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Games with a Weak Adversary

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Abstract. We consider multi-player graph games with partial-observation and parity objective. While the decision problem for three-player games with a coalition of the first and second players against the third player is undecidable, we present a decidability result for partial-observation games where the first and third player are in a coalition against the second player, thus where the second player is adversarial but weaker due to partial-observation. We establish tight complexity bounds in the case where player 1 is less informed than player 2, namely 2-EXPTIME-completeness for parity objectives. The symmetric case of player 1 more informed than player 2 is much more complicated, and we show that already in the case where player 1 has perfect observation, memory of size non-elementary is necessary in general for reachability objectives, and the problem is decidable for safety and reachability objectives. Our results have tight connections with partial-observation stochastic games for which we derive new complexity results.

1 Introduction

Games on graphs. Games played on graphs are central in several important problems in computer science, such as reactive synthesis [23, 24], verification of open systems [1], and many others. The game is played by several players on a finite-state graph, with a set of angelic (existential) players and a set of demonic (universal) players as follows: the game starts at an initial state, and given the current state, the successor state is determined by the choice of moves of the players. The outcome of the game is a *play*, which is an infinite sequence of states in the graph. A *strategy* is a transducer to resolve choices in a game for a player that given a finite prefix of the play specifies the next move. Given an objective (the desired set of behaviors or plays), the goal of the existential players is to ensure the play belongs to the objective irrespective of the strategies of the universal players. In verification and control of reactive systems an objective is typically an ω-regular set of paths. The class of ω-regular languages, that extends classical regular languages to infinite strings, provides a robust specification language to express all commonly used specifications, and parity objectives are a canonical way to define such ω-regular specifications [29]. Thus games on graphs with parity objectives provide a general framework for analysis of reactive systems.

Perfect vs partial observation. Many results about games on graphs make the hypothesis of *perfect observation* (i.e., players have perfect or complete observation about the state of the game). In this setting, due to determinacy (or switching of the strategy quantifiers for existential and universal players) [18], the questions expressed by an arbitrary alternation of quantifiers reduce to a single alternation, and thus are equivalent to solving two-player games (all the existential players against all the universal players). However, the assumption of perfect observation is often not realistic in practice. For example in the control of physical systems, digital sensors with finite precision provide partial information to the controller about the system state [11, 14]. Similarly, in a concurrent system the modules

expose partial interfaces and have access to the public variables of the other processes, but not to their private variables [27, 1]. Such situations are better modeled in the more general framework of *partial-observation* games [26–28].

Partial-observation games. Since partial-observation games are not determined, unlike the perfect-observation setting, the multi-player games problems do not reduce to the case of two-player games. Typically, multi-player partial-observation games are studied in the following setting: a set of partial-observation existential players, against a perfect-observation universal player, such as for distributed synthesis [23, 13, 25]. The problem of deciding if the existential players can ensure a reachability (or a safety) objective is undecidable in general, even for two existential players [22, 23]. However, if the information of the existential players form a chain (i.e., existential player 1 more informed than existential player 2, existential player 2 more informed than existential player 3, and so on), then the problem is decidable [23, 17, 19].

Games with a weak adversary. One aspect of multi-player games that has been largely ignored is the presence of weaker universal players that do not have perfect observation. However, it is natural in the analysis of composite reactive systems that some universal players represent components that do not have access to all variables of the system. In this work we consider games where adversarial players can have partial observation. If there are two existential (resp., two universal) players with incomparable partial observation, then the undecidability results follows from [22, 23]; and if the information of the existential (resp., universal) players form a chain, then they can be reduced to one partial-observation existential (resp., universal) player. We consider the following case of partial-observation games: one partial-observation existential player (player 1), one partial-observation universal player (player 2), one perfect-observation existential player (player 3), and one perfect-observation universal player (player 4); (also see Section 9 in the appendix for further discussion). Roughly, having more partial-observation players leads to undecidability, and having more perfect-observation players reduces to two perfect-observation players. We first present our results and then discuss two applications of our model.

Results. Our main results are as follows:
1. *Player 1 less informed.* We first consider the case when player 1 is less informed than player 2. We establish the following results: (i) a 2-EXPTIME upper bound for parity objectives and a 2-EXPTIME lower bound for reachability objectives (i.e., we establish 2-EXPTIME-completeness); (ii) an EXPSPACE upper bound for parity objectives when player 1 is blind (has only one observation), and EXPSPACE lower bound for reachability objectives even when both player 1 and player 2 are blind. In all these cases, if the objective can be ensured then the upper bound on memory requirement of winning strategies is at most doubly exponential.
2. *Player 1 is more informed.* We consider the case when player 1 can be more informed as compared to player 2, and show that even when player 1 has perfect observation there is a non-elementary lower bound on the memory required by winning strategies. This result is also in sharp contrast to distributed games, where if only one player has partial observation then the upper bound on memory of winning strategies is exponential.

Applications. We discuss two applications of our results: the sequential synthesis problem, and new complexity results for partial-observation *stochastic* games.
1. The sequential synthesis problem consists of a set of partially implemented modules, where first a set of modules needs to be refined, followed by a refinement of some modules by an external source, and then the remaining modules are refined so that the composite open reactive system satisfies a specification. Given the first two refinements

| | Reachability | | Parity | | Parity | |
| | Finite- or infinite-memory strategies | | Infinite-memory strategies | | Finite-memory strategies | |
Player 1	Perfect	More informed	Perfect	More informed	Perfect	More informed
Randomized	EXP-c [8]	EXP-c [3]	Undec. [2, 7]	Undec. [2, 7]	EXP-c [9]	**2EXP**
Pure	EXP-c [6]	**2EXP-c**	Undec. [2]	Undec. [2]	EXP-c [9]	**2EXP-c**

Table 1. Complexity of qualitative analysis (almost-sure winning) for partial-observation stochastic games with partial observation for player 1 with reachability and parity objectives. Player 2 has either perfect observation or more information than player 1(new results boldfaced). For positive winning, all entries other than the first (randomized strategies for player 1 and perfect observation for player 2) remain the same, and the complexity for the first entry for positive winning is PTIME-complete.

    cannot access all private variables, we have a four-player game where the first refinement corresponds to player 1, the second refinement to player 2, the third refinement to player 3, and player 4 is the environment.

2. In partial-observation stochastic games, there are two partial-observation players (one existential and one universal) playing in the presence of uncertainty in the transition function (i.e., stochastic transition function). The qualitative analysis question is to decide the existence of a strategy for the existential player to ensure the parity objective with probability 1 (or with positive probability) against all strategies of the universal player. The witness strategy can be randomized or deterministic (pure), and the decision problem for randomized strategies reduces to the pure strategy question [6]. While the qualitative problem is undecidable, the practically relevant restriction to finite-memory strategies reduces to the four-player game problem, and by the results we establish in this paper, new decidability and complexity results are obtained for the qualitative analysis of partial-observation stochastic games with player 2 partially informed but more informed than player 1.

    The complexity results for almost-sure winning are summarized in Table 1. Surprisingly for reachability objectives, whether player 2 is perfectly informed or more informed than player 1 does not change the complexity for randomized strategies, but it results in an exponential increase in the complexity for pure strategies.

Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we present the definitions of three-player games, and other related models (such as partial-observation stochastic games). In Section 3 we establish the results for three-player games with player 1 less informed, and in Section 4 we show hardness of three-player games with perfect observation for player 1 (which is a special case of player 1 more informed). Finally, in Section 5 we show how our upper bounds for three-player games from Section 3 extend to four-player games, and we conclude with the applications in Section 6.

2 Definitions

We first consider three-player games with parity objectives and we establish new complexity results in Section 3 that we later extend to four-player games in Section 5. In this section, we also present the related models of alternating tree automata that provide useful technical results, and two-player stochastic games for which our contribution implies new complexity results.

2.1 Three-player games

Games Given alphabets A_i of actions for player i ($i = 1, 2, 3$), a *three-player game* is a tuple $G = \langle Q, q_0, \delta \rangle$ where:

- Q is a finite set of states with $q_0 \in Q$ the initial state; and
- $\delta : Q \times A_1 \times A_2 \times A_3 \to Q$ is a deterministic transition function that, given a current state q, and actions $a_1 \in A_1$, $a_2 \in A_2$, $a_3 \in A_3$ of the players, gives the successor state $q' = \delta(q, a_1, a_2, a_3)$.

The games we consider are sometimes called *concurrent* because all three players need to choose simultaneously an action to determine a successor state. The special class of *turn-based* games corresponds to the case where in every state, one player has the turn and his sole action determines the successor state. In our framework, a turn-based state for player 1 is a state $q \in Q$ such that $\delta(q, a_1, a_2, a_3) = \delta(q, a_1, a_2', a_3')$ for all $a_1 \in A_1$, $a_2, a_2' \in A_2$, and $a_3, a_3' \in A_3$. We define analogously turn-based states for player 2 and player 3. A game is turn-based if every state of G is turn-based (for some player). The class of two-player games is obtained when A_3 is a singleton. In a game G, given $s \subseteq Q$, $a_1 \in A_1$, $a_2 \in A_2$, let $\mathsf{post}^G(s, a_1, a_2, -) = \{q' \in Q \mid \exists q \in s \cdot \exists a_3 \in A_3 : q' = \delta(q, a_1, a_2, a_3)\}$.

Observations For $i = 1, 2, 3$, a set $\mathcal{O}_i \subseteq 2^Q$ of *observations* (for player i) is a partition of Q (i.e., $\mathcal{O}_i$ is a set of non-empty and non-overlapping subsets of Q, and their union covers Q). Let $\mathsf{obs}_i : Q \to \mathcal{O}_i$ be the function that assigns to each state $q \in Q$ the (unique) observation for player i that contains q, i.e. such that $q \in \mathsf{obs}_i(q)$. The functions obs_i are extended to sequences $\rho = q_0 \ldots q_n$ of states in the natural way, namely $\mathsf{obs}_i(\rho) = \mathsf{obs}_i(q_0) \ldots \mathsf{obs}_i(q_n)$. We say that player i is *blind* if $\mathcal{O}_i = \{Q\}$, that is player i has only one observation; player i has *perfect information* if $\mathcal{O}_i = \{\{q\} \mid q \in Q\}$, that is player i can distinguish each state; and player 1 is *less informed* than player 2 (we also say player 2 is more informed) if for all $o_2 \in \mathcal{O}_2$, there exists $o_1 \in \mathcal{O}_1$ such that $o_2 \subseteq o_1$.

Strategies For $i = 1, 2, 3$, let Σ_i be the set of *strategies* $\sigma_i : \mathcal{O}_i^+ \to A_i$ of player i that, given a sequence of past observations, give an action for player i. Equivalently, we sometimes view a strategy of player i as a function $\sigma_i : Q^+ \to A_i$ satisfying $\sigma_i(\rho) = \sigma_i(\rho')$ for all $\rho, \rho' \in Q^+$ such that $\mathsf{obs}_i(\rho) = \mathsf{obs}_i(\rho')$, and say that σ_i is *observation-based*.

Outcome Given strategies $\sigma_i \in \Sigma_i$ ($i = 1, 2, 3$) in G, the *outcome play* from a state q_0 is the infinite sequence $\rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3} = q_0 q_1 \ldots$ such that for all $j \geq 0$, we have $q_{j+1} = \delta(q_j, a_1^j, a_2^j, a_3^j)$ where $a_i^j = \sigma_i(q_0 \ldots q_j)$ (for $i = 1, 2, 3$).

Objectives An *objective* is a set $\alpha \subseteq Q^\omega$ of infinite sequences of states. A play ρ *satisfies* the objective α if $\rho \in \alpha$. An objective α is *visible* for player i if for all $\rho, \rho' \in Q^\omega$, if $\rho \in \alpha$ and $\mathsf{obs}_i(\rho) = \mathsf{obs}_i(\rho')$, then $\rho' \in \alpha$. We consider the following objectives:
- *Reachability*. Given a set $\mathcal{T} \subseteq Q$ of target states, the *reachability* objective $\mathsf{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$ requires that a state in $\mathcal{T}$ be visited at least once, that is, $\mathsf{Reach}(\mathcal{T}) = \{\rho = q_0 q_1 \cdots \mid \exists k \geq 0 : q_k \in \mathcal{T}\}$.
- *Safety*. Given a set $\mathcal{T} \subseteq Q$ of target states, the *safety* objective $\mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T})$ requires that only states in $\mathcal{T}$ be visited, that is, $\mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T}) = \{\rho = q_0 q_1 \cdots \mid \forall k \geq 0 : q_k \in \mathcal{T}\}$.
- *Parity*. For a play $\rho = q_0 q_1 \ldots$ we denote by $\mathsf{Inf}(\rho)$ the set of states that occur infinitely often in ρ, that is, $\mathsf{Inf}(\rho) = \{q \in Q \mid \forall k \geq 0 \cdot \exists n \geq k : q_n = q\}$. For $d \in \mathbb{N}$, let $p : Q \to \{0, 1, \ldots, d\}$ be a priority function, which maps each state to a nonnegative integer priority. The parity objective $\mathsf{Parity}(p)$ requires that the minimum priority occurring infinitely often be even. Formally, $\mathsf{Parity}(p) = \{\rho \mid \min\{p(q) \mid q \in \mathsf{Inf}(\rho)\}$ is even$\}$. Parity objectives are a canonical way to express ω-regular objectives [29]. If the priority function is constant over observations of player i, that is for all observations $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_i$ we have $p(q) = p(q')$ for all $q, q' \in \gamma$, then the parity objective $\mathsf{Parity}(p)$ is visible for player i.

Decision problem Given a game $G = \langle Q, q_0, \delta \rangle$ and an objective $\alpha \subseteq Q^\omega$, the *three-player decision problem* is to decide if $\exists \sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \cdot \forall \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2 \cdot \exists \sigma_3 \in \Sigma_3 : \rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3} \in \alpha$.

2.2 Related models

The results for the three-player decision problem have tight connections and implications for decision problems on alternating tree automata and partial-observation stochastic games that we formally define below.

