[{"file_date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:45:58Z","scopus_import":1,"acknowledgement":"We are grateful to Petros Mol for helpful discussions on the reduction for the hardness of the xLPN problem.\r\n","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We construct a perfectly binding string commitment scheme whose security is based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption, or equivalently, the hardness of decoding random linear codes. Our scheme not only allows for a simple and efficient zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for committed values (essentially a Σ-protocol), but also for such proofs showing any kind of relation amongst committed values, i.e. proving that messages m_0,...,m_u, are such that m_0=C(m_1,...,m_u) for any circuit C.\r\n\r\nTo get soundness which is exponentially small in a security parameter t, and when the zero-knowledge property relies on the LPN problem with secrets of length l, our 3 round protocol has communication complexity O(t|C|l log(l)) and computational complexity of O(t|C|l) bit operations. The hidden constants are small, and the computation consists mostly of computing inner products of bit-vectors."}],"user_id":"3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","_id":"2974","title":"Commitments and efficient zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise","has_accepted_license":"1","editor":[{"last_name":"Wang","full_name":"Wang, Xiaoyun","first_name":"Xiaoyun"},{"last_name":"Sako","first_name":"Kazue","full_name":"Sako, Kazue"}],"citation":{"chicago":"Jain, Abhishek, Stephan Krenn, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Aris Tentes. “Commitments and Efficient Zero Knowledge Proofs from Learning Parity with Noise.” edited by Xiaoyun Wang and Kazue Sako, 7658:663–80. Springer, 2012. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40</a>.","mla":"Jain, Abhishek, et al. <i>Commitments and Efficient Zero Knowledge Proofs from Learning Parity with Noise</i>. Edited by Xiaoyun Wang and Kazue Sako, vol. 7658, Springer, 2012, pp. 663–80, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40\">10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40</a>.","ama":"Jain A, Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. Commitments and efficient zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise. In: Wang X, Sako K, eds. Vol 7658. Springer; 2012:663-680. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40\">10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40</a>","ieee":"A. Jain, S. Krenn, K. Z. Pietrzak, and A. Tentes, “Commitments and efficient zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise,” presented at the ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Beijing, China, 2012, vol. 7658, pp. 663–680.","short":"A. Jain, S. Krenn, K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Tentes, in:, X. Wang, K. Sako (Eds.), Springer, 2012, pp. 663–680.","apa":"Jain, A., Krenn, S., Pietrzak, K. Z., &#38; Tentes, A. (2012). Commitments and efficient zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise. In X. Wang &#38; K. Sako (Eds.) (Vol. 7658, pp. 663–680). Presented at the ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Beijing, China: Springer. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40</a>","ista":"Jain A, Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. 2012. Commitments and efficient zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise. ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, LNCS, vol. 7658, 663–680."},"intvolume":"      7658","ec_funded":1,"status":"public","tmp":{"legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","image":"/images/cc_by.png","short":"CC BY (4.0)","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)"},"department":[{"_id":"KrPi"}],"year":"2012","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"ddc":["004","005"],"license":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","date_created":"2018-12-11T12:00:38Z","publist_id":"3730","publication_status":"published","day":"01","pubrep_id":"721","author":[{"first_name":"Abhishek","full_name":"Jain, Abhishek","last_name":"Jain"},{"last_name":"Krenn","orcid":"0000-0003-2835-9093","first_name":"Stephan","id":"329FCCF0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Krenn, Stephan"},{"full_name":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z","first_name":"Krzysztof Z","id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Pietrzak","orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654"},{"full_name":"Tentes, Aris","first_name":"Aris","last_name":"Tentes"}],"alternative_title":["LNCS"],"page":"663 - 680","conference":{"location":"Beijing, China","end_date":"2012-12-06","start_date":"2012-12-02","name":"ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security"},"month":"12","file":[{"date_created":"2018-12-12T10:14:00Z","file_id":"5048","content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","creator":"system","checksum":"ab879537385efc4cb4203e7ef0fea17b","file_name":"IST-2016-721-v1+1_513.pdf","access_level":"open_access","file_size":482570,"date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:45:58Z"}],"oa":1,"doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40","publisher":"Springer","date_updated":"2021-01-12T07:40:11Z","oa_version":"Submitted