against an adversary who can adaptively choose
the sequence of operations was known. We also are the first to prove (or even
formalize) active security where the server can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol
specification. Proving fully active security – where also the users can arbitrarily
deviate – remains open.
acknowledgement: The first three authors contributed equally to this work. Funded
by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon2020 research
and innovation programme (682815-TOCNeT). Funded by the European Union’s Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement
No.665385.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Karen
full_name: Klein, Karen
id: 3E83A2F8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Klein
- first_name: Guillermo
full_name: Pascual Perez, Guillermo
id: 2D7ABD02-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pascual Perez
orcid: 0000-0001-8630-415X
- first_name: Michael
full_name: Walter, Michael
id: 488F98B0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Walter
orcid: 0000-0003-3186-2482
- first_name: Chethan
full_name: Kamath Hosdurg, Chethan
id: 4BD3F30E-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Kamath Hosdurg
- first_name: Margarita
full_name: Capretto, Margarita
last_name: Capretto
- first_name: Miguel
full_name: Cueto Noval, Miguel
id: ffc563a3-f6e0-11ea-865d-e3cce03d17cc
last_name: Cueto Noval
- first_name: Ilia
full_name: Markov, Ilia
id: D0CF4148-C985-11E9-8066-0BDEE5697425
last_name: Markov
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
- first_name: Joel F
full_name: Alwen, Joel F
id: 2A8DFA8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Alwen
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Klein K, Pascual Perez G, Walter M, et al. Keep the dirt: tainted TreeKEM,
adaptively and actively secure continuous group key agreement. In: 2021 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy . IEEE; 2021:268-284. doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00035'
apa: 'Klein, K., Pascual Perez, G., Walter, M., Kamath Hosdurg, C., Capretto, M.,
Cueto Noval, M., … Pietrzak, K. Z. (2021). Keep the dirt: tainted TreeKEM, adaptively
and actively secure continuous group key agreement. In 2021 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (pp. 268–284). San Francisco, CA, United States:
IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp40001.2021.00035'
chicago: 'Klein, Karen, Guillermo Pascual Perez, Michael Walter, Chethan Kamath
Hosdurg, Margarita Capretto, Miguel Cueto Noval, Ilia Markov, Michelle X Yeo,
Joel F Alwen, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “Keep the Dirt: Tainted TreeKEM, Adaptively
and Actively Secure Continuous Group Key Agreement.” In 2021 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy , 268–84. IEEE, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp40001.2021.00035.'
ieee: 'K. Klein et al., “Keep the dirt: tainted TreeKEM, adaptively and actively
secure continuous group key agreement,” in 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy , San Francisco, CA, United States, 2021, pp. 268–284.'
ista: 'Klein K, Pascual Perez G, Walter M, Kamath Hosdurg C, Capretto M, Cueto Noval
M, Markov I, Yeo MX, Alwen JF, Pietrzak KZ. 2021. Keep the dirt: tainted TreeKEM,
adaptively and actively secure continuous group key agreement. 2021 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy . SP: Symposium on Security and Privacy, 268–284.'
mla: 'Klein, Karen, et al. “Keep the Dirt: Tainted TreeKEM, Adaptively and Actively
Secure Continuous Group Key Agreement.” 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy , IEEE, 2021, pp. 268–84, doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00035.'
short: K. Klein, G. Pascual Perez, M. Walter, C. Kamath Hosdurg, M. Capretto, M.
Cueto Noval, I. Markov, M.X. Yeo, J.F. Alwen, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, 2021 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy , IEEE, 2021, pp. 268–284.
conference:
end_date: 2021-05-27
location: San Francisco, CA, United States
name: 'SP: Symposium on Security and Privacy'
start_date: 2021-05-24
date_created: 2021-09-27T13:46:27Z
date_published: 2021-08-26T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-07T13:32:11Z
day: '26'
department:
- _id: KrPi
- _id: DaAl
doi: 10.1109/sp40001.2021.00035
ec_funded: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1489
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 268-284
project:
- _id: 2564DBCA-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '665385'
name: International IST Doctoral Program
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '682815'
name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication: '2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy '
publication_status: published
publisher: IEEE
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '10035'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
status: public
title: 'Keep the dirt: tainted TreeKEM, adaptively and actively secure continuous
group key agreement'
type: conference
user_id: 8b945eb4-e2f2-11eb-945a-df72226e66a9
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '10407'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Digital hardware Trojans are integrated circuits whose implementation differ
from the specification in an arbitrary and malicious way. For example, the circuit
can differ from its specified input/output behavior after some fixed number of
queries (known as “time bombs”) or on some particular input (known as “cheat codes”).