Trees An Σ-labeled tree (T, V) consists of a prefix-closed set $T \subseteq \mathbb{N}^*$ (i.e., if $x \cdot d \in T$ with $x \in \mathbb{N}^*$ and $d \in \mathbb{N}$, then $x \in T$), and a mapping $V : T \to \Sigma$ that assigns to each node of T a letter in Σ. Given $x \in \mathbb{N}^*$ and $d \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $x \cdot d \in T$, we call $x \cdot d$ the *successor* in direction d of x. The node ε is the *root* of the tree. An *infinite path* in T is an infinite sequence $\pi = d_1 d_2 \ldots$ of directions $d_i \in \mathbb{N}$ such that every finite prefix of π is a node in T.

Alternating tree automata Given a parameter $k \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$, we consider input trees of rank k, i.e. trees in which every node has at most k successors. Let $[k] = \{0, \ldots, k-1\}$, and given a finite set U, let $\mathcal{B}^+(U)$ be the set of positive Boolean formulas over U, that is formulas built from elements in $U \cup \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ using the Boolean connectives $\wedge$ and $\vee$. An *alternating tree automaton* over alphabet Σ is a tuple $\mathcal{A} = \langle S, s_0, \delta_\mathcal{A} \rangle$ where:
  – S is a finite set of states with $s_0 \in S$ the initial state; and
  – $\delta_\mathcal{A} : S \times \Sigma \to \mathcal{B}^+(S \times [k])$ is a transition function.
Intuitively, the automaton is executed from the initial state s_0 and reads the input tree in a top-down fashion starting from the root ε. In state s, if $a \in \Sigma$ is the letter that labels the current node x of the input tree, the behavior of the automaton is given by the formulas $\varphi = \delta_\mathcal{A}(s, a)$. The automaton chooses a *satisfying assignment* of φ, i.e. a set $Z \subseteq S \times [k]$ such that the formula φ is satisfied when the elements of Z are replaced by true, and the elements of $(S \times [k]) \setminus Z$ are replaced by false. Then, for each $\langle s_1, d_1 \rangle \in Z$ a copy of the automaton is spawned in state s_1, and proceeds the node $x \cdot d_1$ of the input tree. In particular, it requires that $x \cdot d_1$ belongs to the input tree. For example, if $\delta_\mathcal{A}(s, a) = (\langle s_1, 0 \rangle \wedge \langle s_2, 0 \rangle) \vee (\langle s_3, 0 \rangle \wedge \langle s_4, 1 \rangle \wedge \langle s_5, 1 \rangle)$, then the automaton should either spawn two copies that process the successor of x in direction 0 (i.e., the node $x \cdot 0$) and that enter the states s_1 and s_2 respectively, or spawn three copies of which one processes $x \cdot 0$ and enters state s_3, and the other two process $x \cdot 1$ and enter the states s_4 and s_5 respectively.

Language and emptiness problem A run of $\mathcal{A}$ over a Σ-labeled input tree (T, V) is a tree (T_r, r) labeled by elements of $T \times S$, where a node of T_r labeled by (x, s) corresponds to a copy of the automaton proceeding the node x of the input tree in state s. Formally, a *run* of $\mathcal{A}$ over an input tree (T, V) is a $(T \times S)$-labeled tree (T_r, r) such that $r(\varepsilon) = (\varepsilon, s_0)$ and for all $y \in T_r$, if $r(y) = (x, s)$, then the set $\{\langle s', d' \rangle \mid \exists d \in \mathbb{N} : r(y \cdot d) = (x \cdot d', s')\}$ is a satisfying assignment for $\delta_\mathcal{A}(s, V(x))$. Hence we require that, given a node y in T_r labeled by (x, s), there is a satisfying assignment $Z \subseteq S \times [k]$ for the formula $\delta_\mathcal{A}(s, a)$ where $a = V(x)$ is the letter labeling the current node x of the input tree, and for all states $\langle s', d' \rangle \in Z$ there is a (successor) node $y \cdot d$ in T_r labeled by $(x \cdot d', s')$.

Given an accepting condition $\varphi \subseteq S^\omega$, we say that a run (T_r, r) is *accepting* if for all infinite paths $d_1 d_2 \ldots$ of T_r, the sequence $s_1 s_2 \ldots$ such that $r(d_i) = (\cdot, s_i)$ for all $i \geq 0$ is in φ. The *language* of $\mathcal{A}$ is the set $L_k(\mathcal{A})$ of all input trees of rank k over which there exists an accepting run of $\mathcal{A}$. The emptiness problem for alternating tree automata is to decide, given $\mathcal{A}$ and parameter k, whether $L_k(\mathcal{A}) = \varnothing$. For details related to alternating tree automata and the emptiness problem see [12, 20].

Two-player partial-observation stochastic games Given alphabet A_i of actions, and set $\mathcal{O}_i$ of observations (for player $i \in \{1, 2\}$), a *two-player partial-observation stochastic game* (for brevity, two-player stochastic game) is a tuple $G = \langle Q, q_0, \delta \rangle$ where Q is a finite set of states, $q_0 \in Q$ is the initial state, and $\delta : Q \times A_1 \times A_2 \to \mathcal{D}(Q)$ is a probabilistic transition where $\mathcal{D}(Q)$ is the set of probability distributions $\kappa : Q \to [0, 1]$ on Q, such that $\sum_{q \in Q} \kappa(q) = 1$. Given a current state q and actions a, b for the players, the transition probability to a successor state q' is $\delta(q, a, b)(q')$.

Observation-based strategies are defined as for three-player games. An *outcome play* from a state q_0 under strategies σ_1, σ_2 is an infinite sequence $\rho = q_0\, a_0 b_0\, q_1 \ldots$ such that $a_i = \sigma_1(q_0 \ldots q_i)$, $b_i = \sigma_2(q_0 \ldots q_i)$, and $\delta(q_i, a_i, b_i)(q_{i+1}) > 0$ for all $i \geq 0$.

Qualitative analysis Given an objective α that is Borel measurable (all Borel sets in the Cantor topology and all objectives considered in this paper are measurable [15]), a strategy σ_1 for player 1 is *almost-sure winning* (resp., *positive winning*) for the objective α from q_0 if for all observation-based strategies σ_2 for player 2, we have $\Pr_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2}(\alpha) = 1$ (resp., $\Pr_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2}(\alpha) > 0$) where $\Pr_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2}(\cdot)$ is the unique probability measure induced by the natural probability measure on finite prefixes of plays (i.e., the product of the transition probabilities in the prefix).

3 Three-Player Games with Player 1 Less Informed

We show that for reachability and parity objectives the three-player decision problem is decidable when player 1 is less informed than player 2. The complexity of this problem ranges from EXPTIME-complete when player 2 has perfect information, to EXPSPACE-complete when player 1 is blind, and 2-EXPTIME-complete in general.

Remark 1. Observe that once the strategies of the first two players are fixed we obtain a graph, and in graphs perfect-information coincides with blind for construction of a path (see [5, Lemma 2] that counting strategies that count the number of steps are sufficient which can be ensured by a player with no information). Hence without loss of generality we consider that player 3 has perfect observation, and drop the observation for player 3.