Version","volume":7658,"type":"conference","date_published":"2012-12-01T00:00:00Z","project":[{"call_identifier":"FP7","name":"Provable Security for Physical Cryptography","_id":"258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"259668"}]},{"day":"19","publication_status":"published","publist_id":"3407","date_created":"2018-12-11T12:02:15Z","conference":{"start_date":"2012-01-21","name":"SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science","location":"Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic","end_date":"2012-01-27"},"page":"99 - 114","alternative_title":["LNCS"],"author":[{"orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654","last_name":"Pietrzak","full_name":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z","id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Krzysztof Z"}],"department":[{"_id":"KrPi"}],"year":"2012","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"scopus_import":1,"citation":{"ista":"Pietrzak KZ. 2012. Cryptography from learning parity with noise. SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, LNCS, vol. 7147, 99–114.","apa":"Pietrzak, K. Z. (2012). Cryptography from learning parity with noise (Vol. 7147, pp. 99–114). Presented at the SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic: Springer. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9</a>","short":"K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 99–114.","ieee":"K. Z. Pietrzak, “Cryptography from learning parity with noise,” presented at the SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic, 2012, vol. 7147, pp. 99–114.","ama":"Pietrzak KZ. Cryptography from learning parity with noise. In: Vol 7147. Springer; 2012:99-114. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9\">10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9</a>","mla":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. <i>Cryptography from Learning Parity with Noise</i>. Vol. 7147, Springer, 2012, pp. 99–114, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9\">10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9</a>.","chicago":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. “Cryptography from Learning Parity with Noise,” 7147:99–114. Springer, 2012. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9</a>."},"intvolume":"      7147","oa_version":"None","status":"public","type":"conference","date_published":"2012-02-19T00:00:00Z","volume":7147,"quality_controlled":"1","month":"02","publisher":"Springer","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9","title":"Cryptography from learning parity with noise","date_updated":"2021-01-12T07:42:07Z","_id":"3250","user_id":"3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","abstract":[{"text":"The Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem has recently found many applications in cryptography as the hardness assumption underlying the constructions of &quot;provably secure&quot; cryptographic schemes like encryption or authentication protocols. Being provably secure means that the scheme comes with a proof showing that the existence of an efficient adversary against the scheme implies that the underlying hardness assumption is wrong. LPN based schemes are appealing for theoretical and practical reasons. On the theoretical side, LPN based schemes offer a very strong security guarantee. The LPN problem is equivalent to the problem of decoding random linear codes, a problem that has been extensively studied in the last half century. The fastest known algorithms run in exponential time and unlike most number-theoretic problems used in cryptography, the LPN problem does not succumb to known quantum algorithms. On the practical side, LPN based schemes are often extremely simple and efficient in terms of code-size as well as time and space requirements. This makes them prime candidates for light-weight devices like RFID tags, which are too weak to implement standard cryptographic primitives like the AES block-cipher. This talk will be a gentle introduction to provable security using simple LPN based schemes as examples. Starting from pseudorandom generators and symmetric key encryption, over secret-key authentication protocols, and, if time admits, touching on recent constructions of public-key identification, commitments and zero-knowledge proofs.","lang":"eng"}]},{"quality_controlled":"1","month":"05","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21","date_updated":"2021-01-12T07:42:21Z","publisher":"Springer","oa_version":"None","project":[{"call_identifier":"FP7","name":"Provable Security for Physical Cryptography","grant_number":"259668","_id":"258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425"}],"type":"conference","date_published":"2012-05-04T00:00:00Z","volume":7194,"department":[{"_id":"KrPi"}],"year":"2012","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"day":"04","publication_status":"published","publist_id":"3367","date_created":"2018-12-11T12:02:25Z","conference":{"location":"Taormina, Sicily, Italy","end_date":"2012-03-21","start_date":"2012-03-19","name":"TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference"},"alternative_title":["LNCS"],"page":"369 - 382","author":[{"last_name":"Jain","full_name":"Jain, Abhishek","first_name":"Abhishek"},{"id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Krzysztof