@article{9376,
  abstract     = {This paper presents a method for designing planar multistable compliant structures. Given a sequence of desired stable states and the corresponding poses of the structure, we identify the topology and geometric realization of a mechanism—consisting of bars and joints—that is able to physically reproduce the desired multistable behavior. In order to solve this problem efficiently, we build on insights from minimally rigid graph theory to identify simple but effective topologies for the mechanism. We then optimize its geometric parameters, such as joint positions and bar lengths, to obtain correct transitions between the given poses. Simultaneously, we ensure adequate stability of each pose based on an effective approximate error metric related to the elastic energy Hessian of the bars in the mechanism. As demonstrated by our results, we obtain functional multistable mechanisms of manageable complexity that can be fabricated using 3D printing. Further, we evaluated the effectiveness of our method on a large number of examples in the simulation and fabricated several physical prototypes.},
  author       = {Zhang, Ran and Auzinger, Thomas and Bickel, Bernd},
  issn         = {1557-7368},
  journal      = {ACM Transactions on Graphics},
  keywords     = {multistability, mechanism, computational design, rigidity},
  number       = {5},
  publisher    = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  title        = {{Computational design of planar multistable compliant structures}},
  doi          = {10.1145/3453477},
  volume       = {40},
  year         = {2021},
}

@article{11667,
  abstract     = {The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions, the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. For many valuation spaces, computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently. We prove improved upper bounds on the welfare loss for restrictions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to non-additive bids. These bounds show that increased expressiveness can give rise to additional equilibria of poorer efficiency.},
  author       = {Dütting, Paul and Henzinger, Monika H and Starnberger, Martin},
  issn         = {2167-8383},
  journal      = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
  keywords     = {Theory of computation, Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design, Applied computing, Economics, Simplified mechanisms, Combinatorial auctions with item bidding, Price of anarchy},
  number       = {2},
  publisher    = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  title        = {{Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions}},
  doi          = {10.1145/3232860},
  volume       = {6},
  year         = {2018},
}