Theorem 1 (Upper bounds). *Given a three-player game $G = \langle Q, q_0, \delta \rangle$ with player 1 less informed than player 2 and a parity objective α, the problem of deciding whether $\exists \sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \cdot \forall \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2 \cdot \exists \sigma_3 \in \Sigma_3 : \rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3} \in \alpha$ can be solved in 2-EXPTIME. If player 1 is blind, then the problem can be solved in EXPSPACE.*

Proof. The proof is by a reduction of the decision problem for three-player games to a decision problem for partial-observation two-player games with the same objective. We present the reduction for parity objectives that are visible for player 2 (defined by priority functions that are constant over observations of player 2). The general case of not necessarily visible parity objectives can be solved using a reduction to visible objectives, as in [5, Section 3].

Given a three-player game $G = \langle Q, q_0, \delta \rangle$ over alphabet of actions A_i ($i = 1, 2, 3$), and observations $\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2 \subseteq 2^Q$ for player 1 and player 2, with player 1 less informed than player 2, we construct a two-player game $H = \langle Q_H, \{q_0\}, \delta_H \rangle$ over alphabet of actions A'_i ($i = 1, 2$), and observations $\mathcal{O}'_1 \subseteq 2^{Q_H}$ and perfect observation for player 2, where (intuitive explanations follow):

- $Q_H = \{s \in 2^Q \mid s \neq \varnothing \wedge \exists o_2 \in \mathcal{O}_2 : s \subseteq o_2\}$;
- $A'_1 = A_1 \times (2^Q \times A_2 \to \mathcal{O}_2)$, and $A'_2 = A_2$;

- $\mathcal{O}'_1 = \big\{\{s \in Q_H \mid s \subseteq o_1\} \mid o_1 \in \mathcal{O}_1\big\}$, and let $\mathsf{obs}'_1 : Q_H \to \mathcal{O}'_1$ be the corresponding observation function;
- $\delta_H(s, (a_1, f), a_2) = \mathsf{post}^G(s, a_1, a_2, -) \cap f(s, a_2)$.

Intuitively, the state space Q_H is the set of knowledges of player 2 about the current state in G, i.e., the sets of states compatible with an observation of player 2. Along a play in H, the knowledge of player 2 is updated to represent the set of possible current states in which the game G can be. In H player 2 has perfect observation and the role of player 1 in the game H is to simulate the actions of both player 1 and player 3 in G. Since player 2 fixes his strategy before player 3 in G, the simulation should not let player 2 know player-3's action, but only the observation that player 2 will actually see while playing the game. The actions of player 1 in H are pairs $(a_1, f) \in A'_1$ where a_1 is a simple action of player 1 in G, and f gives the observation $f(s, a_2)$ received by player 2 after the response of player 3 to the action a_2 of player 2 when the knowledge of player 2 is s. In H, player 1 has partial observation, as he cannot distinguish knowledges of player 2 that belong to the same observation of player 1 in G. The transition relation updates the knowledges of player 2 as expected. Note that $|\mathcal{O}_1| = |\mathcal{O}'_1|$, and therefore if player 1 is blind in G then he is blind in H as well.

Given a visible parity objective $\alpha = \mathsf{Parity}(p)$ where $p : Q \to \{0, 1, \dots, d\}$ is constant over observations of player 2, let $\alpha' = \mathsf{Parity}(p')$ where $p'(s) = p(q)$ for all $q \in s$ and $s \in Q_H$. Note that the function p' is well defined since s is a subset of an observation of player 2 and thus $p(q) = p(q')$ for all $q, q' \in s$. However, the parity objective $\alpha' = \mathsf{Parity}(p')$ may not be visible to player 1 in G. We establish that given witness strategies in G we can construct witness strategies in H and vice-versa, and the details of the strategy constructions are presented in Section 7 of the appendix. $\qquad\square$

Theorem 2 (Lower bounds). *Given a three-player game $G = \langle Q, q_0, \delta \rangle$ with player 1 less informed than player 2 and a reachability objective α, the problem of deciding whether $\exists \sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \cdot \forall \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2 \cdot \exists \sigma_3 \in \Sigma_3 : \rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3} \in \alpha$ is 2-EXPTIME-hard. If player 1 is blind (and even when player 2 is also blind), then the problem is EXPSPACE-hard.*

Proof. The proof of 2-EXPTIME-hardness is obtained by a polynomial-time reduction of the membership problem for exponential-space *alternating* Turing machines to the three-player problem. The same reduction for the special case of exponential-space *nondeterministic* Turing machines shows EXPSPACE-hardness when player 1 is blind (because our reduction yields a game in which player 1 is blind when we start from a nondeterministic Turing machine). The membership problem for Turing machines is to decide, given a Turing machine M and a finite word w, whether M accepts w. The membership problem is 2-EXPTIME-complete for exponential-space alternating Turing machines, and EXPSPACE-complete for exponential-space nondeterministic Turing machines [21].

An alternating Turing machine is a tuple $M = \langle Q_\vee, Q_\wedge, \Sigma, \Gamma, \Delta, q_0, q_{acc}, q_{rej} \rangle$ where the state space $Q = Q_\vee \cup Q_\wedge$ consists of the set $Q_\vee$ of or-states, and the set $Q_\wedge$ of and-states. The input alphabet is Σ, the tape alphabet is $\Gamma = \Sigma \cup \{\#\}$ where $\#$ is the blank symbol. The initial state is q_0, the accepting state is q_{acc}, and the rejecting state is q_{rej}. The transition relation is $\Delta \subseteq Q \times \Gamma \times Q \times \Gamma \times \{-1, 1\}$, where a transition $(q, \gamma, q', \gamma', d) \in \Delta$ intuitively means that, given the machine is in state q, and the symbol under the tape head is γ, the machine can move to state q', replace the symbol under the tape head by γ', and move the tape head to the neighbor cell in direction d. A configuration c of M is a sequence $c \in (\Gamma \cup (Q \times \Gamma))^\omega$ with exactly one symbol in $Q \times \Gamma$, which indicates the current state of the machine and the position of the tape head. The initial configuration of M on $w = a_0 a_1 \dots a_n$ is $c_0 = (q_0, a_0) \cdot a_1 \cdot a_2 \cdot \dots \cdot a_n \cdot \#^\omega$. Given the initial configuration

of M on w, it is routine to define the execution trees of M where at least one successor of each configuration in an or-state, and all successors of the configurations in an and-state are present (and we assume that all branches reach either q_{acc} or q_{rej}), and to say that M accepts w if all branches of some execution tree reach q_{acc}. Note that $Q_\wedge = \varnothing$ for nondeterministic Turing machines, and in that case the execution tree reduces to a single path. A Turing machine M uses exponential space if for all words w, all configurations in the execution of M on w contain at most $2^{O(|w|)}$ non-blank symbols.