Z","full_name":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z","last_name":"Pietrzak","orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654"},{"last_name":"Tentes","full_name":"Tentes, Aris","first_name":"Aris"}],"acknowledgement":"Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC)","title":"Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom functions","_id":"3279","user_id":"3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","abstract":[{"text":"We show a hardness-preserving construction of a PRF from any length doubling PRG which improves upon known constructions whenever we can put a non-trivial upper bound q on the number of queries to the PRF. Our construction requires only O(logq) invocations to the underlying PRG with each query. In comparison, the number of invocations by the best previous hardness-preserving construction (GGM using Levin's trick) is logarithmic in the hardness of the PRG. For example, starting from an exponentially secure PRG {0,1} n → {0,1} 2n, we get a PRF which is exponentially secure if queried at most q = exp(√n)times and where each invocation of the PRF requires Θ(√n) queries to the underlying PRG. This is much less than the Θ(n) required by known constructions. \r\n","lang":"eng"}],"citation":{"ieee":"A. Jain, K. Z. Pietrzak, and A. Tentes, “Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom functions,” presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy, 2012, vol. 7194, pp. 369–382.","short":"A. Jain, K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Tentes, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 369–382.","ista":"Jain A, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. 2012. Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom functions. TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 7194, 369–382.","apa":"Jain, A., Pietrzak, K. Z., &#38; Tentes, A. (2012). Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom functions (Vol. 7194, pp. 369–382). Presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy: Springer. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21</a>","chicago":"Jain, Abhishek, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Aris Tentes. “Hardness Preserving Constructions of Pseudorandom Functions,” 7194:369–82. Springer, 2012. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21</a>.","ama":"Jain A, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom functions. In: Vol 7194. Springer; 2012:369-382. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21\">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21</a>","mla":"Jain, Abhishek, et al. <i>Hardness Preserving Constructions of Pseudorandom Functions</i>. Vol. 7194, Springer, 2012, pp. 369–82, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21\">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21</a>."},"intvolume":"      7194","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.iacr.org/archive/tcc2012/tcc2012-index.html"}],"status":"public","ec_funded":1,"scopus_import":1},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2012","department":[{"_id":"KrPi"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Pietrzak","orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654","id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Krzysztof Z","full_name":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z"}],"conference":{"start_date":"2012-03-19","name":"TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference","location":"Taormina, Sicily, Italy","end_date":"2012-03-21"},"page":"548 - 563","alternative_title":["LNCS"],"date_created":"2018-12-11T12:02:26Z","day":"04","publist_id":"3366","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2021-01-12T07:42:21Z","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31","publisher":"Springer","month":"05","quality_controlled":"1","oa":1,"type":"conference","project":[{"_id":"258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"259668","name":"Provable Security for Physical Cryptography","call_identifier":"FP7"}],"date_published":"2012-05-04T00:00:00Z","volume":7194,"oa_version":"Submitted Version","user_id":"3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The (decisional) learning with errors problem (LWE) asks to distinguish &quot;noisy&quot; inner products of a secret vector with random vectors from uniform. The learning parities with noise problem (LPN) is the special case where the elements of the vectors are bits. In recent years, the LWE and LPN problems have found many applications in cryptography. In this paper we introduce a (seemingly) much stronger adaptive assumption, called &quot;subspace LWE&quot; (SLWE), where the adversary can learn the inner product of the secret and random vectors after they were projected into an adaptively and adversarially chosen subspace. We prove that, surprisingly, the SLWE problem mapping into subspaces of dimension d is almost as hard as LWE using secrets of length d (the other direction is trivial.) This result immediately implies that several existing cryptosystems whose security is based on the hardness of the LWE/LPN problems are provably secure in a much stronger sense than anticipated. As an illustrative example we show that the standard way of using LPN for symmetric CPA secure encryption is even secure against a very powerful class of related key attacks. "}],"title":"Subspace LWE","_id":"3280","acknowledgement":"Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC).","status":"public","ec_funded":1,"citation":{"mla":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. <i>Subspace LWE</i>. Vol. 7194, Springer, 2012, pp. 548–63, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31\">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31</a>.","ama":"Pietrzak KZ. Subspace LWE. In: Vol 7194. Springer; 2012:548-563. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31\">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31</a>","chicago":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. “Subspace LWE,” 7194:548–63. Springer, 2012. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31</a>.","apa":"Pietrzak, K. Z. (2012). Subspace LWE (Vol. 7194, pp. 548–563). Presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy: Springer. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31</a>","ista":"Pietrzak KZ. 2012. Subspace LWE. TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 7194, 548–563.","ieee":"K. Z. Pietrzak, “Subspace LWE,” presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy, 2012, vol. 7194, pp. 548–563.","short":"K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 548–563."},"intvolume":"      7194","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"http://www.iacr.org/archive/tcc2012/71940166/71940166.pdf"}]},{"date_published":"2012-05-04T00:00:00Z","type":"conference","volume":7194,"status":"public","oa_version":"None","intvolume":"      7194","citation":{"chicago":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z, Alon Rosen, and Gil Segev. “Lossy Functions Do Not Amplify Well,” 7194:458–75. Springer, 2012. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26</a>.","mla":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z., et al. <i>Lossy Functions Do Not Amplify Well</i>. Vol. 7194, Springer, 2012, pp. 458–75, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26\">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26</a>.","ama":"Pietrzak KZ, Rosen A, Segev G. Lossy functions do not amplify well. In: Vol 7194. Springer; 2012:458-475. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26\">10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26</a>","short":"K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Rosen, G. Segev, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 458–475.","ieee":"K. Z. Pietrzak, A. Rosen, and G. Segev, “Lossy functions do not amplify well,” presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy, 2012, vol. 7194, pp. 458–475.","apa":"Pietrzak, K. Z., Rosen, A., &#38; Segev, G. (2012). Lossy functions do not amplify well (Vol. 7194, pp. 458–475). Presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy: Springer. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26</a>","ista":"Pietrzak KZ, Rosen A, Segev G. 2012. Lossy functions do not amplify well. TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 7194, 458–475."},"main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.iacr.org/archive/tcc2012/tcc2012-index.html"}],"user_id":"3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","abstract":[{"text":"We consider the problem of amplifying the &quot;lossiness&quot; of functions. We say that an oracle circuit C*: {0,1} m → {0,1}* amplifies relative lossiness from ℓ/n to L/m if for every function f:{0,1} n → {0,1} n it holds that 1 If f is injective then so is C f. 2 If f has image size of at most 2 n-ℓ, then C f has image size at most 2 m-L. The question is whether such C* exists for L/m ≫ ℓ/n. This problem arises naturally in the context of cryptographic &quot;lossy functions,&quot; where the relative lossiness is the key parameter. We show that for every circuit C* that makes at most t queries to f, the relative lossiness of C f is at most L/m ≤ ℓ/n + O(log t)/n. In particular, no black-box method making a polynomial t = poly(n) number of queries can amplify relative lossiness by more than an O(logn)/n additive term. We show that this is tight by giving a simple construction (cascading with some randomization) that achieves such amplification.","lang":"eng"}],"title":"Lossy functions do not amplify well","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26","publisher":"Springer","date_updated":"2021-01-12T07:42:22Z","_id":"3281","month":"05","quality_controlled":"1","acknowledgement":"We would like to thank Oded Goldreich and Omer Rein- gold for discussions at an early stage of this project, and Scott Aaronson for clarifications regarding the collision problem.\r\n","author":[{"full_name":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z","id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Krzysztof Z","orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654","last_name":"Pietrzak"},{"last_name":"Rosen","first_name":"Alon","full_name":"Rosen, Alon"},{"last_name":"Segev","full_name":"Segev, Gil","first_name":"Gil"}],"conference":{"name":"TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference","start_date":"2012-03-19","end_date":"2012-03-21","location":"Taormina, Sicily, Italy"},"page":"458 - 475","alternative_title":["LNCS"],"date_created":"2018-12-11T12:02:26Z","day":"04","publication_status":"published","publist_id":"3365","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2012","department":[{"_id":"KrPi"}]},{"title":"Message