Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits

Dütting P, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. 2015. Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 4(1), 4.

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Author
Dütting, Paul; Henzinger, MonikaISTA ; Starnberger, Martin
Abstract
We study individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. We consider settings with multiunit demand and additive valuations. For single-dimensional valuations we prove a positive result for randomized mechanisms, and a negative result for deterministic mechanisms. While the positive result allows for private budgets, the negative result is for public budgets. For multidimensional valuations and public budgets we prove an impossibility result that applies to deterministic and randomized mechanisms. Taken together this shows the power of randomization in certain settings with heterogeneous items, but it also shows its limitations.
Publishing Year
Date Published
2015-12-05
Journal Title
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Volume
4
Issue
1
Article Number
4
ISSN
eISSN
IST-REx-ID

Cite this

Dütting P, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2015;4(1). doi:10.1145/2818351
Dütting, P., Henzinger, M. H., & Starnberger, M. (2015). Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/2818351
Dütting, Paul, Monika H Henzinger, and Martin Starnberger. “Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits.” ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1145/2818351.
P. Dütting, M. H. Henzinger, and M. Starnberger, “Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits,” ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 4, no. 1. Association for Computing Machinery, 2015.
Dütting P, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. 2015. Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 4(1), 4.
Dütting, Paul, et al. “Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits.” ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 4, no. 1, 4, Association for Computing Machinery, 2015, doi:10.1145/2818351.
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