@inproceedings{14457, abstract = {Threshold secret sharing allows a dealer to split a secret s into n shares, such that any t shares allow for reconstructing s, but no t-1 shares reveal any information about s. Leakage-resilient secret sharing requires that the secret remains hidden, even when an adversary additionally obtains a limited amount of leakage from every share. Benhamouda et al. (CRYPTO’18) proved that Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is one bit leakage-resilient for reconstruction threshold t≥0.85n and conjectured that the same holds for t = c.n for any constant 0≤c≤1. Nielsen and Simkin (EUROCRYPT’20) showed that this is the best one can hope for by proving that Shamir’s scheme is not secure against one-bit leakage when t0c.n/log(n). In this work, we strengthen the lower bound of Nielsen and Simkin. We consider noisy leakage-resilience, where a random subset of leakages is replaced by uniformly random noise. We prove a lower bound for Shamir’s secret sharing, similar to that of Nielsen and Simkin, which holds even when a constant fraction of leakages is replaced by random noise. To this end, we first prove a lower bound on the share size of any noisy-leakage-resilient sharing scheme. We then use this lower bound to show that there exist universal constants c1, c2, such that for sufficiently large n it holds that Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is not noisy-leakage-resilient for t≤c1.n/log(n), even when a c2 fraction of leakages are replaced by random noise. }, author = {Hoffmann, Charlotte and Simkin, Mark}, booktitle = {8th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America}, isbn = {9783031444685}, issn = {1611-3349}, location = {Quito, Ecuador}, pages = {215--228}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{Stronger lower bounds for leakage-resilient secret sharing}}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-44469-2_11}, volume = {14168}, year = {2023}, } @inproceedings{14692, abstract = {The generic-group model (GGM) aims to capture algorithms working over groups of prime order that only rely on the group operation, but do not exploit any additional structure given by the concrete implementation of the group. In it, it is possible to prove information-theoretic lower bounds on the hardness of problems like the discrete logarithm (DL) or computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH). Thus, since its introduction, it has served as a valuable tool to assess the concrete security provided by cryptographic schemes based on such problems. A work on the related algebraic-group model (AGM) introduced a method, used by many subsequent works, to adapt GGM lower bounds for one problem to another, by means of conceptually simple reductions. In this work, we propose an alternative approach to extend GGM bounds from one problem to another. Following an idea by Yun [EC15], we show that, in the GGM, the security of a large class of problems can be reduced to that of geometric search-problems. By reducing the security of the resulting geometric-search problems to variants of the search-by-hypersurface problem, for which information theoretic lower bounds exist, we give alternative proofs of several results that used the AGM approach. The main advantage of our approach is that our reduction from geometric search-problems works, as well, for the GGM with preprocessing (more precisely the bit-fixing GGM introduced by Coretti, Dodis and Guo [Crypto18]). As a consequence, this opens up the possibility of transferring preprocessing GGM bounds from one problem to another, also by means of simple reductions. Concretely, we prove novel preprocessing bounds on the hardness of the d-strong discrete logarithm, the d-strong Diffie-Hellman inversion, and multi-instance CDH problems, as well as a large class of Uber assumptions. Additionally, our approach applies to Shoup’s GGM without additional restrictions on the query behavior of the adversary, while the recent works of Zhang, Zhou, and Katz [AC22] and Zhandry [Crypto22] highlight that this is not the case for the AGM approach.}, author = {Auerbach, Benedikt and Hoffmann, Charlotte and Pascual Perez, Guillermo}, booktitle = {21st International Conference on Theory of Cryptography}, isbn = {9783031486203}, issn = {1611-3349}, pages = {301--330}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{Generic-group lower bounds via reductions between geometric-search problems: With and without preprocessing}}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-48621-0_11}, volume = {14371}, year = {2023}, } @inproceedings{14693, abstract = {Lucas sequences are constant-recursive integer sequences with a long history of applications in cryptography, both in the design of cryptographic schemes and cryptanalysis. In this work, we study the sequential hardness of computing Lucas sequences over an RSA modulus. First, we show that modular Lucas sequences are at least as sequentially hard as the classical delay function given by iterated modular squaring proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner (MIT Tech. Rep. 1996) in the context of time-lock puzzles. Moreover, there is no obvious reduction in the other direction, which suggests that the assumption of sequential hardness of modular Lucas sequences is strictly weaker than that of iterated modular squaring. In other words, the sequential hardness of modular Lucas sequences might hold even in the case of an algorithmic improvement violating the sequential hardness of iterated modular squaring. Second, we demonstrate the feasibility of constructing practically-efficient verifiable delay functions based on the sequential hardness of modular Lucas sequences. Our construction builds on the work of Pietrzak (ITCS 2019) by leveraging the intrinsic connection between the problem of computing modular Lucas sequences and exponentiation in an appropriate extension field.