authentication, revisited","_id":"3282","user_id":"3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","abstract":[{"text":"Traditionally, symmetric-key message authentication codes (MACs) are easily built from pseudorandom functions (PRFs). In this work we propose a wide variety of other approaches to building efficient MACs, without going through a PRF first. In particular, unlike deterministic PRF-based MACs, where each message has a unique valid tag, we give a number of probabilistic MAC constructions from various other primitives/assumptions. Our main results are summarized as follows: We show several new probabilistic MAC constructions from a variety of general assumptions, including CCA-secure encryption, Hash Proof Systems and key-homomorphic weak PRFs. By instantiating these frameworks under concrete number theoretic assumptions, we get several schemes which are more efficient than just using a state-of-the-art PRF instantiation under the corresponding assumption. For probabilistic MACs, unlike deterministic ones, unforgeability against a chosen message attack (uf-cma ) alone does not imply security if the adversary can additionally make verification queries (uf-cmva ). We give an efficient generic transformation from any uf-cma secure MAC which is &quot;message-hiding&quot; into a uf-cmva secure MAC. This resolves the main open problem of Kiltz et al. from Eurocrypt'11; By using our transformation on their constructions, we get the first efficient MACs from the LPN assumption. While all our new MAC constructions immediately give efficient actively secure, two-round symmetric-key identification schemes, we also show a very simple, three-round actively secure identification protocol from any weak PRF. In particular, the resulting protocol is much more efficient than the trivial approach of building a regular PRF from a weak PRF. © 2012 International Association for Cryptologic Research.","lang":"eng"}],"acknowledgement":"Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC)","status":"public","ec_funded":1,"intvolume":"      7237","citation":{"apa":"Dodis, Y., Pietrzak, K. Z., Kiltz, E., &#38; Wichs, D. (2012). Message authentication, revisited (Vol. 7237, pp. 355–374). Presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Cambridge, UK: Springer. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>","ista":"Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. 2012. Message authentication, revisited. EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, LNCS, vol. 7237, 355–374.","ieee":"Y. Dodis, K. Z. Pietrzak, E. Kiltz, and D. Wichs, “Message authentication, revisited,” presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Cambridge, UK, 2012, vol. 7237, pp. 355–374.","short":"Y. Dodis, K.Z. Pietrzak, E. Kiltz, D. Wichs, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 355–374.","mla":"Dodis, Yevgeniy, et al. <i>Message Authentication, Revisited</i>. Vol. 7237, Springer, 2012, pp. 355–74, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22\">10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>.","ama":"Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. Message authentication, revisited. In: Vol 7237. Springer; 2012:355-374. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22\">10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>","chicago":"Dodis, Yevgeniy, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, Eike Kiltz, and Daniel Wichs. “Message Authentication, Revisited,” 7237:355–74. Springer, 2012. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22</a>."},"has_accepted_license":"1","file_date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:46:06Z","publisher":"Springer","date_updated":"2021-01-12T07:42:22Z","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22","oa":1,"quality_controlled":"1","file":[{"file_name":"IST-2016-686-v1+1_059.pdf","access_level":"open_access","checksum":"8557c17a8c2586d06ebfe62d934f5c5f","date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:46:06Z","file_size":372292,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5074","date_created":"2018-12-12T10:14:23Z","creator":"system","relation":"main_file"}],"month":"03","type":"conference","project":[{"_id":"258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"259668","call_identifier":"FP7","name":"Provable Security for Physical Cryptography"}],"date_published":"2012-03-10T00:00:00Z","volume":7237,"oa_version":"Submitted Version","year":"2012","ddc":["000","004"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"tmp":{"legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","image":"/images/cc_by.png","short":"CC BY (4.0)","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)"},"department":[{"_id":"KrPi"}],"conference":{"end_date":"2012-04-19","location":"Cambridge, UK","name":"EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques","start_date":"2012-04-15"},"page":"355 - 374","alternative_title":["LNCS"],"author":[{"first_name":"Yevgeniy","full_name":"Dodis, Yevgeniy","last_name":"Dodis"},{"last_name":"Pietrzak","orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654","first_name":"Krzysztof Z","id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z"},{"last_name":"Kiltz","first_name":"Eike","full_name":"Kiltz, Eike"},{"full_name":"Wichs, Daniel","first_name":"Daniel","last_name":"Wichs"}],"pubrep_id":"686","day":"10","publist_id":"3364","publication_status":"published","date_created":"2018-12-11T12:02:27Z"}]