@article{11667,
  abstract     = {The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions, the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. For many valuation spaces, computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently. We prove improved upper bounds on the welfare loss for restrictions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to non-additive bids. These bounds show that increased expressiveness can give rise to additional equilibria of poorer efficiency.},
  author       = {Dütting, Paul and Henzinger, Monika H and Starnberger, Martin},
  issn         = {2167-8383},
  journal      = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
  keywords     = {Theory of computation, Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design, Applied computing, Economics, Simplified mechanisms, Combinatorial auctions with item bidding, Price of anarchy},
  number       = {2},
  publisher    = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  title        = {{Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions}},
  doi          = {10.1145/3232860},
  volume       = {6},
  year         = {2018},
}

@article{11669,
  abstract     = {We study individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. We consider settings with multiunit demand and additive valuations. For single-dimensional valuations we prove a positive result for randomized mechanisms, and a negative result for deterministic mechanisms. While the positive result allows for private budgets, the negative result is for public budgets. For multidimensional valuations and public budgets we prove an impossibility result that applies to deterministic and randomized mechanisms. Taken together this shows the power of randomization in certain settings with heterogeneous items, but it also shows its limitations.},
  author       = {Dütting, Paul and Henzinger, Monika H and Starnberger, Martin},
  issn         = {2167-8383},
  journal      = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
  keywords     = {Algorithmic game theory, auction theory, Clinching auction, Pareto optimality, Budget limits},
  number       = {1},
  publisher    = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  title        = {{Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits}},
  doi          = {10.1145/2818351},
  volume       = {4},
  year         = {2015},
}