To detect such Trojans, countermeasures using multiparty computation (MPC) or
verifiable computation (VC) have been proposed. On a high level, to realize a
circuit with specification F one has more sophisticated circuits F⋄ manufactured
(where F⋄ specifies a MPC or VC of F ), and then embeds these F⋄ ’s into
a master circuit which must be trusted but is relatively simple compared to F
. Those solutions impose a significant overhead as F⋄ is much more complex
than F , also the master circuits are not exactly trivial. In this work, we
show that in restricted settings, where F has no evolving state and is queried
on independent inputs, we can achieve a relaxed security notion using very simple
constructions. In particular, we do not change the specification of the circuit
at all (i.e., F=F⋄ ). Moreover the master circuit basically just queries a subset
of its manufactured circuits and checks if they’re all the same. The security
we achieve guarantees that, if the manufactured circuits are initially tested
on up to T inputs, the master circuit will catch Trojans that try to deviate on
significantly more than a 1/T fraction of the inputs. This bound is optimal for
the type of construction considered, and we provably achieve it using a construction
where 12 instantiations of F need to be embedded into the master. We also discuss
an extremely simple construction with just 2 instantiations for which we conjecture
that it already achieves the optimal bound.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Suvradip
full_name: Chakraborty, Suvradip
id: B9CD0494-D033-11E9-B219-A439E6697425
last_name: Chakraborty
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Dziembowski, Stefan
last_name: Dziembowski
- first_name: Małgorzata
full_name: Gałązka, Małgorzata
last_name: Gałązka
- first_name: Tomasz
full_name: Lizurej, Tomasz
last_name: Lizurej
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
citation:
ama: 'Chakraborty S, Dziembowski S, Gałązka M, Lizurej T, Pietrzak KZ, Yeo MX. Trojan-resilience
without cryptography. In: Vol 13043. Springer Nature; 2021:397-428. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-90453-1_14'
apa: 'Chakraborty, S., Dziembowski, S., Gałązka, M., Lizurej, T., Pietrzak, K. Z.,
& Yeo, M. X. (2021). Trojan-resilience without cryptography (Vol. 13043, pp.
397–428). Presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Raleigh, NC,
United States: Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90453-1_14'
chicago: Chakraborty, Suvradip, Stefan Dziembowski, Małgorzata Gałązka, Tomasz Lizurej,
Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Michelle X Yeo. “Trojan-Resilience without Cryptography,”
13043:397–428. Springer Nature, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90453-1_14.
ieee: 'S. Chakraborty, S. Dziembowski, M. Gałązka, T. Lizurej, K. Z. Pietrzak, and
M. X. Yeo, “Trojan-resilience without cryptography,” presented at the TCC: Theory
of Cryptography Conference, Raleigh, NC, United States, 2021, vol. 13043, pp.
397–428.'
ista: 'Chakraborty S, Dziembowski S, Gałązka M, Lizurej T, Pietrzak KZ, Yeo MX.
2021. Trojan-resilience without cryptography. TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference,
LNCS, vol. 13043, 397–428.'
mla: Chakraborty, Suvradip, et al. Trojan-Resilience without Cryptography.
Vol. 13043, Springer Nature, 2021, pp. 397–428, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-90453-1_14.
short: S. Chakraborty, S. Dziembowski, M. Gałązka, T. Lizurej, K.Z. Pietrzak, M.X.