}, author = {Hoffmann, Charlotte and Hubáček, Pavel and Kamath, Chethan and Krňák, Tomáš}, booktitle = {21st International Conference on Theory of Cryptography}, isbn = {9783031486234}, issn = {1611-3349}, location = {Taipei, Taiwan}, pages = {336--362}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{(Verifiable) delay functions from Lucas sequences}}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-48624-1_13}, volume = {14372}, year = {2023}, } @inproceedings{13143, abstract = {GIMPS and PrimeGrid are large-scale distributed projects dedicated to searching giant prime numbers, usually of special forms like Mersenne and Proth primes. The numbers in the current search-space are millions of digits large and the participating volunteers need to run resource-consuming primality tests. Once a candidate prime N has been found, the only way for another party to independently verify the primality of N used to be by repeating the expensive primality test. To avoid the need for second recomputation of each primality test, these projects have recently adopted certifying mechanisms that enable efficient verification of performed tests. However, the mechanisms presently in place only detect benign errors and there is no guarantee against adversarial behavior: a malicious volunteer can mislead the project to reject a giant prime as being non-prime. In this paper, we propose a practical, cryptographically-sound mechanism for certifying the non-primality of Proth numbers. That is, a volunteer can – parallel to running the primality test for N – generate an efficiently verifiable proof at a little extra cost certifying that N is not prime. The interactive protocol has statistical soundness and can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Our approach is based on a cryptographic primitive called Proof of Exponentiation (PoE) which, for a group G, certifies that a tuple (x,y,T)∈G2×N satisfies x2T=y (Pietrzak, ITCS 2019 and Wesolowski, J. Cryptol. 2020). In particular, we show how to adapt Pietrzak’s PoE at a moderate additional cost to make it a cryptographically-sound certificate of non-primality.}, author = {Hoffmann, Charlotte and Hubáček, Pavel and Kamath, Chethan and Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z}, booktitle = {Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2023}, isbn = {9783031313677}, issn = {1611-3349}, location = {Atlanta, GA, United States}, pages = {530--553}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{Certifying giant nonprimes}}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-31368-4_19}, volume = {13940}, year = {2023}, } @inproceedings{12176, abstract = {A proof of exponentiation (PoE) in a group G of unknown order allows a prover to convince a verifier that a tuple (x,q,T,y)∈G×N×N×G satisfies xqT=y. This primitive has recently found exciting applications in the constructions of verifiable delay functions and succinct arguments of knowledge. The most practical PoEs only achieve soundness either under computational assumptions, i.e., they are arguments (Wesolowski, Journal of Cryptology 2020), or in groups that come with the promise of not having any small subgroups (Pietrzak, ITCS 2019). The only statistically-sound PoE in general groups of unknown order is due to Block et al. (CRYPTO 2021), and can be seen as an elaborate parallel repetition of Pietrzak’s PoE: to achieve λ bits of security, say λ=80, the number of repetitions required (and thus the blow-up in communication) is as large as λ. In this work, we propose a statistically-sound PoE for the case where the exponent q is the product of all primes up to some bound B. We show that, in this case, it suffices to run only λ/log(B) parallel instances of Pietrzak’s PoE, which reduces the concrete proof-size compared to Block et al. by an order of magnitude. Furthermore, we show that in the known applications where PoEs are used as a building block such structured exponents are viable. Finally, we also discuss batching of our PoE, showing that many proofs (for the same G and q but different x and T) can be batched by adding only a single element to the proof per additional statement.}, author = {Hoffmann, Charlotte and Hubáček, Pavel and Kamath, Chethan and Klein, Karen and Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z}, booktitle = {Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2022}, isbn = {9783031159787}, issn = {1611-3349}, location = {Santa Barbara, CA, United States}, pages = {370--399}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{Practical statistically-sound proofs of exponentiation in any group}}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-15979-4_13}, volume = {13508}, year = {2022}, } @inproceedings{12516, abstract = {The homogeneous continuous LWE (hCLWE) problem is to distinguish samples of a specific high-dimensional Gaussian mixture from standard normal samples. It was shown to be at least as hard as Learning with Errors, but no reduction in the other direction is currently known. We present four new public-key encryption schemes based on the hardness of hCLWE, with varying tradeoffs between decryption and security errors, and different discretization techniques. Our schemes yield a polynomial-time algorithm for solving hCLWE using a Statistical Zero-Knowledge oracle.}, author = {Bogdanov, Andrej and Cueto Noval, Miguel and Hoffmann, Charlotte and Rosen, Alon}, booktitle = {Theory of Cryptography}, isbn = {9783031223648}, issn = {1611-3349}, location = {Chicago, IL, United States}, pages = {565--592}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{Public-Key Encryption from Homogeneous CLWE}}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-22365-5_20}, volume = {13748}, year = {2022}, }