We present the key steps of our reduction from alternating Turing machines. Given a Turing machine M and a word w, we construct a three-player game with reachability objective in which player 1 and player 2 have to simulate the execution of M on w, and player 1 has to announce the successive configurations and transitions of the machine along the execution. Player 1 announces configurations one symbol at a time, thus the alphabet of player 1 is $A_1 = \Gamma \cup (Q \times \Gamma) \cup \Delta$. In an initialization phase, the transition relation of the game forces player 1 to announce the initial configuration c_0 (this can be done with $O(n)$ states in the game, where $n = |w|$). Then, the game proceeds to a loop where player 1 keeps announcing symbols of configurations. At all times along the execution, some finite information is stored in the finite state space of the game: a window of the last three symbols z_1, z_2, z_3 announced by player 1, as well as the last symbol $head \in Q \times \Gamma$ announced by player 1 (that indicates the current machine state and the position of the tape head). After the initialization phase, we should have $z_1 = z_2 = z_3 = \#$ and $head = (q_0, a_0)$. When player 1 has announced a full configuration, he moves to a state of the game where either player 1 or player 2 has to announce a transition of the machine: for $head = (p, a)$, if $p \in Q_\vee$, then player 1 chooses the next transition, and if $p \in Q_\wedge$, then player 2 chooses. Note that the transitions chosen by player 2 are visible to player 1 and this is the only information that player 1 observes. Hence player 1 is less informed than player 2, and both player 1 and player 2 are blind when the machine is nondeterministic. If a transition $(q, \gamma, q', \gamma', d)$ is chosen by player i, and either $p \neq q$ or $a \neq \gamma$, then player i loses (i.e., a sink state is reached to let player 1 lose, and the target state of the reachability objective is reached to let player 2 lose). If at some point player 1 announces a symbol (p, a) with $p = q_{acc}$, then player 1 wins the game.

The role of player 2 is to check that player 1 faithfully simulates the execution of the Turing machine, and correctly announces the configurations. After every announcement of a symbol by player 1, the game offers the possibility to player 2 to compare this symbol with the symbol at the same position in the next configuration. We say that player 2 *checks* (and whether player 2 checks or not is not visible to player 1), and the checked symbol is stored as z_2. Note that player 2 can be blind to check because player 2 fixes his strategy after player 1. The window z_1, z_2, z_3 stored in the state space of the game provides enough information to update the middle cell z_2 in the next configuration, and it allows the game to verify the check of player 2. However, the distance (in number of steps) between the same position in two consecutive configurations is exponential (say 2^n for simplicity), and the state space of the game is not large enough to check that such a distance exists between the two symbols compared by player 2. We use player 3 to check that player 2 makes a comparison at the correct position. When player 2 decides to check, he has to count from 0 to 2^n by announcing after every symbol of player 1 a sequence of n bits, initially all zeros (again, this can be enforced by the structure of the game with $O(n)$ states). It is then the responsibility of player 3 to check that player 2 counts correctly. To check this, player 3 can at any time choose a bit position $p \in \{0, \ldots, n-1\}$ and store the bit value b_p announced by player 2 at position p. The value of b_p and p is not visible to player 2. While player 2 announces the bits $b_{p+1}, \ldots, b_{n-1}$ at position $p+1, \ldots, n-1$, the finite state of the game

is used to flip the value of b_p if all bits $b_{p+1}, \ldots, b_{n-1}$ are equal to 1, hence updating b_p to the value of the p-th bit in what should be the next announcement of player 2. In the next bit sequence announced by player 2, the p-th bit is compared with b_p. If they match, then the game goes to a sink state (as player 2 has faithfully counted), and if they differ then the game goes to the target state (as player 2 is caught cheating). It can be shown that this can be enforced by the structure of the game with $O(n^2)$ states, that is $O(n)$ states for each value of p. As before, whether player 3 checks or not is not visible to player 2.

Note that the checks of player 2 and player 3 are one-shot: the game will be over (either in a sink or target state) when the check is finished. This is enough to ensure a faithful simulation by player 1, and a faithful counting by player 2, because (1) partial observation allows to hide to a player the time when a check occurs, and (2) player 2 fixes his strategy after player 1 (and player 3 after player 2), thus they can decide to run a check exactly when player 1 (or player 2) is not faithful. This ensures that player 1 does not win if he does not simulate the execution of M on w, and that player 2 does not win if he does not count correctly.

Hence this reduction ensures that M accepts w if and only if the answer to the three-player game problem is YES, where the reachability objective is satisfied if player 1 eventually announces that the machine has reached q_{acc} (that is if M accepts w), or if player 2 cheats in counting, which can be detected by player 3. □

4 Three-Player Games with Player 1 Perfect

When player 2 is less informed than player 1, we show that three-player games get much more complicated (even in the special case where player 1 has perfect information). We note that for reachability objectives, the three-player decision problem is equivalent to the qualitative analysis of positive winning in two-player stochastic games, and we show that the techniques developed in the analysis of two-player stochastic games can be extended to solve the three-player decision problem with safety objectives as well.

For reachability objectives, the three-player decision problem is equivalent to the problem of positive winning in two-player stochastic games where the third player is replaced by a probabilistic choice over the action set with uniform probability. Intuitively, after player 1 and player 2 fixes their strategy, the fact that player 3 can construct a (finite) path to the target set is equivalent to the fact that such a path has positive probability when the choices of player 3 are replaced by uniform probabilistic transitions. It follows from this equivalence (of winning in three-player games and positive winning in two-player games) for reachability objectives that the result of Theorem 1 generalizes the complexity result of [6, Theorem 1], which established EXPTIME-completeness in stochastic two-player reachability games with player 2 having perfect information. In particular, when both player 1 and player 2 have partial observation, Theorem 1 can be used to show that two-player stochastic games with reachability objective can be solved in 2-EXPTIME when player 1 is less informed than player 2, extending the results of [6].

Reachability objectives. Even in the special case where player 1 has perfect information, and for reachability objectives, non-elementary memory is necessary in general for player 1 to win. This result follows from the equivalence of three-player reachability and two-player stochastic games with positive reachability as discussed above, and from the result of [6, Example 4.2 Journal version] showing that non-elementary memory is necessary to win with positive probability in two-player stochastic games. It also follows from the equivalence described above and the result of [6, Corollary 4.9 Journal version] that the three-

player decision problem for reachability games is decidable in non-elementary time. We extend the decidability result to safety objectives (see Section 8 in Appendix).

Theorem 3. *When player 1 has perfect information, the three-player decision problem is decidable for both reachability and safety games, and for reachability games memory of size non-elementary is necessary in general for player 1.*

5 Four-Player Games

We show that the results presented for three-player games extend to games with four players (the fourth player is universal and perfectly informed). The definition of four-player games and related notions is a straightforward extension of Section 2.1.

