@inproceedings{14490,
  abstract     = {Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising solution to the scalability problem of cryptocurrencies. Any two users connected by a payment channel in the network can theoretically send an unbounded number of instant, costless transactions between them. Users who are not directly connected can also transact with each other in a multi-hop fashion. In this work, we study the incentive structure behind the creation of payment channel networks, particularly from the point of view of a single user that wants to join the network. We define a utility function for a new user in terms of expected revenue, expected fees, and the cost of creating channels, and then provide constant factor approximation algorithms that optimise the utility function given a certain budget. Additionally, we take a step back from a single user to the whole network and examine the parameter spaces under which simple graph topologies form a Nash equilibrium.},
  author       = {Avarikioti, Zeta and Lizurej, Tomasz and Michalak, Tomasz and Yeo, Michelle X},
  booktitle    = {43rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems},
  isbn         = {9798350339864},
  issn         = {2575-8411},
  location     = {Hong Kong, China},
  pages        = {603--613},
  publisher    = {IEEE},
  title        = {{Lightning creation games}},
  doi          = {10.1109/ICDCS57875.2023.00037},
  volume       = {2023},
  year         = {2023},
}