Yeo, in:, Springer Nature, 2021, pp. 397–428.
conference:
end_date: 2021-11-11
location: Raleigh, NC, United States
name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
start_date: 2021-11-08
date_created: 2021-12-05T23:01:42Z
date_published: 2021-11-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-08-14T13:07:46Z
day: '04'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-90453-1_14
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000728364000014'
intvolume: ' 13043'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1224
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 397-428
project:
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '682815'
name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1611-3349
isbn:
- 9-783-0309-0452-4
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Trojan-resilience without cryptography
type: conference
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
volume: 13043
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '9826'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Automated contract tracing aims at supporting manual contact tracing during
pandemics by alerting users of encounters with infected people. There are currently
many proposals for protocols (like the “decentralized” DP-3T and PACT or the “centralized”
ROBERT and DESIRE) to be run on mobile phones, where the basic idea is to regularly
broadcast (using low energy Bluetooth) some values, and at the same time store
(a function of) incoming messages broadcasted by users in their proximity. In
the existing proposals one can trigger false positives on a massive scale by an
“inverse-Sybil” attack, where a large number of devices (malicious users or hacked
phones) pretend to be the same user, such that later, just a single person needs
to be diagnosed (and allowed to upload) to trigger an alert for all users who
were in proximity to any of this large group of devices.\r\n\r\nWe propose the
first protocols that do not succumb to such attacks assuming the devices involved
in the attack do not constantly communicate, which we observe is a necessary assumption.
The high level idea of the protocols is to derive the values to be broadcasted
by a hash chain, so that two (or more) devices who want to launch an inverse-Sybil
attack will not be able to connect their respective chains and thus only one of
them will be able to upload. Our protocols also achieve security against replay,
belated replay, and one of them even against relay attacks."
acknowledgement: Guillermo Pascual-Perez and Michelle Yeo were funded by the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska–Curie
Grant Agreement No. 665385; the remaining contributors to this project have received
funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme (682815 - TOCNeT).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Benedikt
full_name: Auerbach, Benedikt
id: D33D2B18-E445-11E9-ABB7-15F4E5697425
last_name: Auerbach
orcid: 0000-0002-7553-6606
- first_name: Suvradip
full_name: Chakraborty, Suvradip
id: B9CD0494-D033-11E9-B219-A439E6697425
last_name: Chakraborty
- first_name: Karen
full_name: Klein, Karen
id: 3E83A2F8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Klein
- first_name: Guillermo
full_name: Pascual Perez, Guillermo
id: 2D7ABD02-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pascual Perez
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Michael
full_name: Walter, Michael
id: 488F98B0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Walter
orcid: 0000-0003-3186-2482
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
citation:
ama: 'Auerbach B, Chakraborty S, Klein K, et al. Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated
contact tracing. In: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021. Vol 12704. Springer
Nature; 2021:399-421. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17'
apa: 'Auerbach, B., Chakraborty, S., Klein, K., Pascual Perez, G., Pietrzak, K.
Z., Walter, M., & Yeo, M. X. (2021). Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated contact
tracing. In Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021 (Vol. 12704, pp. 399–421).
Virtual Event: Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17'
chicago: Auerbach, Benedikt, Suvradip Chakraborty, Karen Klein, Guillermo Pascual
Perez, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, Michael Walter, and Michelle X Yeo. “Inverse-Sybil
Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing.” In Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021,
12704:399–421. Springer Nature, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17.
ieee: B. Auerbach et al., “Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated contact tracing,”
in Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021, Virtual Event, 2021, vol. 12704,
pp. 399–421.
ista: 'Auerbach B, Chakraborty S, Klein K, Pascual Perez G, Pietrzak KZ, Walter
M, Yeo MX. 2021. Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated contact tracing. Topics in
Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021. CT-RSA: Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference,
LNCS, vol. 12704, 399–421.'
mla: Auerbach, Benedikt, et al. “Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing.”
Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021, vol. 12704, Springer Nature, 2021,
pp. 399–421, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17.
short: B. Auerbach, S. Chakraborty, K. Klein, G. Pascual Perez, K.Z. Pietrzak, M.
Walter, M.X. Yeo, in:, Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021, Springer Nature, 2021,
pp. 399–421.
conference:
end_date: 2021-05-20
location: Virtual Event
name: 'CT-RSA: Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference'
start_date: 2021-05-17
date_created: 2021-08-08T22:01:30Z
date_published: 2021-05-11T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-02-23T14:09:56Z
day: '11'
department:
- _id: KrPi
- _id: GradSch
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: ' 12704'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/670
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 399-421
project:
- _id: 2564DBCA-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '665385'
name: International IST Doctoral Program
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '682815'
name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- '16113349'
isbn:
- '9783030755386'
issn:
- '03029743'
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated contact tracing
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 12704
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '9969'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Payment channel networks are a promising approach to improve the scalability
of cryptocurrencies: they allow to perform transactions in a peer-to-peer fashion,
along multihop routes in the network, without requiring consensus on the blockchain.