In a four-player game with player 1 less informed than player 2, and perfect information for both player 3 and player 4, consider the *four-player decision problem* which is to decide if $\exists \sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \cdot \forall \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2 \cdot \exists \sigma_3 \in \Sigma_3 \cdot \forall \sigma_4 \in \Sigma_4 : \rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1,\sigma_2,\sigma_3,\sigma_4} \in \alpha$ for a parity objective α (also see Section 9 in the appendix for further discussion). Since player 3 and player 4 have perfect information, we assume without loss of generality that the game is turn-based for them, that is there is a partition of the state space Q into two sets Q_3 and Q_4 (where $Q = Q_3 \cup Q_4$) such that the transition function is the union of $\delta_3 : Q_3 \times A_1 \times A_2 \times A_3 \to Q$ and $\delta_4 : Q_4 \times A_1 \times A_2 \times A_4 \to Q$. Strategies and outcomes are defined analogously to three-player games. A strategy of player $i \in \{3,4\}$ is of the form $\sigma_i : Q^* \cdot Q_i \to A_i$.

By determinacy of perfect-information turn-based games with countable state space [18], the negation of the four-player decision problem is equivalent to $\forall \sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \cdot \exists \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2 \cdot \exists \sigma_4 \in \Sigma_4 \cdot \forall \sigma_3 \in \Sigma_3 : \rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1,\sigma_2,\sigma_3,\sigma_4} \in \alpha$. Once the strategies σ_1 and σ_2 are fixed, the condition $\exists \sigma_4 \in \Sigma_4 \cdot \forall \sigma_3 \in \Sigma_3 : \rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1,\sigma_2,\sigma_3,\sigma_4} \in \alpha$ can be viewed as the membership problem for a tree t^{σ_1,σ_2} in the language of an alternating parity tree automaton [9] with state space Q where t^{σ_1,σ_2} is the $(A_1 \times A_2)$-labeled tree (T, V) where $T = \mathcal{O}_2^+$ and $V(\rho) = (\sigma_1(\mathsf{obs}_1(\rho)), \sigma_2(\rho))$ for all $\rho \in T$.

By the results of [12], if there exists an accepting $(\mathcal{O}_2^+ \times Q)$-labeled run tree (T_r, r) for an input tree t^{σ_1,σ_2} in an alternating parity tree automaton, then there exists a *memoryless* accepting run tree, that is such that for all nodes $x, y \in T_r$ such that $|x| = |y|$ and $r(x) = r(y)$, the subtrees of T_r rooted at x and y are isomorphic. Since the membership problem is equivalent to a two-player parity game played on the structure of the alternating automaton, a memoryless accepting run tree can be viewed as a winning strategy $\sigma_4 : \mathcal{O}_2^+ \times Q \to A_4$, or equivalently $\sigma_4 : \mathcal{O}_2^+ \to (Q \to A_4)$ such that for all strategies $\sigma_3 : T_r \to A_3$, the resulting infinite branch in the tree T_r satisfies the parity objective α.

It follows from this that the (negation of the) original question $\forall \sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \cdot \exists \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2 \cdot \exists \sigma_4 \in \Sigma_4 \cdot \forall \sigma_3 \in \Sigma_3 : \rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1,\sigma_2,\sigma_3,\sigma_4} \in \alpha$ is equivalent to $\forall \sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \cdot \exists \sigma_{24} \in \Sigma_{24} \cdot \forall \sigma_3 \in \Sigma_3 : \rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1,\sigma_{24},\sigma_3} \in \alpha$ where $\Sigma_{24} = \mathcal{O}_2^+ \to (A_2 \times (Q \to A_4))$ is the set of strategies of a player (call it player 24) with observations $\mathcal{O}_2$ and action set $A_2' = A_2 \times (Q \to A_4)$, and the outcome $\rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1,\sigma_{24},\sigma_3}$ is defined as expected in a three-player game (played by player 1, player 24, and player 3) with transition function $\delta' : Q \times A_1 \times A_2' \times A_3 \to Q$ defined by $\delta'(q, a_1, (a_2, f), a_3) = \delta(q, a_1, a_2, a_3, f(q))$.

Hence the original question (and its negation) for four-player games reduces in polynomial time to solving a three-player game with the first player less informed than the second player. Hardness follows from the special case of three-player games.

Theorem 4. *The four-player decision problem with player 1 less informed than player 2, and perfect information for both player 3 and player 4 is 2-EXPTIME-complete for parity objectives.*

6 Applications

We now discuss applications of our results in the context of synthesis and qualitative analysis of two-player partial-observation stochastic games.

Sequential synthesis. The *sequential synthesis* problem consists of an open system of partially implemented modules (with possible non-determinism or choices) $M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n$ that need to be refined (i.e., the choices determined by strategies) such that the composite system after refinement satisfy a specification. The system is open in the sense that after the refinement the composite system is reactive and interact with an environment. Consider the problem where first a set $M_1, \ldots, M_k$ of modules are refined, then a set $M_{k+1}, \ldots, M_\ell$ are refined by an external implementor, and finally the remaining set of modules are refined. In other words, the modules are refined sequentially: first a set of modules whose refinement can be controlled, then a set of modules whose refinement cannot be controlled as they are implemented externally, and finally the remaining set of modules. If the refinements of modules $M_1, \ldots, M_\ell$ do not have access to private variables of the remaining modules we obtain a partial-observation game with four players: the first (existential) player corresponds to the refinement of modules $M_1, \ldots, M_k$, the second (universal) player corresponds to the refinement of modules $M_{k+1}, \ldots, M_\ell$, the third (existential) player corresponds to the refinement of the remaining modules, and the fourth (adversarial) player is the environment. If the second player has access to all the variables visible to the first player, then player 1 is less informed.

Two-player partial-observation stochastic games. Our results for four-player games imply new complexity results for two-player stochastic games. For qualitative analysis (positive and almost-sure winning) under finite-memory strategies for the players the following reduction has been established in [9, Lemma 1] (see Lemma 2.1 of the arxiv version): the probabilistic transition function can be replaced by a turn-based gadget consisting of two perfect-observation players, one angelic (existential) and one demonic (universal). The turn-based gadget is the same as used for perfect-observation stochastic games [4, 10]. In [9], only the special case of perfect observation for player 2 was considered, and hence the problem reduced to three-player games where only player 1 has partial observation and the other two players have perfect observation. In case where player 2 has partial observation, the reduction of [9] requires two perfect-observation players, and gives the problem of four-player games (with perfect observation for player 3 and player 4). Hence when player 1 is less informed, we obtain a 2-EXPTIME upper bound from Theorem 4, and obtain a 2-EXPTIME lower bound from Theorem 2 (since the three-player games problem with player 1 less informed for reachability objectives coincides with positive winning for two-player partial-observation stochastic games; see Section 10 in appendix for lower bound for almost-sure winning). Thus we obtain the following result.

Theorem 5. *The qualitative analysis problems (almost-sure and positive winning) for two-player partial-observation stochastic parity games where player 1 is less informed than player 2, under finite-memory strategies for both players, are 2-EXPTIME-complete.*

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Appendix

7 Detailed Proof of Theorem 2

We present the details of the strategy constructions to establish the correctness of the construction for the proof of Theorem 2.

Let Σ_i be the set of observation-based strategies of player i ($i = 1, 2, 3$) in G, and let Σ_i' be the set of observation-based strategies of player i ($i = 1, 2$) in H. We claim that the following statements are equivalent:

(1) In G, $\exists \sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \cdot \forall \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2 \cdot \exists \sigma_3 \in \Sigma_3 : \rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3} \in \alpha$.

