Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information
L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, Nature Communications 14 (2023).

The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature Communications 14 (2023).

Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces
L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PLOS Computational Biology 18 (2022).

A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity
L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, M.A. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 5 (2021) 1292–1302.

Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens
B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A.V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, S. Cremer, (2020).

Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens
B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A.V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, S. Cremer, Ecology Letters 23 (2020) 565–574.

Social dilemmas among unequals
O.P. Hauser, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature 572 (2019) 524–527.

The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds
M. Hoffman, C. Hilbe, M. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 2 (2018) 397–404.

Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity
C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 2 (2018) 469–477.

Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness
J. Reiter, C. Hilbe, D. Rand, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature Communications 9 (2018).

Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature 559 (2018) 246–249.

Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information
C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 115 (2018) 12241–12246.

Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity
C. Hilbe, V. Martinez, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 114 (2017) 4715–4720.

The red queen and king in finite populations
C. Veller, L. Hayward, M. Nowak, C. Hilbe, PNAS 114 (2017) 96–05.

Asymmetric power boosts extortion in an economic experiment
C. Hilbe, K. Hagel, M. Milinski, PLoS One 11 (2016).

Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
M. Milinski, C. Hilbe, D. Semmann, R. Sommerfeld, J. Marotzke, Nature Communications 7 (2016).

Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on cEvolutionary game theory using agent-based methodsd by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze
C. Hilbe, A. Traulsen, Physics of Life Reviews 19 (2016) 29–31.

Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity
S. Baek, H. Jeong, C. Hilbe, M. Nowak, Scientific Reports 6 (2016).

Coevolutionary interactions between farmers and mafia induce host acceptance of avian brood parasites
M. Chakra, C. Hilbe, A. Traulsen, Royal Society Open Science 3 (2016).

Experimental game instructions
C. Hilbe, K. Hagel, M. Milinski, (2016).