However, during the discovery of cost-efficient routes for the transaction, critical
information may be revealed about the transacting entities. This paper initiates
the study of privacy-preserving route discovery mechanisms for payment channel
networks. In particular, we present LightPIR, an approach which allows a client
to learn the shortest (or cheapest in terms of fees) path between two nodes without
revealing any information about the endpoints of the transaction to the servers.
The two main observations which allow for an efficient solution in LightPIR are
that: (1) surprisingly, hub labelling algorithms – which were developed to preprocess
“street network like” graphs so one can later efficiently compute shortest paths
– also perform well for the graphs underlying payment channel networks, and that
(2) hub labelling algorithms can be conveniently combined with private information
retrieval. LightPIR relies on a simple hub labeling heuristic on top of existing
hub labeling algorithms which leverages the specific topological features of cryptocurrency
networks to further minimize storage and bandwidth overheads. In a case study
considering the Lightning network, we show that our approach is an order of magnitude
more efficient compared to a privacy-preserving baseline based on using private
information retrieval on a database that stores all pairs shortest paths.'
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Iosif
full_name: Salem, Iosif
last_name: Salem
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Schmid, Stefan
last_name: Schmid
- first_name: Michelle X
full_name: Yeo, Michelle X
id: 2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Yeo
citation:
ama: 'Pietrzak KZ, Salem I, Schmid S, Yeo MX. LightPIR: Privacy-preserving route
discovery for payment channel networks. In: IEEE; 2021. doi:10.23919/IFIPNetworking52078.2021.9472205'
apa: 'Pietrzak, K. Z., Salem, I., Schmid, S., & Yeo, M. X. (2021). LightPIR:
Privacy-preserving route discovery for payment channel networks. Presented at
the 2021 IFIP Networking Conference (IFIP Networking), Espoo and Helsinki, Finland:
IEEE. https://doi.org/10.23919/IFIPNetworking52078.2021.9472205'
chicago: 'Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z, Iosif Salem, Stefan Schmid, and Michelle X Yeo.
“LightPIR: Privacy-Preserving Route Discovery for Payment Channel Networks.” IEEE,
2021. https://doi.org/10.23919/IFIPNetworking52078.2021.9472205.'
ieee: 'K. Z. Pietrzak, I. Salem, S. Schmid, and M. X. Yeo, “LightPIR: Privacy-preserving
route discovery for payment channel networks,” presented at the 2021 IFIP Networking
Conference (IFIP Networking), Espoo and Helsinki, Finland, 2021.'
ista: 'Pietrzak KZ, Salem I, Schmid S, Yeo MX. 2021. LightPIR: Privacy-preserving
route discovery for payment channel networks. 2021 IFIP Networking Conference
(IFIP Networking).'
mla: 'Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z., et al. LightPIR: Privacy-Preserving Route Discovery
for Payment Channel Networks. IEEE, 2021, doi:10.23919/IFIPNetworking52078.2021.9472205.'
short: K.Z. Pietrzak, I. Salem, S. Schmid, M.X. Yeo, in:, IEEE, 2021.
conference:
end_date: 2021-06-24
location: Espoo and Helsinki, Finland
name: 2021 IFIP Networking Conference (IFIP Networking)
start_date: 2021-06-21
date_created: 2021-08-29T22:01:16Z
date_published: 2021-06-21T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-11-30T10:54:50Z
day: '21'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.23919/IFIPNetworking52078.2021.9472205
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2104.04293'
isi:
- '000853016800008'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.04293
month: '06'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
project:
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '682815'
name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication_identifier:
eisbn:
- 978-3-9031-7639-3
eissn:
- 1861-2288
isbn:
- 978-1-6654-4501-6
publication_status: published
publisher: IEEE
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '14506'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'LightPIR: Privacy-preserving route discovery for payment channel networks'
type: conference
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
year: '2021'
...