(2) In H, $\exists \sigma_1' \in \Sigma_1' \cdot \forall \sigma_2' \in \Sigma_2' : \rho_{\{q_0\}}^{\sigma_1', \sigma_2'} \in \alpha'$.

The 2-EXPTIME result of the theorem follows from this equivalence because the game H is at most exponentially larger than the game G, and two-player partial-observation games with a parity objective can be solved in EXPTIME, and when player 1 is blind they can be solved in PSPACE [8]. Observe that when player 2 has perfect information, his observations are singletons and H is no bigger than G, and an EXPTIME bound follows in that case.

To show that (1) implies (2), let $\sigma_1 : \mathcal{O}_1^+ \to A_1$ be a strategy for player 1 such that for all strategies $\sigma_2 : \mathcal{O}_2^+ \to A_2$, there is a strategy $\sigma_3 : \mathcal{O}_3^+ \to A_3$ such that $\rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3} \in \alpha$. From σ_1, we construct an (infinite) DAG over state space $Q_H \times \mathcal{O}_1^+$ with edges labeled by elements of $A_2 \times \mathcal{O}_2$ defined as follows. The root is $(\{q_0\}, \mathsf{obs}_1(q_0))$. There is an edge labeled by $(b, o_2) \in A_2 \times \mathcal{O}_2$ from (s, ρ) to (s', ρ') if $s' = \mathsf{post}^G(s, a, b, -) \cap o_2 \neq \varnothing$ where $a = \sigma_1(\rho)$, and $\rho' = \rho \cdot o_1$ where $o_1 \in \mathcal{O}_1$ is the (unique) observation of player 1 such that $o_2 \subseteq o_1$. Note that for every node $n = (s, \rho)$ in the DAG, for all states $q \in s$, for all $b \in A_2, c \in A_3$, there is a successor $n' = (s', \rho')$ of n such that $\delta(q, a, b, c) \in s'$ where $a = \sigma_1(\rho)$. Consider a perfect-information turn-based game played over this DAG, between player 2 choosing actions $b \in A_2$ and player 3 choosing observations $o_2 \in \mathcal{O}_2$, resulting in an infinite path $(s_0, \rho_0)(s_1, \rho_1) \ldots$ in the DAG as expected, and that is defined to be winning for player 3 if the sequence $s_0 s_1 \ldots$ satisfies α'. We show that in this game, for all strategies of player 2 (which naturally define functions $\sigma_2 : \mathcal{O}_2^+ \to A_2$), there exists a strategy of player 3 (a function $f_3 : Q_H \times \mathcal{O}_1^+ \times A_2 \to \mathcal{O}_2^+$) to ensure that the resulting play satisfies α'. The argument is based on (1) saying that given the strategy σ_1 is fixed, for all strategies $\sigma_2 : \mathcal{O}_2^+ \to A_2$, there is a strategy $\sigma_3 : \mathcal{O}_3^+ \to A_3$ such that $\rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3} \in \alpha$. Given a strategy for player 2 in the game over the DAG, we use σ_3 to choose observations $o_2 \in \mathcal{O}_2$ as follows. We define a labelling function $\lambda : Q_H \times \mathcal{O}_1^+ \to Q$ over the DAG in a top-down fashion such that $\lambda(s, \rho) \in s$. First, let $\lambda(\{q_0\}, \mathsf{obs}_1(q_0)) = q_0$, and given $\lambda(s, \rho) = q$ with an edge labeled by (b, o_2) to (s', ρ'), let $\lambda(s', \rho') = \delta(q, a, b, c)$ where $a = \sigma_1(\rho)$ and $c = \sigma_3(\rho)$. Note that indeed $\delta(q, a, b, c) \in s'$. Now we define a strategy for player 3 that, in a node (s, ρ) of the DAG, chooses the observation $\mathsf{obs}_2(\delta(q, a, b, c))$ where $q = \lambda(s, \rho)$, $a = \sigma_1(\rho)$, b is the action chosen by player 2 at that node (remember we fixed a strategy for player 2), and $c = \sigma_3(\rho)$. Since $\lambda(s, \rho) \in s$, it follows that the resulting play satisfies α' since $\rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3}$ satisfies α.

By determinacy of perfect-information turn-based games [18], in the game over the DAG there exists a strategy f_3 for player 3 such that for all player-2 strategies, the outcome play satisfies α'. Using f_3, we construct a strategy σ_1' for player 1 in H as follows. First, by a slight abuse of notation, we identify the observations $o_1' \in \mathcal{O}_1'$ with the observation $o_1 \in \mathcal{O}_1$ such that $u \subseteq o_1$ for all $u \in o_1'$. For all $\rho \in \mathcal{O}_1^+$, let $\sigma_1'(\rho) = (a, f)$ where

$a = \sigma_1(\rho)$ and f is defined by $f(s, a_2) = f_3(s, \rho, a_2)$. By construction of the DAG and of the strategy σ_1', for all strategies of player 2 in H the outcome play $s_0 s_1 \ldots$ satisfies the parity objective α', and thus σ_1' is a winning observation-based strategy in H.

To show that (2) implies (1), let σ_1' be a winning observation-based strategy for the objective α' in H. Consider the DAG over state space $Q_H \times \mathcal{O}_1^+$ with edges labeled by elements of A_2 defined as follows. The root is $(\{q_0\}, \mathsf{obs}_1(q_0))$. For all nodes (s, ρ), for all $b \in A_2$, there is an edge labeled by b from (s, ρ) to (s', ρ') if $s' = \mathsf{post}^G(s, a, b, -) \cap o_2$ and $\rho' = \rho \cdot o_1$ where $o_2 = f(s, b)$ and $(a, f) = \sigma_1'(\rho)$, and $o_1 \in \mathcal{O}_1$ is the (unique) observation of player 1 such that $o_2 \subseteq o_1$. We say that (s', ρ') is the b-successor of (s, ρ). Note that for all $q' \in s'$, there exists $q \in s$ and $c \in A_3$ such that $q' = \delta(q, a, b, c)$.

This DAG mimics the unraveling of H under σ_1', and since σ_1' is a winning strategy, for all infinite paths $(s_0, \rho_0)(s_1, \rho_1) \ldots$ of the DAG, the sequence $s_0 s_1 \ldots$ satisfies α'.

Define the strategy σ_1 such that $\sigma_1(\rho) = a$ if $\sigma_1'(\rho) = (a, f)$ (again identifying the observations in $\mathcal{O}_1'$ and $\mathcal{O}_1$). To show that (1) holds, fix an arbitrary observation-based strategy σ_2 for player 2. The outcome play of σ_1 and σ_2 in H is the sequence $(s_0, \rho_0)(s_1, \rho_1) \ldots$ where (s_0, ρ_0) is the root, and such that for all $i \geq 1$, the node (s_i, ρ_i) is the b-successor of (s_{i-1}, ρ_{i-1}) where $b = \sigma_2(\mathsf{obs}_2(s_0 s_1 \ldots s_{i-1}))$ (where $\mathsf{obs}_2(s_i)$ is naturally defined as the unique observation $o_2 \in \mathcal{O}_2$ such that $s_i \subseteq o_2$). From this path in the DAG, we construct an infinite path $p_0 p_1 \ldots$ in G using König's Lemma [16] as follows. First, it is easy to show by induction (on k) that for every finite prefix $s_0 s_1 \ldots s_k$ and for every $p_k \in s_k$ there exists a path $p_0 p_1 \ldots p_k$ in G such that $p_i \in s_i$ for all $0 \leq i \leq k$. Note that $p_0 = q_0$ since $s_0 = \{q_0\}$ and that by definition of the DAG, for each s_{i+1} ($i = 0, \ldots, k - 1$), there exist $a \in A_1$, $b \in A_2$, and $o_2 \in \mathcal{O}_2$ such that $s_{i+1} = \mathsf{post}^G(s_i, a, b, -) \cap o_2$. Hence, given $p_{i+1} \in s_{i+1}$, there exist $c_i \in A_3$ and $p_i \in s_i$ such that $\delta(p_i, a, b, c_i) = p_{i+1}$.

Arranging all these finite paths in a tree, we obtain an infinite finitely-branching tree which by König's Lemma [16] contains an infinite branch $q_0 q_1 \ldots$ that is a path in G and such that $q_i \in s_i$ for all $i \geq 0$. Now we can construct the strategy σ_3 such that $\sigma_3(p_0 \ldots p_i) = c_i$. Since $s_0 s_1 \ldots$ satisfies α', it follows that $\rho_{q_0}^{\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3} = p_0 p_1 \ldots$ satisfies α, which completes the proof.

8 Three-player Games with Player 1 Perfect: Safety Objectives

We now discuss the main ideas for the decidability of three-player games with perfect observation for player 1 and safety objectives.

Safety objectives. We show that the three-player decision problem can be solved for games with a safety objective when player 1 has perfect information. The proof is using the *counting abstraction* of [6, Section 4.2 Journal version] and shows that the answer to the three-player decision problem for safety objective $\mathsf{Safe}(\mathcal{T})$ is YES if and only if there exists a winning strategy in the two-player counting-abstraction game with the safety objective to visit only counting functions (i.e., essentially tuples of natural numbers) with support contained in the target states $\mathcal{T}$. Intuitively, the counting abstraction is as follows: with every knowledge of player 2 we store a tuple of counters, one for each state in the knowledge. The counters denote the number of possible distinct paths to the states of the knowledge, and the abstraction treats large enough values as infinite (value ω). The counting-abstraction game is monotone with regards to the natural partial order over counting functions, and therefore it is well-structured and can be solved by computing a self-covering unraveling tree, i.e. a tree in which the successors of a node are constructed only if this node has no greater ancestor. The properties of well-structured systems (well-quasi-ordering and

König's Lemma) ensure that this tree is finite, and that there exists a strategy to ensure only supports contained in the target states $\mathcal{T}$ are visited if and only if there exists a winning strategy in the counting-abstraction game (in a leaf of the tree, one can copy the strategy played in a greater ancestor). It follows that the three-player decision problem for safety games is equivalent the problem of solving a safety game over this finite tree.

9 Remark about Strategy Quantifiers

We discuss the various possibilities of strategy quantifiers and information of the players in multi-player games. First, if there are two existential (resp., universal) players with incomparable information, then the decision question is undecidable [22, 23]; and if there is a sequence of existential (resp., universal) quantification over strategies players such that the information of the players form a chain (i.e., in the sequence of quantification over the players, let the players be $i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_k$ such that i_1 is more informed than i_2, i_2 more informed than i_3 and so on), then with repeated subset construction, the sequence can be reduced to one quantification [23, 17, 19]. Note however that if there is a quantifier alternation between existential and universal, then even if the information may form a chain, subset construction might not be sufficient: for example, if player 1 is perfect and player 2 has partial-information, non-elementary memory might be necessary (as shown in Section 4). We now discuss the various possibilities of strategy quantification in four-player games. Without loss of generality we consider that the first strategy quantifier is existential. The above argument for sequence of quantifiers (either undecidability with incomparable information or the sequence reduces to one) shows that we only need to consider the following strategy quantification: $\exists_1 \forall_2 \exists_3 \forall_4$, where the subscripts denote the quantification over strategies for the respective player. First, note that once the strategies of the first three players are fixed we obtain a graph, and similar to Remark 1 without loss of generality we consider that player 4 has perfect observation. We now consider the possible cases for player 3.

1. *Perfect observation.* The case when player 3 has perfect observation has been solved in the main paper (results of Section 5).

2. *Partial observation.* We now consider the case when player 3 has partial observation. If player 2 is less informed than player 1, then the problem is at least as hard as the problem considered in Section 4. If player 3 is less informed than player 2, then even in the absence of player 1, the problem is as hard as the negation of the question considered in Section 4 (where first a more informed player plays, followed by a less informed player, just the strategy quantifiers are $\forall_2 \exists_3 \forall_4$ as compared to $\exists_1 \forall_2 \exists_3$ considered in Section 4). Finally, if player 1 is less informed than player 2, and player 2 is less informed than player 3, then we apply our construction of Section 3 twice and obtain a double exponential size two-player partial-observation game which can be solved in 3-EXPTIME.

10 Remark about Theorem 5

We showed in Section 6 that the 2-EXPTIME lower bound for *positive* winning in two-player partial-observation stochastic games directly follows from Theorem 2.

The 2-EXPTIME lower bound for *almost-sure* winning is obtained by an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 2. We use the same reduction from exponential-space alternating Turing machines, with the following changes: (i) the third player is replaced by a uniform probability distribution over player-3's moves, thus the reduction is now to two-player

partial-observation stochastic games; (ii) instead of reaching a sink state when player 2 detects a mistake in the sequence of configurations announced by player 1, the game restarts in the initial state; thus the target state of the reachability objective is not reached, but player 1 gets another chance to faithfully simulate the Turing machine.

It follows that if the Turing machine accepts, then player 1 has an almost-sure winning strategy by faithfully simulating the execution. Indeed, either (a) player 2 never checks, or checks and counts correctly, and then player 1 wins since no mistake is detected, or (b) player 2 checks and cheats counting, and then player 2 is caught with positive probability (player 1 wins), and with probability smaller than 1 the counting cheat is not detected and thus possibly a (fake) mismatch in the symbol announced by player 1 is detected. Then the game restarts. Hence in all cases after finitely many steps, either player 1 wins with (fixed) positive probability, or the game restarts. It follows that player 1 wins the game with probability 1.

If the Turing machine rejects, then player 1 cannot win by a faithful simulation of the execution, and thus he should cheat. The strategy of player 2 is then to check and to count correctly, ensuring that the target state of the reachability objective is not reached, and the game restarts. Hence for all strategies of player 1, there is a strategy of player 2 to always avoid the target state (with probability 1), and thus player 1 cannot win almost-surely (he wins with probability 0). This completes the proof of the reduction for almost-sure winning.